# Daily Report

# East Europe

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10 January 1990

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*FBIS-EEU-90-007* *10 January 1990*

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## 45th CEMA Session Opens in Sofia

*AU0901145490 Sofia BTA in English 1301 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Excerpt] Sofia, January 9 (BTA)—[Passage omitted] Bulgaria's prime minister pointed out the important role of the CMEA [CEMA] for the socioeconomic progress of the member-states in its 40-years history.

Along with that he noted that during the last years the cooperation in the framework of the council has started to lose its actuality and dynamics. The difficulties and the shortcoming in the system of mutual cooperation are a reflection of the negative processes in the socioeconomic development of the member states, said Georgi Atanasov. He pointed out the need of radical reforms in the system of cooperation and integration.

The head of the Bulgarian Government stressed the favourable situation in the world for the development of economic communication with the capitalist and the developing countries.

He paid special attention to the opportunities for cooperation between the CMEA and the EEC on a multilateral as well as on a bilateral base.

A discussion started on the report of the Executive Committee on the activity of the CMEA during the period between the two last sessions and on fundamental questions of cooperation.

Mr Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the CMEA Executive Committee, stressed that this period has been unusual, dynamic and not an easy one for most of the CMEA member states. The efforts have been oriented toward the realization of most important national and socioeconomic tasks, toward the carrying out of deep economic and social reforms. The rate of the production growth in most of the countries was accompanied by difficulties, tension and instability, by unfavourable tendencies in the development of the mutual trade.

The cooperation in the material production did not assist adequately the growing of the quality and the technical level of the exchanged goods. Unsatisfactory are also the volume of the cooperated deliveries, the quality and reliability of the electronic technologies exchanged, the implementation of the program for economy of resources. The standards in the community have not been utilized sufficiently, their commitment to international standards has been poor.

The shortcomings of the cooperation in material production and the economic difficulties in the separate countries have a negative influence on the development of the barter. During the observed period the volume of the trade has remained almost at its previous level. The growth envisaged by the five-year trade agreements has not been realized.

Mr Andrey Lukanov expressed the position of the Executive Committee of the member states that the overcoming of the negative tendencies and the activation of the integration processes require not just simply an improvement but decisive and brave reforms of the entire system of cooperation, revolutionary review of the principles and mechanisms.

He spoke about the need of social orientation of the cooperation, for increase of its role in the solution of the food problems, for broadening of the production of industrial consumer goods. A number of modern forms of cooperation between the interested sides were also proposed.

Mr Andrey Lukanov pointed out that during the observed period activation of the economic and trade relations of the CMEA member-states with third countries has been noted. He noted the contribution of the favourable international political conditions to this end.

The cooperation of Vietnam with the USSR and the other CMEA [CEMA] member-states is a major factor for building socialism in the country, said Mr Vo Van Kiet, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam. He underlined that the multilateral and bilateral cooperation carried out within the CMEA is the result of an objective necessity.

At the same time the leader of the Vietnamese delegation pointed out that the model of integration within the organization and its mechanisms of cooperation are outdated and not up to the requirements life has set in the last years.

Vietnam considers that the CMEA should exist but that it should start functioning on an entirely new basis. Its model should be in line with the restructuring implemented in the member-countries of this organization. It is necessary to break with centralized planning and switch to a wide use of economic leverage. The integration processes should be advanced on a voluntary basis by complying with the principle of interests, thus guaranteeing the dynamic development of each country. The organization should be open for participation in the international division of labour and cooperation with different regional organizations.

Mr Vo Van Kiet proposed that a project for a new model of cooperation should be developed and that the programme for specialization and cooperation implemented on the basis of the old mechanisms should be revised. The two documents should be discussed at the next session of the CMEA.

Mr Hans Modrow, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, declared himself to be for a new quality of the CMEA multilateral cooperation which would make it possible to build the all-European economic space and fill in the technological gap between the East and the West.

Expressing concern over the situation of the economic and sci-technical cooperation within the CMEA, he

pointed out that it is necessary to determine in a new way its role, targets and structure and to work out new rules of the organization.

The improvement of the interaction among the CMEA member-countries should serve, first of all, for the stabilization of their economies. Mr Hans Modrow paid special attention to the strict fulfilment of all bilateral and multilateral agreements and the contracts for delivering goods and services.

The leader of the GDR Government sees the future of the economic relations in promoting the practice of direct contacts between production and scientific research units and bringing the conditions of cooperation within the CMEA in line with the requirements of the world market.

He proposed to reduce the time-limit for operative contractual prices from five to three years, to make wide use of economic leverage, to switch to payments in free convertible currency and to check the role of the transferable rouble as a unit of clearing accounts.

Mr Modrow spoke in favour of a gradual implementation of the reform in the mechanisms of cooperation.

The complex programme for sci-technical cooperation within the CMEA fell short of the planned vanguard targets, he said.

The necessity of making the CMEA standards compatible with the international standards and with the European ones in particular was also pointed out.

### Further on Opening

*LD0901194190 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Report by special correspondent Vladimir Vercak from Sofia on the 45th CEMA session]

[Text] The session itself was opened by Bulgarian Premier Georgi Atanasov. Then Andrey Lukyanov, chairman of the Executive Committee read the report on the development of CEMA since the last session in Prague in 1988. In it he very critically evaluated the past 18 months and said that it is a extraordinary period, dynamic and difficult. Characteristic of it is the struggle for national, social and economic, changes, tension and instability, which must be reflected in the work of CEMA as a whole.

The next part of today's agenda was dedicated to speeches by individual heads of delegations. With regard to the closed nature of the session, we were only informed in general about the content. However, even from this it is possible to learn that in most cases there was a requirement for radical reform, for making the activity of CEMA more economic, for the introduction of new forms of cooperation, which would be based on a market economy. Only the head of the Cuban delegation wanted the council to be built on purely socialist principles.

As we were informed by Marcel Jansen, the press spokesman of the CSSR delegation, its head, CSSR Premier Marian Calfa, in his speech said, among other things, that our country does not think that the council should continue its activity in its present form while relations between its members stand as they do. This is why we consider a fundamental revision of the present mechanism of cooperation between the CEMA member states on the basis of market principles common in world trade to be vital.

Concluding his speech, the CSSR leader said the session should include the requirement for member countries to put forward proposals for a change in the council's statutes and for the direction of its activity by the end of February 1990, and that the extraordinary 46th CEMA session which should take place in the first half of this year.

### CSSR Rejects Initial CEMA Agenda, Resolution

*LD0901200490 Prague Television Service in Czech 1830 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Jan Martinek report from Sofia on 45th CEMA Session]

[Text] The 45th CEMA session has opened here in the Sofia National Culture Palace shortly after 2100 accompanied with the great interest of newsmen and television companies from practically all world. The delegations of all 10 member countries of the council, the representatives of Yugoslavia, and seven other states with observer status are present.

The Czechoslovak delegation is headed by Marian Calfa, federal premier. Because the whole day's proceedings were closed to reporters, we asked Deputy Federal Premier Vladimir Dlouhy to briefly describe today's proceedings.

[Begin Dlouhy recording] Today's proceedings actually started last night, when the permanent representatives of CEMA countries held a brief evening session to hammer out today's agenda. After discussion within the CSSR Government, the CSSR had in advance and in writing rejected the draft agenda and rejected the prepared resolution. The main reason for rejecting the agenda was because it—so to speak—reflected the past inertia in CEMA's work. So after discussing the report of the Executive Committee on activity between the 44th and 45th CEMA sessions, we proposed to devote this entire meeting to truly fundamental and principle questions of the present situation and future CEMA work. Today's speech by Premier Marian Calfa was also drafted in this spirit. [end recording]

### Commission Formed 'To Work Out Radical Reform'

*AU1001074290 Sofia BTA in English 2312 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["CMEA: Cooperation or Business?"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, January 9 (BTA)—The CMEA has formed a commission which was given two or three months to work out a radical reform of the organization, it was revealed this evening at a news conference in connection with the 45th CMEA Session which is being held here. It was also indicated that today's meeting of the session may produce a compromise on the speed and the depth of the desired changes.

Representatives of the attending delegations, including Mr Vladimir Dlouhy, deputy prime minister of Czechoslovakia, pointed out that radical reforms should actually be perceived as a return to market economy and the appropriate trade.

"If we still don't know what sort of CMEA we need, at least we know what sort of CMEA we don't want," a Romanian delegation member said. "We don't need an organization which imposes mandatory state- level decisions. The CMEA should not develop as a closed system but should secure an integration into Europewide cooperation and into the international division of labour."

The Czechoslovak delegation said that cooperation should be discarded in favour of business, profits and welfare for all member countries which is unattainable within the old framework.

Mr Peter Medesi, deputy chairman of Hungary's Council of Ministers, called into question the possibility of integration among countries with undeveloped market. Along with that, he noted the approximately identical economic level of the states introducing market mechanisms. Mr Medesi sees this as a chance of establishing an integration inner circle between Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. This matter has not been discussed but there are plans to raise it.

## Speeches Before 45th CEMA Session Reported

### Hungary's Nemeth

*LD0901154190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1500 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] The CEMA summit has begun in the Bulgarian capital. The consultations were previously postponed several times because the governments concerned believed that it would make sense to hold the meeting only if they did not spend their time spouting cliches. It appears that the first speaker, who was the Hungarian premier, spoke in this spirit.

At the aforementioned session of the CEMA in Sofia, Premier Miklos Nemeth, in his speech, said that the organization must change its basis. Otherwise it will cease to exist. According to unofficial reports, Miklos Nemeth said that new forms of cooperation must be developed, primarily, and a special working group must be set up to work this out.

### Nemeth's 4-Point Proposal

*LD0901210290 Budapest MTI in English 1954 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia, January 9 (MTI)—Addressing the 45th CMEA session in Sofia, Hungarian Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth welcomed the democratic changes within the member states, and the spreading idea of Pan-European cooperation, and emphasized that the situation and role of the CMEA should be reinterpreted.

The prime minister spoke about Hungary's economic renewal and the democratization of political institutions.

The CMEA is a product of political division in Europe, Mr Nemeth said. Its consequences include a deformed system of contractual prices, separated from both the world market prices and the internal pricing system of the particular countries, the lack of realistic value relations, and the prevalence of a quantitative approach. The prime minister criticized the idea of creating a unified market as a premature concept disregarding the concrete situation and potentials, and the series of gigantomanic resolutions, which turned the history of the CMEA into the history of unrealized decisions.

Mr Nemeth said that the only way out was offered by an economic opening which requires a series of measures. We have been stressing for years, he said, that the new model of cooperation should be based on the consistent application of the value relations of the world market, and accompanied by the introduction of a new monetary system within the CMEA.

In the foreseeable time, the CMEA countries should adapt themselves to the world economy, Mr Nemeth said. Transition to the new model should be a gradual process, taking the different economic situation, level of development and system of econmic management of the member states into account. The member countries prepared for more rapid advance should further develop further cooperation in bilateral frames or with the participation of a few countries.

Mr Nemeth proposed to modernize cooperation in standardization, criticized the comprehensive programme of the member states' scientific and technical progress until the year 2000, and stated that the conditions for plan coordination were missing. He said that the Hungarian state would limit its obligations to the supply of the most important strategic products.

Instead of plan coordination, the member states should rather bring their economic policy strategies into harmony, and grant a wide scope to the market-based cooperation of companies.

In the future, the coexistence of the various models of cooperation seems to be a realistic concept and the two-circle solution a conceivable idea. In the first circle, the CMEA, radical changes are required to develop a set of means, enabling the countries, which reached a different level of development and made different progress

in opening towards the world market, to harmonize their cooperaiton. The second, inner circle would imply closer cooperation between the countries prepared to introduce a market economy. The CMEA should make efforts to harmonize the various models of cooperation, enabling a growing number of CMEA countries to embark on the road of integration. On behalf of the Hungarian Government, Mr Nemeth put forward the following four-point proposal:

1. In the first half of 1990, the Executive Committee should concentrate its efforts on elaborating the main elements of the new system of cooperation.

2. The provisional work group headed by Academician Oleg Bogomolov should work out the concrete elements of the new conception of cooperation.

3. The sectoral commissions and committees should suspend their work, and the functional commissions get involved in the activity of the provisional work group until the new system of cooperation has been elaborated.

4. The above tasks should be fulfilled by the autumn of 1990 so that the prime ministerial session should be able to pass appropriate decisions on the sweeping transformation of economic cooperation.

### Further on Nemeth Speech

*AU0901212290 Sofia BTA in English 1934 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia, January 9 (BTA)—Mr Miklos Nemeth, chairman of the Council of Ministers of Hungary, expressed his country's firm conviction that the further cooperation within the CMEA [CEMA] depends on the possibility to switch to a new updated model of interaction the soonest possible.

Hungary sees the new model in the pursuit of market-type cooperation based on the consistent application of world market value relations, combining it with the introduction of a new currency system in the CMEA member-countries.

The transition to this new model can be realised only by taking into account the difference in the economic situation in the individual CMEA member-countries, the level of their development and the considerable differences in the internal systems of management applied in their economies.

Mr Miklos Nemeth pointed out that as there are such differences, it will be impossible to update simultaneously the economic cooperation among all CMEA members. Those countries which are ready for a more accelerated development will have to step up the improvement of cooperation within the framework of bilateral relations or with the participation of several countries.

Concerning the improvement of cooperation in the field of standardization, he spoke in favour of accepting only those standards which are up to the contemporary international requirements. These standards should be applied only by the countries which are prepared adequately for it.

As far as coordination of plans is concerned, the Hungarian side considers that it should be gradually abandoned and that the way should be cleared for carrying out market-type cooperation in the sphere of enterprises that enjoy complete independence.

Mr Miklos Nemeth pointed out that the results of the implementation of the comprehensive programme for scientific and technological progress hitherto achieved fell short of the expectations at the time it was worked out.

### Nemeth on CEMA Renewal

*LD1001093190 Budapest MTI in English 0825 GMT 10 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia, January 10 (MTI)—The CMEA should be entirely renewed rather than dissolved. Hungary advocates the transformation of bilateral relations between the member states yet before the introduction of dollar accounting and world market prices. Until then, the CMEA relations should be frozen, Hungarian Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth told the correspondent of the Finnish Radio on Tuesday.

The Hungarian premier stressed that there were major differences between the economies of the CMEA member countries: Hungary and Poland have started to establish a market-based economy while the other member states have not yet made such steps.

In the first stage, a market mechanism should be established everywhere. After that, a market-based economic integration could be created in three to five years. To transform the CMEA into an organization like the Common Market would require 15-20 years.

In reply to a question whether Hungary would leave the CMEA if the Sofia meeting proved to be a failure, Mr Nemeth said: If the CMEA reform failed, the Hungarian Government should reconsider the whole affair. In any case, in the past ten years Hungary has made some steps towards the EEC and EFTA [European Free Trade Association] countries.

### CSSR's Calfa

*LD0901221790 Prague CTK in English 1920 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia Jan 9 (CTK) - The Czechoslovak government confirmed its interest in radical changes within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in its program statement of December 19, 1989, Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa stated here today adding that together with other members "we do not consider the continuation of the council's activity in the present forms of relations between its members possible."

Addressing the 45th CMEA session which opened here today, Marian Calfa pointed out that "Czechoslovakia's economy was already in the pre-war period comparable with the standard of the most advanced European states. However, today we stand before accounting for the losses caused by artificial separation of our economy from the resources of modern technologies and equipment and from the advantages of the world division of labour. Not once have we been—against our will—deprived of the possibility to follow up the traditions of asserting our national industry in the world. Our aim is therefore the restoration of Czechoslovakia's natural and reliable position in the world economy and in Europe in particular."

Marian Calfa further stated that the implementation of this goal will require time and several interlinked steps, among them a radical reform of the Czechoslovak economy and also enforcement of "such changes in economic relations between the CMEA member states that would make it possible to introduce the conditions of world trade without any greater shocks." This should be in fact the chief task of Council in the future, the premier said adding that the Council should create a basis for an effective system of consultations and possibly, if all sides are interested, also coordination in the search for the necessary measures in the sphere of economic, scientific-technological, ecological and social progress. "We therefore unequivocally link Cezchoslovakia's interest in a new concept of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance with the extent to which our share in cooperation within CMEA would contribute to achieving the goals and natural needs of the economic and social development of Czechoslovakia," Marian Calfa said.

Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa further stated: "We thus consider a basic revision of the present mechanism of economic cooperation between the CMEA member states on the basis of market principles usual in world trade as absolutely essential. At the same time we are aware that although we abandon the present forms of trade, new trade opportunities will be created at the same time. In any case we will not precisely define Czechoslovakia's specific relations with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and the extent of Czechoslovakia's involvement, until after the changes to which we want to contribute by our effort have been carried out. This includes discussions on the cancellation of agreements and contracts such as the Karl-Marx-Stadt agreement, which hinders the application of market principles in the linkage of national economies, and thus also purposeful and effective cooperation."

Speaking about the main directions and considerations in the formation of a new shape in the organization of cooperation, Marian Calfa said "they are based on the fact that a united CMEA market, as it is conceived in the resolutions of the 43rd (extraordinary) and 44th sessions of the CMEA, notably as the culmination of the regional integration with the final horizon at the end of this century, is neither a realistic nor a substantiable goal in the new conditions of functioning of Czechoslovak political and economic life."

"We set ourselves different aims which, in our view, are very topical and realizable in the next few years. They involve the implementation of basic changes in the content of membership of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, changes which will respect the reality of economic and political development in a number of the member states. In the case of Czechoslovakia this means to respect the creation of a plural democratic system and transition to market economy".

"In our opinion the CMEA—now an inter-governmental organization competent to make its acts binding for the member states—should turn into a platform for consultations and for the creation of a contractual system suiting our requirements. Besides the government level it will also be necessary to assess the share of the parliaments in the representation of the member states in the newly conceived organization."

"We take it as a reality that sufficient conditions are not created at present for the functioning of the market within the CMEA. This is why it is necessary to create a contractual system which would react to the fact that in 1995 at the latest the conditions of the world market and the chief subject in mutual trade will be the enterprise and not the state".

"The ways to this aim will not be straight and it will be necessary to make use of all the possibilities as well as various forms of cooperation between the Council's member states to achieve the set aim. I mean by this bilateral and multilateral measures in introducing new conditions of mutual trade. At the same time it will be necessary to solve what to do with the transferable rouble and how to integrate the national currencies in this process", Marian Calfa stressed.

Marian Calfa recalled the proposal submitted by the Soviet premier that topical prices of the world markets be used in mutual trade gradually beginning from 1991, and accounting be done only in freely convertible currencies. The Czechoslovak side could accept the proposal in principle if it is designed as a universal transition to the conditions of world trade.

The premier pointed out that "if the CMEA is now to switch over to accounting in free currencies and to topical prices on the world markets, it is necessary to switch over fully to the regimen of world trade. This means, however, to revise all mutual economic agreements and formulate them in a new way. The principal issue in this point is a mutual system opening of our markets."

Marian Calfa further stated that the transition to the world market prices and to accounting in free currencies represents a complex economic manoeuvre which will require, as far as the Czechoslovak side is concerned,

basic changes in the Czechoslovak economy, especially in its development strategy, bringing considerable economic and social pressures.

"The priorities of Czechoslovakia's economic policy required by the present state of its economy are to maintain the relative stability of the internal market and the balance of payments, to carry out dramatic steps in the economic reform as well as to ensure an increase in the technical and technological level of production, its competitiveness and effectiveness. It is evident from what has been said here that this is not just our problem. We believe that the effectiveness of the national programmes of renewal of internal and economic balance, which are being prepared in a number of CMEA member states, would increase if the possibilities of taking advantage of mutual cooperation in the solution of these tasks were used simultaneously," the Czechoslovak premier emphasized.

### Further on Calfa Speech

*LD0901203190 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1900 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa took the floor at the 45th CEMA session. He said in his speech that in the majority of European member states of the council, the political situation has radically changed. Czechoslovakia does not consider possible the continuation of CEMA activity in its current form of relations between its members. Our aim is to find again a natural and a reliable place for Czechoslovakia in the world economy and particularly in Europe. We therefore see as an important and demanding step the implementation of such changes in the economic relations among the CEMA countries which will make it possible to implement the conditions of world trade without extensive commotion.

Federal Premier Marian Calfa emphasized that Czechoslovakia will define exactly its specific relations and extent of our participation in the council only after the changes that it wants to help make are implemented. This involves the implementation of key changes in the content of membership in CEMA, which will respect the reality of economic and political development in member countries, and this means in the case of Czechoslovakia to respect the creation of a pluralistic and democratic system and a switch to a market economy.

### Poland's Mazowiecki

*LD0901234390 Warsaw PAP in English 2300 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["Mazowiecki's Address to CMEA (CEMA) Session (Abridged)"—PAP headline]

[Text] Sofia, Jan. 9—Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki delivered an address at the 45th session of the CMEA here today. Excerpts:

We consider it an urgent need to make radical changes within the CMEA.

The resolutions of the 43rd and 44th CMEA sessions have turned out to be ineffective so far, this ensuing, in our view, from an inefficient, centralized mechanism of cooperation, and especially of trade, binding in economic relations between CMEA countries. We must strive to overcome this status quo. We are of the opinion that significant changes are indispensable in this respect.

Political and economic changes which we have introduced in Poland do not jeopardize the interests of our partners. We confirm that our earlier commitments are binding. Our reforms carried out consistently and by peaceful means not only stabilize our internal situation but also eliminate the factor of uncertainty in foreign relations.

We come out in favour of the real and not declarative, radical restructuring of the principles of coordination of our economic ventures. One should aim to limit settlements at the central level and to increase the role of enterprises in negotiating mutual co- production, scientific and trade ties.

In our opinion governments should guarantee the realization of agreements signed at the central level at the initial stage till 1995 in order to ensure stable supplies of raw materials and fuels. Whereas the remaining turnover should be negotiated by enterprises and come under their civil and legal responsibility.

A deep transformation of the socio-economic system taking place in Poland aims at basing it on market mechanisms, introducing deep changes of ownership and opening our economy to the world.

We want to do this quickly by radical means so as to cut the period of transition so burdensome for society to the shortest possible time.

We continue to actively come our in favour of urgently creating a new model of economic cooperation between our countries, a system which would be based on market parameters of the cost-and-effect account, and on recognizing an independent enterprise as the main link in bi- and multilateral cooperation between our countries.

This will make it possible to assess the measurable profits of cooperation and will significantly stimulate its development. This is the main reason why we are coming out in favour of cooperation based on principles applied in the world practice, that is the tested and effective market solutions.

We must frankly admit that the economy of the CMEA countries is stagnant. The progress in living standards in most of these countries does not correspond to social aspirations in this respect. Sharp social conflicts have accumulated in many a country. The condition of ecology and health is alarming and the housing problems have not been solved. The tourist traffic between our

countries has been reduced as a result of stricter customs regulations and the discriminatory treatment of the arriving tourists.

We score poor effects in scientific and technological cooperation, especially at the stage of application. The gap is growing between CMEA countries and technologically developed ones as regards the technical standards in the majority of production and consumption areas. This is the biggest shortcoming in our economic cooperation.

Profound transformations in the socio-economic systems in our countries and a completely new situation which has developed now make fundamental changes of mechanisms of CMEA countries' cooperation an imperative of the day.

Meanwhile, as I know, work on the restructuring carried on various levels is under way for more than two years now. Various groups kept discussing things but there was no progress despite the fact that appropriate decisions were made by the CMEA sessions. The restructuring was hampered both by the lack of consolidation of our economies and by contradictory interests of member countries.

We propose that, while not waiting for the full shape of market commodity-and-money relations and for full consolidation of markets in particular CMEA countries, we start fundamental changes in the mechanisms and rules of multilateral cooperation as well as join the world trend of scientific and technological progress as soon as possible.

We think that our cooperation should now concentrate on two basic problems.

First, on the problem of consistency in introducing a market economy in our countries to a greater or smaller extent and on the issue of cooperation between our countries, based on principles tested in international relations.

Second, on the problem of effectively joining the ongoing processes in world economy and the creation of all-European economic integration.

In our opinion, the direction of changes should be determined by basing cooperation between CMEA countries on market rules.

We put forward a motion that the session appoint a special working group to possibly shortly work out proposals on switching economic relations between CMEA countries to market mechanisms of cooperation.

We understand that the process of transforming the CMEA will require a specific period of time but we believe that it will be short. This cannot hinder our to-date cooperation.

Therefore, taking into consideration the current needs of this cooperation, we propose that the executive committee urgently verify the principles that have been binding in the CMEA so far with a view to immediately liberalizing them and making their use optional.

Poland is ready to start to apply new solutions immediately, even only with those countries which will voice their readiness to this. To test those solutions even by a group of a few countries may become a kind of an "economic laboratory" which may encourage other countries and speed up the process of practically approaching world terms of economic cooperation and trade.

### Warsaw Radio Reports Mazowiecki Speech

*LD0901194790 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] CEMA is deliberating behind closed doors in Sofia. Opening the meeting, Bulgarian Premier Georgiy Atanasov stressed that the meeting is taking place at a moment of great transformations in Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki, speaking at this forum, said, among other things: We must tell each other frankly that the economies of the CEMA countries find themselves in stagnation. In most of the countries the progress being attained in the level and standard of living does not correspond with people's aspirations. Severe social conflicts have arisen in many countries. The situation in the ecological and health spheres is alarming. Housing problems have not been resolved. Tourists' movement between our countries is being subjected to limitation. We are achieving minor results in scientific and technical cooperation. The gap in technological expertise relative to highly developed countries is growing in the majority of production and consumption areas.

Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki proposed that the session create a special working group for the formulation of proposals for the transformation of economic relations among CEMA countries to market mechanisms of cooperation, and also changes in the principles of the functioning and statute of the CEMA.

### Further on Mazowiecki, Calfa Speeches

*AU0901225090 Sofia BTA in English 2136 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia, January 9 (BTA)—Mr Tadeusz Mazowiecki, chairman of Poland's Council of Ministers, also declared himself in favour of radical changes in the CMEA. He said that the last two sessions' decisions on restructuring the organization had failed to produce the desired result because of the ineffective centralized mechanism of cooperation still retained in the economic relations among the member countries.

He indicated that the changes should be effected proceeding from the countries' right to a free choice of the

mode of their socio-economic development and of the extent of their participation in the cooperation.

The Polish head of government said that the centralized coordination should be limited and at the same time enterprises should be given a greater role in establishing production, scientific and commercial contacts.

Poland believes that cooperation should focus on two major aspects: first, on the effects of the introduction of a market economy to a larger or lesser extent in the member countries and of intra-community cooperation based on principles tested in international relations; secondly, on an effective integration into the processes unfolding in the world economy and into the formation of Europe-wide economic integration. The changes should proceed in a direction determined by the fact that the activity of the CMEA member countries is based on the laws of the market. It should be clear, however, that this will take a transitional period.

It was suggested that the session form a special working group to draft at utmost short notice suggestions for a transition of intra-community economic relations to market mechanisms in cooperation. This group should also work out suggestions for the respective changes in the principles of operation and in the charter.

Mr Tadeusz Mazowiecki stressed Poland's readiness to start immediately the implementation of the new decisions if only with the countries which would reciprocate this readiness.

Mr Marian Calfa, prime minister of Czechoslovakia, expressed his country's opinion that the activity of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance cannot go on in its present form. It is our target to restore Czechoslovakia to her natural place in the world economy and, first of all, in Europe.

The leader of Czechoslovakia's Government pointed out how important it is to implement the reform in economic relations without major cataclysms. He said that this is the most important role of the CMEA today. In his opinion the targets outlined at the previous sessions for the establishment of a single CMEA market and the completion of the regional integration by the end of the century are neither realistic, nor acceptable from the point of view of the new political and economic system in Czechoslovakia. The CMEA should not take moves binding on its member-countries but turn into a platform for consultations. Besides the governments of the CMEA member-countries, their parliaments should also be enlisted in the working out of the new concept of the organization.

Mr Marian Calfa said that the CMEA member-countries should begin to exchange information about all measures taken as to their internal pricing policy. The matter raised will include a new trade regime and new conditions for the entry of economic organizations in the national markets.

Expressing dissatisfaction with the present statute of the CMEA, Czechoslovakia's representative stressed that its new variant should be based on the universally accepted rules and principles of state-to-state relations. He expressed his country's readiness to work out proposals for infusing the CMEA membership with a new meaning and a new statute and to organize the discussion of these documents by experts in March 1990.

In connection with the Soviet proposal for a transition to convertible currency at current world prices in the commercial exchanges within the CMEA, Mr Calfa said that in principle his country accepts it as a universal approach, but he pointed out that it will entail very complicated problems of generally economic and legal natures in bilateral relations. He expressed fears that it could result in discrimination of partners and unilateral advantage.

In conclusion the speaker suggested that the CMEA member-countries should present their proposals for the amendment of the statute and the lines along which the CMEA should carry out its activity by the end of February this year.

### Report on Mazowiecki, USSR's Ryzhkov

*LD0901210190 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1830 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] The 45th CEMA session is being held in Sofia. The economy of CEMA members is in stagnation, and heads of governments discussed how to end this stagnation. The gap between the leading industrialized countries of the world and the 10 CEMA countries is becoming larger all the time, and only radical economic reforms and an immediate change in CEMA mechanisms can avert these tendencies. Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki spoke, inter alia, about this, and his was not the solitary voice:

[Begin Mazowiecki recording] We announced that we aim at radically changing CEMA, in the sense that [illegible] prises and direct contacts between them become the main factor, but certain basic things concerning raw materials and fuels, in particular, will have to be guaranteed at the governmental level. It is also necessary to create such mechanisms so that cooperation takes place directly among the enterprises and that they become the guiding factor for prices and mutual relations. We propose that a special group, which would work out the restructuring of CEMA, the changing of its status, be set up. Instead of using existing bodies, a special group for this purpose should be set up, because we think that only in a special way is it possible to implement this task, and not in the current petrified framework. If certain CEMA countries are not yet prepared to go over to the new methods of cooperation, Poland is ready to immediately enter the new methods of cooperation with those countries which would be ready for them. Such cooperation among a number of countries could constitute some kind of an economic laboratory. [end recording]

The restructuring of CEMA meets the strategic interests of the Soviet Union, Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov said:

[Begin Ryzhkov recording in Russian, with superimposed Polish translation] I think that today's CEMA meeting will allow for the working out of a new, fundamental approach to how, in future, we are to shape new mechanisms, mutual relations, and new principles of cooperation. I think they ought to be completely reworked. Half of the heads of delegations expressed themselves in favor of this. I did not hear anyone talk about the dissolution of CEMA. Everyone is talking about the renewal of the Council. That is why I am deeply convinced—and this is the position of the Soviet side—that we need CEMA, but that we need a completely different CEMA. [end recording]

All the speeches were interesting, and they confirm the opinion that this session will be crucial to the future of CEMA. Nevertheless, the name will not be changed. However, there will certainly be new arrangements and new methods. Proceedings end tomorrow with the signings of protocols and agreements, and within them, a reply to the question: Will CEMA manage to overcome the crisis with which it is afflicted?

### Further on Ryzhkov Speech

For the "text" of the 9 January speech by N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at the 45th CEMA session in Sofia, see the Communist Relations section of the 10 January Soviet Union DAILY REPORT.

### Cuba's Rodriguez; Mongolian Premier

*AU0901220190 Sofia BTA in English 1937 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia, January 9 (BTA)—Dr Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, vice president of the State Council and of the Council of Ministers of Cuba, voiced the member countries' concern over the problems which the CMEA [CEMA] encounters and declared himself in favour of reforms intended to rally the community. He does not deem it necessary that the council should renounce already established principles and expressed the view that the introduction of market economy elements in interaction does not necessarily mean that the markets themselves would benefit.

According to the Cuban head of delegation, the combination of different forms of ownership, the private one included (there is no private property in Cuba) should not erode the decisive role of state ownership.

Dr Carlos Rafael Rodriguez pointed out that the plan should not be conceived as some limitation and that long-term development can only be guaranteed on the basis of a plan. "It should be borne in mind," he went on to say, "that the advanced capitalist countries have borrowed planning from the socialist states."

He indicated that capitalist market prices should not be idealized and that even on that market the advanced countries apply a system of preferential prices in their relations with the underdeveloped countries. All suggested pricing reforms within the CMEA should be consistent with the principles of levelling the stages of development.

Dr Carlos Rafael Rodriguez agreed with the opinions that the comprehensive programme for scientific and technological progress is being inadequately fulfilled and said that the council was far from achieving positive results in that area.

Mr Dumaagiyn Sodnom, chairman of Mongolia's Council of Ministers, pointed out that the new mechanism of cooperation presupposes above all an improvement of pricing in reciprocal trade and the establishment of an effective system of monetary and lending relations. Active joint efforts are needed in the specialisation and cooperation of the production of major types of machines, equipment, and materials to set up highly efficient production structures in the less developed CMEA member countries.

In Mongolia's view the reform of the CMEA standardization matches the tasks of a further advancement of mutual cooperation and of restructuring the council's mechanism.

### SFRY's Pajkovik, Roman, Atanasov Speeches

*AU0901230290 Sofia BTA in English 2153 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia, January 9 (BTA)—Mr Branimir Pajkovic, member of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia, said that the share of the trade with the CMEA [CEMA] member-countries within his country's total turnover has dropped from 40 to 30 per cent in the last years. He pointed out that Yugoslavia's trade balance with some CMEA member-countries is positive, which has an unfavourable effect on foreign trade and economic relations as a whole. According to him the transition to market criteria in carrying out cooperation and creating conditions for making payments in convertible currency will help settle the now-existing problems.

Yugoslavia's representative stressed the positive impression the economic reforms in the CMEA member-countries have made. This is a prerequisite for establishing more efficient economic relations not only among the CMEA member-countries but with other countries too.

The participants in the session were familiarized with the economic reforms in Yugoslavia and it was particularly stressed that their strategic targets are similar to those pursued with the changes of the economic mechanisms in the CMEA member-countries.

Prof Petre Roman, prime minister of Romania, expressed gratitude on behalf of the Romanian people,

the National Salvation Front and the Romanian Government for the solidarity and the support to the Romanian Revolution of the CMEA member countries.

He briefed the participants on the current situation in Romania and on the ideas and the programme of the revolution.

The idea is to secure economic and political stability in Romania on the basis of national consensus. In future the country will rely on more help from the friendly countries to utilize the major economic capacities which were built without economic justification but are anyway there.

Prof Petre Roman pointed out that the changes in the socialist countries have eliminated many of the problems existing in their relations.

The Romanian head of government emphasized that the transitional period in the cooperation among the CMEA member countries which is being discussed will only work if there is a way to build a structure consistent to a considerable extent with the interests of each country.

Certainly, the CMEA now has an objectively existing basis: the structure of existing relationships, he said, stressing that Romania would like to see a rapid progress of bilateral relations as they can be realized much faster and much more efficiently.

Prof Petre Roman went on to expound some of his ideas about CMEA's future development, stressing the need for a speedy integration of the council's member countries into the processes of European and world development.

Mr Georgi Atanasov, chairman of Bulgaria's Council of Ministers, indicated that cooperation within the CMEA could now emerge as a key factor of the accelerated growth and restructuring of the member countries' economies.

In his view, in essence the new approach to cooperation in the CMEA should be based on the commodity producers' profit motive and enterprise. The only possible way in which this motive could be manifested is a really functioning market, the head of the Bulgarian delegation said. He pointed out that the formation of an integrated socialist market becomes particularly important for the overall progress of further cooperation. The efforts in this direction so far have proved ineffective because of substantive differences in the approaches and the stands of the individual countries, but the new situation opens up an opportunity for a new approach based on a common understanding of these processes.

Mr Georgi Atanasov said that Bulgaria was convinced of the need to work out soon a common concept about the integrated market. Specific interrelated steps could be taken right now.

Bulgaria believes that the CMEA should go through a transitional period during which specific steps will be taken for the speediest possible transition to regulated market relations and for a reciprocal adaptation of the national economic and legal mechanisms.

The trade, economic and technical barriers should be removed in commerce, trade should be liberalized and the commodity producers should be allowed access to each other's national markets, Mr Georgi Atanasov said.

He agreed that the CMEA needs radical restructuring. He viewed the coordination of the economic development plans for the next five years as a factor securing the necessary balance in the national economies.

Mr Georgi Atanasov pointed out that contract prices should be adjusted to the current world prices. "It would be right to lay down specific mechanisms for the collective encouragement and regulation of the production and consumption of commodity groups in short supply on our markets, such as farm products and foods, a number of high-technology products and information technology systems," he said.

This evening the heads of delegation held a separate session. The session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance will be resumed tomorrow.

## GDR's Modrow

*LD1001121790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1100 GMT 10 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia (ADN)—The GDR bases its proposals for reforms in CEMA on the assumption that cooperation with the USSR and the other CEMA countries continues to be of essential importance for its national economy. Premier Hans Modrow emphasized this during the discussions at the 45th CEMA Council meeting in Sofia. The system of cooperation to date has been characterized by administrative and autarchical endeavors in member states.

Mutual trade had been geared to a large extent to balancing trade deficits; criteria of efficiency have played only a subordinate role. International specialization is limited to end products, and cooperation between branches is completely inadequate. Direct cooperation was made almost impossible because of the bureaucracy, Hans Modrow said.

The future work of CEMA must be a component of worldwide cooperation. There are quite different requirements for this than has been the case in the past. The GDR has made a consistent break with its underestimation of cooperation between branches. It is necessary to effect a reduction in the excessively wide range of products, in particular in mechanical engineering, and also to increase the series in mechanical engineering as an important condition for the competitiveness of the products on the world market.

The main cooperation partners, according to a further GDR observation, must be the economic units and the scientific institutions. The GDR will create conditions

for this and for overcoming the administrative interpretation of the foreign trade monopoly. The relations between the enterprises of the different countries must be developed on an economic basis. This means recognition of the conditions of the world market in all foreign relations, which is bound up with far-reaching consequences and even structural policy.

The GDR is in favor of a transitional solution over the next few years, and a reduction of the basic time period for prices from 5 to 3 years. In this connection, answers must be found to questions such as that of the future role of the convertible rouble, the fixing of its rate against capitalist currencies, the rates between the national currencies and their economic performance, the adjustment to the regulations governing international trade, and the possible creation of a free trade zone of the CEMA countries. All questions of a change in the mechanism of cooperation, including the prospect of the creation of a single market for the cema countries, are related to the achievement of economic reform in the countries themselves. This applies to the free exchange of goods, services, and labor, as well as the need for the development of an internal pricing system closely linked to the prices on the main commodities markets.

The GDR proposed that the Executive Committee be instructed to prepare, for the next Council meeting, concrete proposals for the reshaping of the mechanism of cooperation, including simplification of the structure of the CEMA organs. At the same time it is necessary to revise the statute of the economic organizations.

## Leaders' Assessments of CEMA Activities

### Romania's Roman Statement

*AU0901222290 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 2030 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Report on statement by Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman in Sofia; date not given—recorded]

[Text] In connection with the agenda of the CEMA session convened in Sofia and our country's viewpoints presented during the discussion, Prime Minister Petre Roman made a statement to our special envoy Ion Ciucu:

[Begin Roman recording] The session which opened today, although supposedly an ordinary meeting, has actually been extraordinary by virtue of its contents. From the very beginning, we decided to discuss basic issues. In this respect, the question was raised whether CEMA still represents the East Europe of today, that is, the Europe where profound renewal and democratic changes are taking place. There is a consensus that CEMA should undergo serious reform in order to become a useful instrument, in view of the fact that in recent years it has been an inefficient body.

There are specific problems which CEMA could solve with greater efficiency than has been the case to date, namely, issues pertaining to production-sharing and the clarification of existing conventions. Of course, we emphasized that our country is currently interested in the issue of bilateral ties, which have a greater mobility than the entire CEMA body, which should start moving. These bilateral ties can pinpoint more easily various existing opportunities for trade, cooperation, and exchanges. It is worthwhile mentioning the fact that all East European countries expressed the desire for direct ties and cooperation between enterprises, which would better agree with the given situation in each individual country and would represent an improvement on past relations.

I also had talks with the chairman of Bulgaria's Council of Ministers, Mr Atanasov, and with Mr Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. I can tell you that, as far as direct ties are concerned, there are good prospects for cooperation in this respect. We also discussed various concrete aspects, the details of which can be worked out by our experts and by managers of ministries, enterprises, central departments, and so forth, in order to agree on useful links between our countries.

Generally speaking, we believe that our participation in this session is quite important. It reflects the current position of our country, which has finished off dictatorship and has entered, thanks to our revolution, into a period of profound and true democratic changes. I presented this position during my speech, which met with understanding from our East European partners. Thank you very much [end recording]

### Modrow Urges 'Fundamental Change'

*LD0901155190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1436 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Excerpts] Sofia (ADN)—The present situation demands, in all urgency, fundamental change and improvement in CEMA cooperation, GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow said today at the 45th CEMA meeting in Sofia. The GDR assumes, here, that the deepening of cooperation in the CEMA must be effected in conjunction with the active participation of the CEMA countries in the worldwide division of labor. On the basis of intensified integration of the CEMA countries in this international division of labor and the economic reforms tackled by them, CEMA's roles and tasks should be redetermined and the structure simplified. To this end, the GDR considers it necessary to revise CEMA's statute. It supports the proposal of developing a new regime which would rely to a considerable extent upon direct relations between independent economic organizations.

The conditions for cooperation should be aligned gradually with those of the world market. In this, commodity-money-categories and the application of economic mechanisms for controlling economic relations must be given new weight.

Modrow suggested that the role of the transferable ruble as clearing unit be examined and the transition to clearing in freely convertible currencies between the CEMA member states be implemented gradually on a bilateral basis. The GDR head of state described as urgently necessary cooperation based on the division of labor in the branches of the supply industry.

As reasons for the failure to attain the goal of winning key positions in science, technology and production, he cited, among other things, central administrative constraints, to which enterprises and institutes have been subordinated.

It should be a main concern of CEMA cooperation to make better use of the existing scientific and production capacities, such as in specialized ranges and considerably more rational division of labor in the development of new technologies and equipment, Modrow said. Mutual agreements on scientific strategies and research cooperation provide important points of departure for greater efficiency in the future division of labor.

It is important now, the GDR prime minster demanded, to reveal the causes of the situation that has arisen, and in particular those of the continuing stagnation of foreign trade relations, the increasing scientific-technical backwardness compared with capitalist industrialized countries, and the delayed development of modern production and export structures. At the same time it is important to ensure a far-reaching analysis of the inadequate specialization and cooperation in production, above all in the predominantly scientific branches.

### Modrow Interviewed on Session

*LD0901211690 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1830 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia (ADN)—The CEMA member countries are determined to cooperate in the renewal of this economic organization. No one questioned the continued existence of CEMA on the first day of discussions in Sofia. This was stated by GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow in an interview with GDR journalists on Tuesday evening. It was of fundamental importance that the administrative forms of cooperation within CEMA be no longer continued, and that the organization conform to the international situation and open up to the world economy. There was also agreement that a certain transitional phase was needed in which the convertibility of the currencies should be prepared and formulated.

Hans Modrow emphasized the great possibilities and significant responsibility that could be adopted by the GDR in the process of pan-European cooperation. The treaty-based community with the FRG, which is being sought by the GDR Government, could contribute to this. In this connection, the minister also pointed to his talks with French President Francois Mitterrand and Austrian Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky.

Following his return from Sofia, the rounttable in Berlin also will be informed of the results of the discussions. Hans Modrow announced that he intended to call on the roundtable's economic working group to cooperate in the further working out of the new principles and fundamentals for CEMA cooperation.

### Modrow, Atanasov Favor Continued Economic Ties

*LD0901182990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1719 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia (ADN)—In Sofia today, the GDR and Bulgarian heads of government, Hans Modrow and Georgi Atanasov, respectively, advocated the extension of economic relations between the two countries. They noted with satisfaction the stable and continuing development of these relations over the past few years. In accordance with the necessary changes in the two countries' economic mechanisms, consideration should be made in the future for the greater autonomy of enterprises.

Modrow assumed that the joint GDR-Bulgaria economic committee would continue to play an important role in the shaping of economic relations. The prime ministers discussed the possibilities for bilateral relations emerging from the desired new nature of cooperation within the CEMA.

### CSSR's Calfa Meets Mazowiecki, Roman

*LD0901221190 Prague Television Service in Czech 2100 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Marian Calfa, head of Czechoslovak delegation at the CEMA session, met his Polish and Romanian counterparts today. In a very friendly talk with Premier Mazowiecki, it was emphasized that all prerequisites exist for the establishment of qualitatively new relations between our countries. The premiers agreed that Tadeusz Mazowiecki will come for a 1-day working visit in Czechoslovakia on the invitation of Marian Calfa at the end of January.

In a talk with Petre Roman, the two premiers discussed, among other things, coordination of further efficient assistance from Czechoslovakia for Romania. They agreed that Deputy Premier Frantisek Reichel will hold talks about these issues in Romania during his forthcoming visit.

### Further on Meeting

*LD0901234290 Prague CTK in English 2239 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia Jan 9 (CTK correspondent]—Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa and his Polish counterpart, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, stressed at their meeting here today that there are all prerequisites for the two states to open a new chapter in their relations which stem from their interests.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki will pay a one-day working visit to Czechoslovakia at the end of January at the invitation of Marian Calfa. Their talks will involve some unsolved ecological questions, the problems of crossing the borders as well as forms of the two countries' cooperation in the economy and other spheres.

Marian Calfa met also with Romanian Premier Petre Roman. They discussed coordination of further Czechoslovakia's assistance to Romania. Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Frantisek Reichel will negotiate directly with Romanian partners at his forthcoming visit to Romania.

On behalf of the Czechoslovak Government, Marian Calfa expressed regret at the tragic December events in Romania and assured Romanian representatives of further support of Czechoslovakia.

The three officials are attending here the 45th CMEA session which opened today.

### Trade Unions Demand 'New CEMA Body'

*AU0901223490 Sofia BTA in English 2144 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["Trade Unions Campaign for New CMEA Body"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, January 9 (BTA)—The trade union organizations of nine socialist community countries handed in a collective address to the heads of government attending the CMEA [CEMA] session and to the chairman of the council's Executive Committee.

The address says that as cooperation within the CMEA framework affects the working people's interests, the trade unions and the council's bodies should interact on a regular basis. The establishment of a permanent body on cooperation in the social sphere involving trade union experts is suggested as one possible form to attain this objective. The body will consider and solve problems concerning labour law and wages, social security, working conditions, production and natural environment, tourism and recreation, workers' training and retraining.

The address was drafted by the trade union organisations in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Vietnam, Mongolia, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR.

### Albanian Article on Issue of CEMA Survival

*AU1001112890 Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian 6 Jan 90 p 4*

[Genc Kondi article: "Will CEMA Survive?"]

[Text] This question is being asked now, just as people have been asking a similar question about a parallel organization, the Warsaw Pact, for some time. These questions have arisen within the context of the situation in East Europe, which has been fraught with successive and unexpected changes since the end of last year. Of course, with what is happening in Poland, Hungary, Romania, the GDR, and elsewhere, it is logical to cast in doubt the array of organizations of the so-called "socialist community," which seemed impregnable before the changes which the Kremlin's "perestroyka" introduced into international relations.

It is therefore logical to now ask the question, is there still a place for a "socialist common market," toward which CEMA was evolving until a number of countries of the former bloc openly and conclusively abandoned the ideas and practices of socialism, and when political forces hostile to socialism have come to power in several of them?

Two days ago, this very question of the fate of CEMA was raised by a decision of the CSSR Government, voiced by the Finance Ministry, which declared that the CSSR was proposing CEMA's dissolution, together with the annulment of certain earlier economic agreements with countries of the "socialist community." Prague's high-level official announced that the CSSR would unilaterally withdraw from the organization if other members failed to agree.

Meanwhile, Kremlin spokesman Oleg Bogomolov, in a TASS interview, expressed entirely different views from those expressed in Prague. He said that the prime ministers of the member states were to meet in Sofia next Tuesday and Wednesday to discuss the transition to the more advanced stage of a "single market" among CEMA countries. He said that the experience of the EEC should be studied for this.

Just as in the case of the discussions of the role of military alliances following the events in East Europe, which have ushered in radical changes in the situation, it is clearly emerging that Moscow has no intention of giving up such community structures, but that, as Bogomolov's statement seems to show, there is no more talk of a "socialist CEMA." Just as in the case of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union is trying to preserve the economic community, seeking to maintain its own favorable positions in the markets of these countries, and the present export-import balance, whereby trade with Moscow is given compulsory priority.

The Kremlin is willing for the countries of the "socialist community" to openly and finally abandon socialism. However, it wishes to preserve its political and economic influence on them. It remains to be seen how far this can be achieved. In fact, some of the various Eastern countries have stated their intention of withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact or CEMA. In theory, Gorbachev's basic idea of a "common European home" in the restructuring of international relations gives these countries the right to act in such a way, with the prospect of there being no more East and West in the future. However, until this time comes, Moscow is seeking not to allow its political, diplomatic, and economic dominion to weaken. These developments show that, although Moscow did advance the idea of a "common home," it intends, together with some Western countries, to keep the lion's share for itself.

## Overthrow of Romania's 'Hated' Dictator Viewed

*AU0901154590 Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian 31 Dec 89 p 4*

[Genc Kondi article: "Toward Normalizing the Situation in Romania"]

[Text] The Romanians have again been through difficult times this week. The terrorist activity of members of Nicolae Ceausescu's secret police, the "Securitate," is continuing. As the National Salvation Front [NSF] officially admitted recently, they are refusing all surrender proposals and resisting stubbornly. They are equipped with more modern weapons than those of the Army, are well trained, and have at their disposal a network of underground tunnels and passages whose layout is known only to themselves.

The dictator Ceausescu was sentenced and executed this week. He was charged and found guilty, by a military court, of genocide against his own people, economic abuses, the creation of an apparatus of violence used against the people, sending the nation's economy and living standards into decline, and so forth. The president of the NSF, asked by the public at home and abroad why the former Romanian leader could not have been tried by a regular public court at a later time, said that while Ceausescu was under arrest at a military base, this base was attacked three times by "Securitate" troops who had found out where their chief was being held and were attempting to free him. With his execution, the new regime counted on making the further resistance of terrorist elements meaningless. It is true that the gunfire has abated, although it has still not entirely ceased, and on Friday [29 December] the television announced that the Army had finally gotten the situation under control. The situation in the country is now returning to normal.

In contrast to events in other countries in East Europe, those in Romania took a bloody turn. Accounts vary regarding the number of victims in the last 2 weeks, but it is a fact that the Romanian people paid dearly in toppling the Ceausescu clan, hated by the entire people. They showed great civil courage in courageously challenging the great engine of death the dictator had created to safeguard his rule. The "Securitate" was merely a tool to preserve the rule of the Ceausescus as a family dynasty, not to protect the people from their enemies. From their deeds, it turned out that enemies of the Romanian people had usurped state positions in Bucharest. The populace was subjected to progressive impoverishment, while the corruption and luxurious life-style of the leading clan were legendary. While the people were subjected to declining living standards, funds were used to build palatial government premises and residential areas which were to perpetuate Ceausescu's name, but could have no economic purpose. National minorities were subjected to outright oppression and assimilation, which created diplomatic problems with neighboring countries.

In acting in this way, the Romanian people helped create conditions for the democratization of national life. Of course, it is up to this people to decide themselves the form of government and the socioeconomic order to be established in their country. The more independently they settle this issue, the better it will be for Romania, the Balkans, and Europe. There was also a great deal of talk about armed intervention in this country from abroad. In a step unimaginable until now, the United States, Britain, and France called on the Soviet Union to send Warsaw Pact troops to Romania. The Romanian people succeeded in solving their own problems in the right way.

## People's Assembly Approves 1990 Plan

*AU0901125890 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 29 Dec 89 p 1*

[Law on the 1990 State Plan for the Development of the Economy and Culture of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania; issued in Tirana on 28 December]

[Text] The People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, having considered the draft plan for the development of the economy and culture of the People's Socialist Republic of Albanian in 1990, on the basis of Article 67 of the Constitution and on the proposal of the Council of Ministers, decrees:

**Article 1**

The main targets of the 1990 State Plan for the Development of the Economy and Culture of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, in comparison with the expected level of fulfillment of the 1989 plan, are as follows:

General industrial production will rise by 8.6 percent and general agricultural production by 15 percent.

The total volume of investment for the development of the economy and culture will rise by 1.4 percent. Freight transportation in tonne-kilometers will rise by 3.1 percent, rail transportation by 4.6 percent, and passenger transportation by 2.6 percent. The export of goods will rise by 33.4 percent; retail sales for cash will rise by 5.1 percent, and repairs, services, and contracted services for the people will rise by 11.6 percent. Social labor productivity will rise by 4.4 percent, and labor productivity in industry by 2.9 percent.

**Article**

The Council of Ministers will allocate responsibilities for the 1990 plan among the ministries and other central institutions, and will take steps to implement the tasks stemming from it.

**Article 3**

This law comes into force on 1 January 1990.

Tirana, 28 December 1989. Law No. 7345.

[signed] Sihat Tozaj, secretary to the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania. Ramiz Alia, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

## People's Assembly Approves 1990 Budget

*AU0801201090 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 29 Dec 89 p 1*

[Law on the 1990 State Budget]

[Text] On the basis of Article 67 of the Constitution and on the proposal of the Council of Ministers, the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania resolves:

**Article 1**

The 1990 State Budget submitted by the Council of Ministers of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania is approved as follows:

BOT Revenue.....9,650 million leks.

Expenditure.....9,600 million leks.

Surplus..... 50 million leks. EOT

**Article 2**

The total sum of revenue from the socialist economy (productive sector) in the 1990 State Budget is set at 9,323 million leks.

**Article 3**

The total sum of revenue from the nonproductive sector [scientific institutions, nurseries, kindergartens, cinemas, theaters, etc.] and other income from the socialist sector in 1990 is set at 327 million leks.

**Article 4**

The total sum of expenditure for the finance of the socialist economy (for the further development of industry, mines and geology, the energy industry, agriculture, transportation, the communal economy and other branches of the economy) in the 1990 State Budget is set at 4,933 million leks, apart from expenditure which enterprises will cover from their own resources.

**Article 5**

The total sum of expenditure for the finance of measures of a social and cultural nature (for kindergartens, eighth grade elementary schools, vocational schools, general and vocational high schools, the university and institutes of higher education, libraries, radio, television, theaters, children's nurseries, hospitals, sanatoria, physical culture, pensions, grants for mothers with large families, and other social and cultural measures) in the 1990 State Budget is set at 3,042 million leks.

**Article 6**

The 1990 State Budget allocates 1,030 million leks for the defense of the homeland.

**Article 7**

The 1990 State Budget allocates 175 million leks for the maintenance of the administrative apparatus.

**Article 8**

The sum of 4,300 million leks is allocated to the budgets of people's councils in the districts in 1990, divided according to district as follows:

BOT Berat District..... 188,100,000 leks.

Diber District..... 158,400,000 leks.

Durres District..... 315,500,000 leks.

Elbasan District..... 263,900,000 leks.

Fier District..... 280,400,000 leks.

Gramsh District..... 77,700,000 leks.

Gjirokaster District..... 117,800,000 leks.

Kolonje District..... 53,100,000 leks.

Korce District..... 274,900,000 leks.

Kruje District..... 132,000,000 leks.

Kukes District..... 123,900,000 leks.

Lezhe District..... 82,600,000 leks.

Librazhd District..... 73,300,000 leks.

Lushnje District..... 170,700,000 leks.

Mat District..... 91,500,000 leks.

Mirdite District..... 79,200,000 leks.

Permet District..... 62,600,000 leks.

Pogradec District..... 97,100,000 leks.

Puke District..... 67,100,000 leks.

Sarande District..... 147,800,000 leks.

Skrapar District..... 81,300,000 leks.

Shkoder District..... 287,500,000 leks.

Tepelene District..... 81,300,000 leks.

Tirana District..... 639,400,000 leks.

Tropoje District..... 76,400,000 leks.

Vlore District..... 276,500,000 leks. EOT

**Article 9**

The actual budget for 1988 is approved as follows:

BOT Income..... 8,558,210,205.85 leks.

Expenditure..... 8,551,612,179.00 leks.

Surplus..... 6,598,026.85 leks. EOT

**Article 10**

The Council of Ministers will divide the 1990 budget among ministries, other central institutions, and the executive committees of people's councils in the districts, and will take measures to implement the tasks arising from it.

**Article 11**

This law comes into force on 1 January 1990.

Tirana, 28 December 1989. No, of law: 7346.

[signed] Sihat Tozaj, secretary to the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

Ramiz Alia, chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

## Finance Minister Nako Presents 1990 Budget

*AU0801071390 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 28 Dec 89 pp 1, 3-4*

[Report presented to People's Assembly by Minister of Finances Andrea Nako in Tirana on 27 December: "On the Expected Fulfillment of the 1989 State Budget and 1990 Draft Budget"]

[Text] Comrade deputies,

The general mobilization of our working masses under the leadership of the party led by Comrade Ramiz Alia for the fulfillment of the state budget, the implementation of the decisions of the Ninth Albanian Workers Party [AWP] Congress, and the directives of the AWP Central Committee plenums is a major characteristic of 1989. This revolutionary spirit was further stimulated by the jubilee of the 45th anniversary of the victory of the country's liberation and the victory of the people's revolution.

Relying entirely on internal socialist accumulation, our economy and finances were further consolidated during 1989. The state's financial income increased by approximately eight percent over 1988, while the income of agricultural cooperatives increased by 12 percent. The state budget regularly financed the implementation of the program of capital investments and the development of the economy, culture, and science, as well as the measures to protect the health of the population and for the country's defense. The further development of agriculture and the livestock-raising sector was followed with great attention—particularly in the highland and hilly regions—and financial relations with agricultural cooperatives was improved, making better use of economic levers.

Participating in numerous actions and revolutionary movements intended primarily to raise production efficiency, the overwhelming majority of enterprises and districts met or exceeded the economic and financial indicators. In the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the pledges adopted to increase the efficiency of production and the state budget income, good results were achieved, in addition to Tirana District, also by the districts of Durres, Sarande, Korce, Gjirokaster, Kukes, Lezhe, and so forth.

Careful work was carried out to effect savings. About 200 million leks were saved by reducing construction and other state investment expenditures, particularly those of an administrative nature. In addition, compared with 1988, losses were reduced by about three times, while some sectors and enterprises not only reduced their losses completely, but achieved a net income.

However, some parts of the industry, mining, and energy system, agriculture, light industry, and construction created deficits in their economic and financial indicators. Consequently, the state budget income was fulfilled by 98 percent and the income of agricultural cooperatives by about 93 percent.

The failure to meet economic and financial indicators, as was also stressed at the Eighth AWP Central Committee plenum, is also due to shortcomings in organization and management, as well as to the failure to use financial and banking methods properly. This is also proof of shortcomings in the working method of financial and banking organs at all levels. The adoption of concrete measures to eliminate production and accumulation shortcomings represent a great reserve for the economy as a whole. The Ministry of Finances and other central departments, as well as the district people's council executive committees, should do more to help these enterprises and, together with their collectives, ways should be found to meet economic and financial targets all along the line.

As a result of measures adopted for the proper administration of socialist property, damages, abuses of property, and violations of financial discipline have been reduced. However, there are still shortcomings in this direction. In some enterprises, particularly in the foodstuffs industry, retail trade, the communal economy, and some agriculture cooperatives, internal control is not appreciated as it should be, and there are weaknesses in the prevention of damage to property, absenteeism, abuse, and cronyism. Negative manifestations in the field of administration can and must be cut down to a minimum by raising public opinion and by strengthening workers class control. As Comrade Enver Hoxha taught us, the leadership and control of the workers class over everything and everyone must be full and comprehensive.

Comrade deputies, the 1990 draft state plan and budget presented by the Council of Ministers for examination and approval is based on the orientations of the AWP Central Committee, the eighth AWP Central Committee

plenum, and on Comrade Ramiz Alia's very important instructions at this plenum and during his visits to the districts of Puke, Tropoje, and Pogradec. The draft budget reflects the real financial possibilities of the economy in 1990 and totals 9.650 billion leks of expenditure and a surplus of 50 million leks. It has several major characteristics as follows:

—The planning of the financial indicators and the 1990 draft state budget is more scientifically based and has a higher degree of guarantee, this being reflected in better coordination between the financial and economic aspects of the plan. The overall state financial income is approximately eight percent higher and the financial accumulation, in its two forms, increases by about ten percent over the expected 1989 results. This is partly based on the expected commissioning of a number of projects, such as the urea plant in Fier, the ferro-chrome and nickel-cobalt plants in Elbasan, and so forth.

The economic and financial indicators of the agricultural cooperatives are also characterized by a satisfactory growth rate. The gross income of cooperatives will increase by about 14 percent over the expected 1989 income and their net income by about 20 percent. The accumulation fund will be given priority and will increase by about 32 percent, compared with an increase of about 16 percent for the consumption fund, while the value of the daily wage will increase by over ten percent, thus ensuring a high reproduction rate in the cooperative sector and the increased well-being of the cooperative members.

The state will continue to assist agricultural cooperatives with financial assets, particularly the ones in the highlands and hilly regions, both with short-term and long-term credits, as well as through the system of economic levers, while in the higher-type cooperatives the state's participation will be increased through turnover assets and investments.

To achieve these objectives, enterprises, institutions, and agricultural cooperatives, as well as the state and economic organs, must work persistently to improve the scientific management of economic and financial problems and to strengthen financial control.

Greater attention must be paid to the utilization of materials, fuels, and other combustibles per unit of production, since these account for 60-70 percent of all production expenditure. In addition to establishing scientific consumption norms, concrete measures are needed to prevent the excessive use of these assets in a number of enterprises of the ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the ore enrichment plants, in the foodstuffs industry, the clothing and footwear industry, and so forth.

Particular care must be shown to fully apply and improve production technologies, particularly in the metallurgical sector, the foodstuffs industry, the glass and ceramics industry, the construction materials industry, and so forth, in which raw materials are wasted to a considerable extent; there is excessive use of fuels, the wages funds, and so forth. Economic thinking and logic must be in close unity with technical thinking in order to raise production efficiency.

In order to effect savings in the utilization of materials as a whole, and of those in short supply particularly, the dispositions pertaining to the material incentives of those workers who effect savings in the use of raw and other materials must be made better use of, by improving these dispositions in the case of distinguished and innovative workers, and measures must be introduced to prevent the excessive utilization or misuse of such materials.

—The 1990 draft plan preserves the correct proportions between the major economic indicators of the country's socioeconomic development and priority is given to increasing financial assets, this being a prerequisite to achieve extended socialist reproduction. Compared with the expected results in 1989, the state's general financial income is expected to increase by 3.8 percent more than the increase in social production and 4.3 percent more than the increased national income. This will result from the measures that have been stipulated to further deepen the achievements in raising economic efficiency. About 25 percent of the increase in the net incomes of enterprises will be secured through cost reductions. This will require measures to work out the cost reduction plans at all levels in the enterprises, sections, factories, and sectors. Every worker and cooperative member must become acquainted with the tasks pertaining to cost reductions and the fulfillment of these tasks must be checked systematically through frequent analyses, even on a daily base, to get a continuous view of the overall picture.

The state and economic organs at the base, in the districts, and at the center must render improved qualified assistance to the less stable enterprises, from the viewpoint of economic and financial efficiency, because whereas 80-100 enterprises manage to overcome their lag annually, other enterprise take their place in creating deficits. The advanced experience of a considerable number of enterprises with regard to profitability, such as the agricultural enterprises in Elbasan, Lushnje, and other districts, must be disseminated.

Special measures have been adopted to improve the supply of the urban and rural population with foodstuffs and consumer commodities, to further expand vital services, and to increase the purchasing power of the currency. The positive experience gained in accelerating the turnover of monetary assets will be further deepened next year.

The economic and state organs in the districts and the central departments must raise the efficiency of their assistance and control functions with regard to agricultural enterprises and cooperatives. In addition to the

fulfillment of production tasks, it is necessary to eliminate shortcomings observed in removing products from the fields or from transit storage places, which cause irregularities in market supplies, production, and exports through losses and damage. The Internal Trade Ministry and its organs must better direct production in conformity with the needs of the population, the culture of service in the trade sector must be raised, particularly in the catering sector, and all alien manifestations must be tackled. It is necessary to increase and to improve communal services, in the cities and in the countryside, to better meet the needs of the population.

All cells and levels of the economy need to show greater appreciation of the problems pertaining to the rational utilization of time, increased productivity, and thrifty use of the wages fund. In addition to the measures that are being adopted in enterprises and agricultural cooperatives to perfect the socialist organization of labor, strengthen labor discipline, and fully utilize working schedules in conformity with the orientations of the eighth AWP Central Committee plenum, the Council of Ministers has instructed the state organs to perfect and make more efficient use of economic levers and instruments in order to increase the interest and sense of responsibility of the workers, specialists, or managers with regard to the question of raising the productivity and quality of work.

The increase of foreign currency resources and their thrifty and more highly efficient use represents one of the major objectives of the 1990 draft budget for all state and economic organs. Profound economic thinking and concrete action is needed more than anywhere else in this field, in addition to qualified, imaginative, and innovative work to increase the volume and improve the structure of exports, as well as to reduce imports, keeping economic profitability under consideration. The work carried out in 1989 to increase foreign currency earnings from non-trading activities must be further deepened next year, particularly through external transportation, a better knowledge and broader use of financial, customs, and banking operations, insurance of export and import commodities, and so forth, using them better than hitherto in the interest of the economy.

—The 1990 financial draft plan and draft state budget are characterized by a stringent savings regimen in the use of financial resources and their increased efficiency. The growth rate of the state's general financial expenditure will be over two percent less that incomes, while showing an increase of 5.7 percent, compared with the expected final results in the current year.

The development of the production sphere occupies the main place in the distribution of financial assets. These are expected to account for 55 percent of the total expenditure, showing an increase of seven percent over 1989.

Over nine percent more expenditure than the expected 1989 results are stipulated to finance the broad program of capital investments in 1990, the overwhelming part of which is being devoted to the production sector.

The state and economic organs are confronted with the urgent task of making more rapid changes in raising the efficiency of the large-scale investments stipulated in the 1990 draft plan and draft budget. This requires a further deepening of the revolutionary initiatives and actions carried out by the masses in the current year, like those envisaging the commissioning of a number of projects ahead of schedule, as well as the full utilization of all machinery and equipment.

The financial and banking organs must strengthen their all-round financial control during the process of drafting and implementing investment plans.

In addition to increasing the material base of production, all enterprises are required to adopt measures to increase the efficiency of the considerable financial assets used to secure this base by increasing their turnover. Despite improvements made, the enterprises are still stocking materials and goods that remain outside the economic circulation process, thus hindering a sounder financial situation. The financial and banking organs must further raise their control in these matters through innovative use of the credit levers and other forms of financing.

The 1990 draft budget includes the necessary financial assets to ensure the development and expansion of educational, cultural, sports, and scientific activities, the health service, and other measures of a social and cultural nature to meet the population growth rate, as well as contemporary requirements, the financial effects of the reduction in the retirement age of female members of cooperatives with numerous children, and so forth. Over 31 percent of the state budget expenditure is stipulated for this purpose, or seven percent more than the expected final results in 1989. The institutions concerned, the district executive committees, central departments, and the planning and financial organs at all levels are required to use these considerable assets placed at the disposal of the non-productive sphere in a thrifty manner and with a great degree of efficiency. In addition to meeting the requirements of the further development of these sectors, it is necessary to avoid the tendency of allocating excessive assets leading to damage, misuse, and the non-utilization of equipment. In the institutions of this sphere, too, particularly those engaged in cultural, sport, and artistic activities, measures are being adopted to deepen the application of economic management methods, to better link the expenditure effected with the quantitative and qualitative results of scientific, artistic, sports, and other activities, as well as to increase incomes to ensure that these institutions are made more conscious and more responsible in the fulfillment of their tasks.

In conformity with the directions of the eighth AWP Central Committee plenum, the degree of independent

action and responsibility of enterprises for the development of economic and production activity will be raised in 1990 through the perfecting of budgetary instruments, better linking its activity with the realization of the planned financial resources. It is envisaged, for this purpose, that the enterprise will use about 63 percent more of their planned income than in 1989 to meet planned and unplanned investment expenditures, to increase the norm of turnover assets, and to create funds for the material incentires of distinguished working people and innovators. These funds and assets are to be used in a rational way and should serve to further strengthen internal accountability in the enterprises. All the assets spent and invested should give a maximum economic return in leks and in foreign currency.

In conformity with the competence given to them for the year 1990, the economic and social activity of the district people's council executive committees and their subordinate bodies will be financed, through their budgets, to the tune of 4.3 billion leks, or 45 percent of all state budget expenditure. In the course of implementing the decisions of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, the planning and financial organs will provide the people's councils with better qualified assistance to fully carry out their competence in the budgetary field.

The people's council executive committees are faced with great tasks with regard to the qualified management of economic and financial problems in meeting the objectives stipulated in the 1990 plan and budget, particularly with regard to raising production efficiency and to fulfilling their tasks in a timely manner.

The country's defense expenditure represents 10.7 percent of the 1990 draft plan and the expenditure stipulated for the country's administration represents 1.8 percent. In conformity with the party's directives, measures to further strengthen the savings regimen will be further developed in the matter of administrative and, generally speaking, all other non-production expenditure.

The orientations of the eighth AWP Central Committee plenum and Comrade Ramiz Alia's important instructions about the struggle against bureaucracy, technocracy, and liberalism by deepening the line of the masses, represent a broad program of work for the financial and banking organs in further increasing their role with regard to the fundamental questions of accountable and efficient management of the economy. The great problems of production, costs, profitability, accumulation, of strengthening the savings regimen, and of the efficient administration of property cannot be resolved successfully without the active engagement of the broad masses of workers, engineers, technicians, and other production specialists, and without drawing on their innovative thinking. Drawing lessons from the shortcomings experienced in 1989, the financial and banking organs are entering the stage of the concrete application of the tasks that have been stipulated, making financial problems a question for the masses, which will be discussed and decided by the workers and cooperative members themselves.

Comrade deputies,

The objectives included in the 1990 draft state budget, which the Council of Ministers is presenting for examination and approval, represent the real possibilities of our economy. However, on the basis of the superiority of our socioeconomic system and bearing in mind the situation developing in Europe and the world, these objectives must be considered as minimal targets as far as production, exports, and foreign currency earnings are concerned, and as maximal targets as far as expenditure, investments, production costs, and imports are concerned. This requires the need for us to raise organization and management at all levels to a higher degree and that the work of the planning, financial, and banking organs be further perfected in order to discover and utilize the considerable reserves that exist within our socialist system and to better respond to the requirements of the present stage of the country's socioeconomic development. It is with this intention that we must work in implementing the 1990 state plan and budget at all levels, beginning with the brigades, sectors, factories, and enterprises, and right up to the people's councils at all levels, because financial questions are a matter concerning thousands of workers. Financial and budgetary levers must be used more efficiently to increase their effect over production and to raise its efficiency, measured in leks and in foreign currency.

The Council of Ministers is confident that, under the party's and Comrade Ramiz Alia's leadership, the working masses of our country will turn the objectives of the 1990 state plan and budget into reality.

## Mladenov Meets Labor Representatives

*AU1001073890 Sofia BTA in English 2307 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Sofia, December 9 (BTA)—At a meeting today with representatives of workforces from all over the country, Mr Petur Mladenov, president of the State Council, analyzed the situation in the country after the November 10, 1989 Plenum of the CC [Central Committee] of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party]. Restructuring is gaining momentum, new forces emerge and seek solution to the pressing problems, he said. Sometimes these forces differ in the ways for which they look in order to settle the existing problems but we are seeking dialogue and consensus. No one harbours any illusions that it will be easy to demolish the old system, but there is no way for the country other than democratization and renewal.

The State Council president described the present state of affairs in the country as a "complicated situation requiring key decisionmaking". One such decision was the December 29 move to restore the Muslims rights which was intended to correct serious mistakes threatening to destabilize society. What is needed now is dialogue to ease tensions, and the workforces can be instrumental in this dialogue.

Mr Petur Mladenov went on to consider the severe damage inflicted on Bulgaria's international prestige by the 1984 decision affecting the Muslim population. Stressing the enormous importance of the ethnic policy for the future of Bulgaria, he said that in future the entire people should share in the shaping of this policy. This policy should seek to achieve solid popular unity and to build a state where all citizens are guaranteed equal rights.

The participants in the meeting, which lasted for more than three hours, suggested a number of specific ways out of the crisis. The speakers supported the resolutions of the BCP CC plenums held since November 10, 1989.

They stressed that a stable economy is one of the prerequisites for the achievement of national unity. An emphasis was laid on the need to begin a wide-ranging democratic discussion on key aspects of economic development. Tangible stabilizing measures and normal working conditions were singled out as essential for an economic breakthrough.

## Democratic Party Organizes Nationwide Meetings

*AU0901151090 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] The Central Operational Bureau of the Democratic Party calls upon all organizations of this party throughout the country to conduct general meetings until the end of January, at which bureaus and control commissions should be elected. The protocols of the meetings should be sent or brought to Sofia for the approval of the Operational Bureau. The address: Sofia 1000, Lyuben Karavelov Street No. 5, telephone 87-15-38.

## Clarifications of 'Road to Europe' Platform

*AU0901145990 Sofia NARODNA MLADEZH in Bulgarian 2 Jan 90 p 1*

[Professor Dr Petur-Emil Mitev article: "Necessary Clarifications"]

[Text] NARODNA MLADEZH on 27 December carried the draft of the "Bulgaria's Road to Europe" platform, which was proposed for preliminary discussion. More than 1,000 people—Communists and nonparty members—telephoned the telephone numbers indicated in the draft, and the NARODNA MLADEZH Editorial Board as well. On their own behalf and on the behalf of entire organizations, they posed questions, reported rallies in support of the platform, and sought clarifications. The stream of telephone calls continues.

Certain clarifications are necessary.

First. We do not mean to create a faction. The "Road to Europe" platform is a variant of the party course toward renewal, de-Stalinization, and eliminating the Zhivkov system. We do not deny the right of Communists to form factions. However, the most important thing before the congress is to clarify the content of the radical change within the party that is necessary. In this context the "European Platform" is an ideological trend.

Second. The date of the party congress has already been set. Time is short. The issue of electing delegates is of crucial importance. Improving self-organization is our only chance of success. Let us disseminate the platform, campaign for it, and elect delegates who support its basic principles.

Third. The platform is an open one. It must be enriched and expanded until the congress. We shall organize coordination meetings every Sunday at 1400 [1200 GMT]—from 31 December to the end of January—in front of Sofia's National Theater. We will conduct conversations, and will add new elements to the platform. We propose to the adherents to the "Road to Europe" platform to organize similar meetings throughout the country in front of the theaters, and where there are no theaters—in front of the culture clubs.

Fourth. What else should those who adhere to the platform do? Let them be initiators of meetings at which the platform will be discussed. Let them join the platform by expressing agreement with its basic principles. This can be don. through telegrams and letters sent to the NARODNA MLADEZH Editorial Board, Sofia, "Lenin" Boulevard 47, and by personally participating in the 4 January meeting in Sofia's Kliment Okhridski University Hall 65.

We again stress that the platform is based on the following principles: European road of developing the

country; a democratic understanding of socialism; pluralism of ownership; de-Stalinization of the party and uprooting Todor Zhivkov's system; freedom of personality, national consensus, reconciliation, and nonviolence.

The most important thing is to influence the congress by electing delegates of this platform.

Conduct agitation in favor of the platform among the people that believe you!

Elect representatives, who will maintain contact with the Coordination Council!

There is no time!

Prof Dr Petur-Emil Mitev, chairman of the Coordination Council of the "Bulgarian Road to Europe" platform.

### BCP Meeting Held on 'Road to Europe' Platform

*AU0901125090 Sofia NARODNA MLADEZH in Bulgarian 2 Jan 90 p 1*

[NARODNA MLADEZH report: "First Steps"]

[Text] On 31 December, 1400 [1200 GMT], more than 200 people gathered in front of the "Ivan Vazov" People's Theater in Sofia. Many of them have heard the radio announcement, and the one made during the last TV newscast on the previous evening. The initiators of the "Road to Europe" platform invited their supporters to a conversation about the specific steps that are to be adopted in order to elect delegates to the 14th BCP Extraordinary Congress. There also were people who had not read the platform, and people who came with specific proposals. Some came as private persons, others, as representatives of the party organizations they belong to. Some of them expressed their willingness to explain the platform and its ideas and goals during their business trips in the first days of the year. There were many different people, but most of them were young people concerned with the party's future and with quickly uprooting Stalinism and Zhivkovism. Disputes and lively conversations were conducted. Topics such as how to elect honest rank-and-file party members as delegates, so that the apparatus and nomenklatura do not again conquer it and impose their will, were discussed.

Unfortunately, we have no information whether meetings such as those proposed by the Coordination Council, really did take place in front of the theaters in other places throughout the country. The period that remains until the congress is very short, and all those who are sincerely thinking about the future of the party should organize such meetings, at which the platform will be enriched.

Despite the fact that the meeting in Sofia was not meant to be a rally, many people expressed their willingness to speak. They supported the platform's ideas and principles and thus proved that there are forces within the party that can radically change it.

### 'Road to Europe' Coordination Council Founded

*AU0901150490 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] A Coordination Council of the Bulgarian Road to Europe Platform, composed of 9 members, was founded in Pleven.

In a letter to the Municipal Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] and the mass media, the council proposes to use the days until the 14th BCP Extraordinary Congress for developing a broad discussion of the organizational principles of developing the party and society. It was proposed that all party organizations in the municipality discuss at their accountability-election meetings and conferences that basic premises of the platform and express their opinions.

It also was proposed that every Wednesday and Friday at 1800 [1600 GMT] the Pleven Hall of the Party Club would be used for the organization of an open discussion club.

### Economist Attacks BCP Market Policy

*AU0801071890 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 29 Dec 89 pp 1, 4*

[Article by Ventsislav Antonov, from the Institute for Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasting: "Beyond the Magic of Words, or for Whom the Bell Tolls"]

[Text] I make use of the appeal to develop discussion within the party on acute issues relating to economic and social life, which was contained in the resolution of the 11-13 December plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP], to put forward certain arguments from the platform of RABOTNICHESKO DELO. I believe that this time the promised pluralism will not turn out to be the usual playing with words. I cannot remain silent, and I hope that I will be given a hearing and understood.

By following the growth model established during the last 30 years, at the end of 1985 we entered the regular "5-year-plan" cyclical crisis. The attempt to escape from this crisis using inadequate means brought the country to the verge of a political crisis. It is plain to everyone that unless we undertake radical measures within the next 1-2 months, measures that are adequate for the present state of the economy, then the existing hotbeds of political tension will flare up into an open political crisis. In other words, the question of power will be posed in a new way, one that has been unfamiliar over many generations.

The Bulgarian people are entitled to demand that the governing party, which has accepted responsibility for the crisis, should also accept the responsibility for emerging from it. Disassociating the party from the

former leadership does not in itself provide sufficient grounds for the new leadership to win credit in the eyes of the people. It is clear that from the political aspect the issue of credit is still metaphorical in nature. Whether or not Article 1 of the Constitution is abolished, Bulgaria can only be governed by the BCP. However, looking into the future, the issue may be posed like this: Is there any guarantee that the nation's trust will not be betrayed this time as well? We need a clear, specific, and realistic program for emerging from the economic crisis. This is why those parts of the plenum's resolution in which the new priorities and immediate tasks of economic policy are outlined attract particular attention.

The BCP leadership was expected to present its own version of the truth in the economic sphere, to pose the problems in the right perspective, and to indicate a realistic sequence of steps to bring the country out of the crisis. A careful analysis of the report and the resolution reveals that these expectations have, by and large, not been justified. According to the old saying, politics is the art of the possible. To construct an economic policy in this sense means doing what is economically possible. Unfortunately, the economists are once again invited to believe in the feasibility of a great variety of economic utopias, which the former leadership amused itself in "creating" during the past 25 years. Judging from the proposed solutions, the party leadership still has no sufficiently clear idea of the real scale of the crisis. This can only be explained by the fact that over a period of more than 40 years, total economic ignorance has been implanted in Bulgaria in the most aggressive forms, and we are already reaping the fruits of this.

No one argues against the fact that in order to bring the country out of the crisis, we need a package of extraordinary stabilizing measures to enable the economy to finally be brought under control. The outstanding feature of the package of measures adopted by the plenum is that they provide practically no evidence of the adoption of a view regarding the main repository of economic information in a market-oriented economy. This demonstrates that, in spite of the declared adherence to the idea of turning Bulgaria into a "socialist market economy," this idea is regarded as a new political metaphor into which no one has any intention of instilling real meaning. The key issue of the prices and wages reform is removed from the context of the envisioned radical reform, and thereby deprived of economic meaning. What is proposed to take its place?

First, it is proposed to remove the tensions in the domestic market by increasing the production of consumer goods to the maximum possible extent. Every economist knows that no increase in production is capable by itself of dealing with the universal shortages that prevail in our economy. The revival of the myth that the rise in production can reduce shortages shows that they are again suggesting that we should not establish the true reasons for the empty stores. In whose interest is it that the truth should remain locked away in a drawer this time as well? Why were solemn vows intoned on the plenum platform concerning dismantling the public relations scarecrow called the administrative-command system, while in practical terms it was proposed that we should rely on the only lever by which this system promised for decades on end to feed and clothe the people? In the period from 1962 to the present, a reserve of hidden inflation accumulated in the economy that is at least equal to a 500-percent increase in prices, and if one allows for the multiplication effect, the prices index that may bring the market into equilibrium will probably exceed 1,000 percent. Given the crisis of insufficient production, which even the falsified report of the Central Statistical Administration for the first 9 months of 1989 failed to conceal, how is it possible, except by introducing universal labor conscription, to increase production sufficiently to remove the tensions in the market?

Second, the idea is being presented of creating a "new incomes policy," which is supposed to establish social justice, link pay with the end results of labor, and limit inflation. Translated into economic terms, it is proposed that we mix a cocktail of ingredients taken from utopian socialism, economic liberalism, and the new monetarism. The paradox here is that it is suggested that a communist party that stands or falls on the tenets of orthodox Marxism should descend into a situation that was cruelly ridiculed by K. Marx in his "Critique of the Gothic Program." Who is interested in disseminating unscientific, mythological concepts in the sphere of distribution?

It is well-known that social justice means payment according to needs, or approximately so. The principle of social justice has been established in Bulgaria in one form or another for more than 4 decades. In the lower stages of economic evolution, in which Bulgaria is in fact situated, social justice means nothing else than universally and totally reducing all the workers to the same level. The link between pay and end results is established by the labor market, where it exists as such. Capitalism developed this market and used it to defeat feudalism by economic means. In places where no labor market exists, the connection between pay and end results is made by the state, which consciously assumes the role of a "market," or rather of a patron of various goods, services, and so on. It is therefore the state, and not some impersonal mechanism, which determines what should be regarded as the end result, and exactly how much should be paid for each unit of this end result. To attempt to find a magic algorithm that will objectively link end results with pay in the absence of a market, in the conditions of immense imbalances, to achieve this without encouraging inflation, and at the same time to dispense social justice, means asking the economists to take up alchemy.

The thesis that the pressure for higher wages is leading to an exacerbation of the crisis deserves special analysis. This question concerns distribution, and, as Marxism teaches, the distribution of income follows the distribution of property. In view of the fact that in Bulgaria the state is the only owner under the Constitution of the

means of production, it follows that it receives the lion's share in the distribution process. The existing distortions in prices and statistics painstakingly conceal this fact. Despite this, it may be shown that in industry alone 15 out of every 16 leva of wages actually earned end up in the state treasury. With a rate of "concealed" exploitation of the order of 1,500 percent that arises from this, it is difficult to maintain that our service to history lies in eliminating the exploitation of man by man.

It must be clearly understood that the present pressure for wage increases is the natural and purely economic reaction of the workers' class to the "disclosure" of the true scale of the economic and social crisis in Bulgaria. Before publishing scientifically proven alternative assessments of the level of the social minimum, on the distribution of incomes, and on the dynamics of hidden and open inflation in Bulgaria, no one who claims to represent the workers' interests can categorically condemn the pressure for a fairer distribution of the national product, corresponding to the real labor contribution. The workers in Bulgaria have now been living for decades in worse conditions than those in which they work, and, therefore, to raise the slogan "we will live as we work" implies a failure to comprehend the real state of affairs.

Third, it is proposed to examine the state of the various unprofitable enterprises and eliminate those that cannot be stabilized. The stabilization of unprofitable enterprises—under the existing system of taxes and prices—means burdening the state budget and the material and labor balances. The elimination of these enterprises weighs down the budget to the extent of the social assistance given to those made redundant and the costs of retraining them. If priority is really being given to stabilizing the financial balances, then it is a better policy to shut the plants down. The problem, however, lies in the fact that the scale of a plausible program of this kind would have to cover enterprises that produce more than one-third of the national income. Those made redundant by this program will create a pool of unemployment of a size that Bulgaria has never experienced, even in the times of the great depression. There is no political force in Bulgaria today that can permit itself such a luxury.

Fourth, the solution of the problem of foreign exchange has been put forward as a key priority in economic policy. Various speculations are spreading in this sphere, so that things have to be made crystal clear. The foreign exchange problem has long ceased to be a key problem for Bulgaria, if one understands this problem as a task whose resolution will open the way to solving the chief problems facing the economy. In every case, comparison of the data announced at the plenum concerning the country's net foreign debt with the figures published by the Bank for International Payments shows that, at least since the end of 1987, our country exceeded the critical limit and fell into the trap of the "eternal debtors," whose indebtedness can only increase. With the existing state of the economy and the international money markets, one cannot take anyone seriously who proposes the task of stopping the rise in the debt in the short term, and possibly repaying the debt by the end of the century. This is a task that has no reasonable solution. What is more, there is absolutely no economic or political sense in solving this task at the expense of overstraining our economy's already exhausted strength.

Many government economists and members of the government are attempting to instill the idea among the public at large that unless Bulgaria regularly pays its debts, it will lose its reputation of a good payer, that this will impair our international reputation, and so on. The truth is that we have always been exemplary payers, and in the name of this we have for more than 30 years continuously stressed exports "at any cost," destroyed our agriculture, ruined our light industry and food and tobacco industry, and even begun to cease investing in heavy industry. What positive results has this short-sighted policy produced? What happened to the receipts from the re-export of Soviet petroleum during the 10 years between the first oil crisis and the end of the Brezhnev era? Who benefited from the draining of the national economy? What became of the billions of dollars gained at the expense of allowing real consumption to stagnate for 12 years? Until these questions are answered, no one has the right to ask the Bulgarian people for fresh sacrifices. The new conditions require new solutions. The fundamental formulation of the question is this: Anyone who wants to revive the regime of socialism by directives in a new guise, argues in favor of repaying debts, but anyone who wants radical reforms will seek and find other solutions. Bulgaria can stop servicing its foreign debts tomorrow and make a start on economic reforms. Bulgaria can rely on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, it can utilize foreign aid to restore the normal functioning of its economy, and, even after this, can cover the consequences of some people's irresponsible decisions. Only the administrative-command system will not obtain foreign aid, and because of this it can only rely on continuing the uncontrolled exploitation of the exhausted domestic resources, on the "belt-tightening" policy. Is the policy proclaimed at the plenum of increasing export revenues by about 1 billion dollars during the next 5-6 years really still possible?

The following is clear to a small number of macroeconomists in Bulgaria: Pushing exports "at any cost" is equivalent to increasing the foreign debt in parallel with this and encouraging galloping inflation within the country, because exporting goods at any price in fact means exporting them at a low price, thus worsening the terms of trade. Quite independently of this, the maintenance of a positive balance in the goods exchange causes a fall in rates of growth, increases the share of imported goods in the distributed product, and creates a considerable potential for inflation. The extent to which the goods supply meets market demand is falling drastically even under present conditions, and this further depresses

labor productivity and growth rates, thus starting a new cycle of multiplication of negative effects: Further falls in growth rates, worsening of the terms of trade, increases in the debt, acceleration of inflation, and so on.

What is incomprehensible in our entire situation is that the program formulated at the plenum rests on the unspoken assumption that the economy will somehow start growing from the start of 1990. Why might, or should this be so, and what are the forces or laws that may bring this about? One of two things is true: Either we are in an economic crisis, in which case there can be no question of increasing production on such a scale during 1990, and this means that the entire platform of the stabilization program is based on the magic of words, or we are in a stage of upswing, in which case the growth in the national product is able to accept the proposed accelerated investment programs in agriculture and light industry and the pushing of exports, without at the same time affecting real consumption, which has already been heavily trimmed in the last 2 years. There is no need to accuse professional economists of narrow-mindedness when they say the stressing of exports at the present time will irreparably damage real consumption. In economics there exist peculiar "laws of preservation," according to which the burden of the economic policy started to be carried by consumption in the mid-eighties. Today there is no other acceleration pedal to use in order for the debt burden and the new stress laid on exports to be accepted.

No argument is being put forward for giving priority to simultaneously pushing exports while stabilizing the financial balances. Quite independently of the effects of the terms of trade upon the domestic debt, the assumed acceleration in growth in the short term can only be ensured through inflation, because this is the customary model according to which we have been functioning. From the end of the sixties, our economy got through the phases of upswing and crisis only at the expense of accelerating or slowing down hidden and open inflation. In recent years this fact has become so glaringly obvious that it can be seen with the naked eye in the reports on plan fulfillment published by the Central Statistical Administration. In this situation, can we really accept that the proposed stabilization program meets the natural conditions of compatibility and realism? Who needs the acknowledgement in words that we are in a state of crisis, accompanied by the launching in practice of ideas and measures arising from the convenient ideology, according to which we are still living in the best possible world? Is not this a proof that, under the guise of restructuring in words, the proposal is being made that we would once again experiment with the well-used old model?

It is clear that if we as a party want to bring the country out of the crisis, the first condition required is to remove all ideology from economic theory and economic policy, unconditionally and without delay. The resuscitation of the premises of the sixties implies that no recognition is given to the modern theory of noncompetitive equilibriums and the genetic incompatibility of state planning with market mechanisms that this theory proves. The old principle of Roman law, according to which ignorance of the law is no excuse, is directly applicable to this subject. The economists, who for the past 10 years have been accused of all the sins on earth, and who were even deprived of their "science" by supreme sanction, are entitled at long last to ask a few questions, such as the following: For how long will the economic illiteracy at the supreme leadership level be concealed under a cloak of pseudo-Marxist rhetoric and antiscientific forms of words? Is it possible at the present time of crisis, when our entire nation is expecting the BCP to make sober, intelligent decisions capable of uniting the social forces in order to emerge from the crisis, to put forward false criteria that remind the older generation of the notorious "developed socialism" concept? How long will this remain possible, and what will be the cost of this?

The general conclusion that I can draw is that at present the BCP has no new economic ideology at its disposal, and for this reason is contenting itself with cosmetic nuances of phraseology inherited from the former regime. It is evident that this creates a certain vacuum, which cannot be tolerated for long. My proposal is that, without setting preconditions, the BCP should become the initiator of a permanently functioning "roundtable" on economic issues, in which economic experts representing all the political tendencies in the country may take part. The immediate task of this roundtable will be to reach a consensus on the chief issues of economic strategy and tactics in the course of the radical reform. If the BCP wants to remain in the vanguard of society, it must master the new ideas before the opposition does so. Accordingly, the bell tolls for us.

Editorial Note: The publication of this article, which subjects party documents to criticism, including decisions of the plenum of the BCP Central Committee, is likely to appear unusual. However, this is demanded by the new times, and there is nothing unnatural in this. Certainly some of the author's views sound extreme, and it is possible that he has not formulated sufficiently constructive views.

However, RABOTNICHESKO DELO considers that the discussion that is now in progress within the party must be reflected on its pages. Because of this view, the newspaper will continue to publish other views as well.

## 'Ecoglasnost' Founder Discusses Organization

*AU0901155390*

[Editorial Report] Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian on 4 January, on pages 1 and 3 carries a 1,500-word interview with Petur Beron, "one of the 'Ecoglasnost' founders and, since recently, secretary of the Coordination Council of the Union of Democratic Forces," by Rozalin Kostov, ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME reporter: "Let Us Take Ecology Out of Offices,"—date and place not given.

The interview deals with the activity of the Independent "Ecoglasnost" Association in environmental protection. Beron describes "Ecoglasnost" as "heir to the Committee on Ecological Protection in Ruse, and an organization that unites scientists, public figures, artists, workers, and students. Our goals are subject to the urgent need to protect nature and man." Beron considers "the action against the 'Rila' hydroelectric complex and the 'Mesta' hydro-technological complex" as the most successful activity of "Ecoglasnost" until now. He asserts that "Ecoglasnost" would like to be "an organization that controls the governmental apparatus, rather than a part of the government."

Asked about the organization's finances, Beron points out that contributions are the only source of financing the activities. In this context he says that "in 10 months we spent precisely 1,200 leva. We do not have any membership fees, and every branch is responsible for collecting its own contributions."

Beron thinks that "the critical border of environmental protection in Bulgaria has not been crossed yet," and stresses that "if we preserve what is left of our ecology, with joint efforts we will be able to repair some of the damage."

In conclusion he points out that "democracy is the best purifying system" of environmental protection.

### Foreign Minister Dimitrov Ends Talks in Kuwait

*AU1001104490 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 10 Jan 90*

[Report by special correspondent Martin Minkov from Kuwait]

[Text] This morning at the Bayan Palace the meeting of the Bulgarian and Turkish ministers of foreign affairs ended. The officials accompanying the two ministers and many journalists attended the final ceremony. A joint announcement was published.

Using the good services of the Amir of Kuwait, His Highness Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, chairman of the Fifth Summit Islamic Conference, and in accordance with the agreements that were achieved, Boyko Dimitrov, minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and Mesut Yilmaz, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Turkey, held a meeting in Kuwait on 9 January 1990.

In a frank and constructive spirit the two ministers discussed in a detailed and comprehensive manner the present state and prospects of Bulgarian-Turkish relations. They agreed that a further review must be conducted at future talks.

They expressed the political will of their governments to improve relations on a firm and mutually beneficial foundation.

An agreement was reached to hold a meeting during the Open Sky Conference in Ottawa, from 12 to 15 February 1990.

The ministers expressed deep gratitude to the Amir of Kuwait and his government for the initiative and the excellent conditions that had been created for the meeting.

At the closing ceremony, on 10 January 1990, Boyko Dimitrov and Mesut Yilmaz shook hands. I would like to believe that this was more than a protocol gesture at the end of the dialogue.

The Bulgarian and Turkish sides organized separate and brief press conferences in Kuwait. Boyko Dimitrov confirmed the assessment of the dialogue as being frank and constructive. In a response to a question Mesut Yilmaz pointed out that Turkey has no territorial claims toward Bulgaria. He described this part of the Bulgarian population as loyal Bulgarian citizens toward whose fate, as he said, Turkey was not indifferent.

I shall also note that our public has the right to expect a practical expression of this statement, in the spirit of the efforts to normalize bilateral relations.

Boyko Dimitrov, our minister of foreign affairs, met with Dr Hamid al-Jabid, general secretary of the Islamic Conference Organization. Thus the mission in Kuwait ended.

### Dimitrov's Statement After Talks

*AU0901221090 Sofia BTA in English 2146 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["On the Kuwait meeting"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, January 9 (BTA)—Following his session of talks with his Turkish counterpart in Kuwait, Mr Boyko Dimitrov, Bulgaria's minister of foreign affairs, made a statement saying that the Bulgarian delegation had raised the question of a new beginning in Bulgarian-Turkish relations. Essentially, Bulgaria proposed the signing of a non-aggression pact between the two neighbouring states, Bulgarian Television reported. Bulgaria cannot agree to the raised question about a Turkish minority status in the country, the Bulgarian foreign minister said.

The next meeting will be held during an international conference in Ottawa in February.

### Dimitrov To Leave Kuwait, Visit Greece

*AU1001074090 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 0700 GMT 10 Jan 90*

[Text] The meeting in Kuwait between the leaders of the Bulgarian and Turkish Foreign Ministries, Boyko Dimitrov and Mesut Yilmaz will end in a few hours with a joint announcement on their conduct. The intensive

bilateral dialogue was facilitated by the good organization and conditions of conducting the talks, created by the hosts.

As our special correspondent reports, the two foreign ministers will meet today their Kuwaiti colleague Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah. Later on Minister Boyko Dimitrov and the officials who are accompanying him, will depart for Cyprus.

Tomorrow Boyko Dimitrov will make a working visit to Athens, where he will discuss bilateral cooperation. This was confirmed by Andonios Samaras, Greek minister of foreign affairs. The Greek Government, he said, greets the recent decision of the Bulgarian Government, which contributed to respecting human rights. Samaras described Bulgarian-Greek relations as excellent.

### Atanasov Meets Romanian, GDR Counterparts

*AU0901190790 Sofia BTA in English 1747 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["Areas of Cooperation Between Bulgaria and Romania and Bulgaria, GDR Discussed"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, January 9 (BTA)—Mr Georgi Atanasov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, today had a meeting with Mr Petre Roman, prime minister of Romania. During their discussion special attention was paid to the areas of the future cooperation between the two countries and a stress was laid on bilateral economic relations.

It was agreed to outline the concrete targets and determine the ways for their achievement. It was pointed out that the cooperation between the two countries should be placed on a new basis, the main components of which should be the respective interested enterprises.

Mr Georgi Atanasov had also a meeting with Mr Hans Modrow, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR. During the talks attention was focused on the future of bilateral relations. After exchanging information on the problems the two countries are solving now, the two sides discussed some current problems of bilateral economic cooperation and trade.

The areas of cooperation in the next five-year period were discussed. It was pointed out that the skillful combination of the interaction between the separate enterprises and the support of the respective governments will be of particular importance for the dynamics of bilateral relations.

### Text of Havel Telegram to President Bush

*AU0901124690 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 5 Jan 90 p 1*

[Unattributed CTK report: "Thanks for Congratulations"]

[Text] Prague— Vaclav Havel sent the following thanks to U.S. President George Bush for his congratulations on his being elected CSSR president:

Esteemed Mr President,

I thank you for your congratulations on my election as CSSR president. I am convinced that completely new horizons of cooperation between our two nations are now opening up.

We have not forgotten the significant role played by your country and President Wilson personally in the birth of our modern state. I trust that we shall follow this often forgotten fact not only by a new quality of our relations but also by a joint contribution of our two states—although one is so big and the other so small—to world peace.

### New Inquiry Into Danube Dam Project

*AU1001115390 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 3 Jan 90 pp 1, 3*

[Report on interview with Ivan Vesely, Slovak minister of forestry, water economy, and the wood-processing industry, by unidentified reporter; date and place not given: "The Danube Is Silent; the Minister Is Not"]

[Text] In his statement of 15 December last year, Eng Ivan Vesely, minister of forestry, water economy, and wood-processing industry of the Slovak Socialist Republic, announced that he accepts the proposal of the Hungarian Republic to hold talks on changing the agreement between the CSSR and the Hungarian Republic on the construction and operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydropower project. This should be done so that the Gabcikovo section can be completed and put into operation. At the same time he halted preparatory work on the substitute solution for the Hrusov-Dunakiliti reservoir as an expression of the Czechoslovak side's readiness to complete the hydropower project jointly. At that time the minister had promised to enter into negotiations with civic initiatives, environmentalists, and scientists. How have you kept this promise, Mr Minister? You can find the answer to this question on page 3.

[Question] What are the prospects of the construction of the system of hydropower projects on the Danube?

[Vesely] Together with Mr Ondrus, deputy premier of the Slovak Socialist Republic, I participated in talks on the ecological problems concerning the operation of the Gabcikovo dam project. These talks were held in the Research Institute of the Water Economy in Bratislava on 21 December.

[Question] This was the first time that technicians, scientists, researchers, and environmentalists were assessing jointly the system of hydropower projects on the Danube. Did you find common language? At what conclusions did you arrive?

[Vesely] Even before that scientists and researchers had participated in the preparation and realization of the project. However, from the viewpoint of the present level of knowledge and the present approach there exist a number of questions that need to be mutually clarified and assessed again. We agreed on joint conclusions for the further course of action. We decided to set up three groups of experts, which will be headed by appointed representatives of ecologists and technicians and in which experts from the Ministry of Forestry, Water Economy, and Wood-Processing Industry, scientists, researchers, and representatives of the Slovak Union of Nature and Landscape Conservationists and of the Public Against Violence will take part. One commission will deal with the landscape-hydrology regime of underground and surface water levels of Rye Island [area along the Danube in southern Slovakia]. This also includes questions concerning the preservation of the abundant natural resources of drinking water in the upper part of Rye Island and the impact of the project on wetland forests, agriculture, and water supply. The second commission will study the quality of water, both on Rye Island and in the Hrusov reservoir, which will be influenced by the quality of Danube water coming from Austria, by the quality of water in the Danube's Vah and Morava tributaries, and, not least, by the network of canals on Rye Island. The conclusions of these commissions will serve as background material for the activity of the third group, which will make an economic evaluation of the landscape and ecological changes from the viewpoint of the national economic efficiency of the Gabcikovo hydroelectric power station. This group will also put forward a timetable of steps that need to be taken to eliminate ecological risks. The results of the commissions' work will be used in talks with the Hungarian Republic on the further course of construction of the Gabcikovo section of the Danube dam project.

[Question] Do not take offense, please, but whenever a commission was set up in our country to clarify the causes of some serious incident, the public usually did not find out anything about the outcome of the inquiry. What timetable have you adopted for the work of these three specialized groups, if their establishment is not to be an end in itself, but a means of unifying divergent views?

[Vesely] The commission heads and the composition of the commissions are to be announced by 6 January 1990. Until 10 January the dialogue will continue in these specialized groups. We reckon that the conclusions of the commissions will result in short-term measures that can be implemented within the framework of the construction of the Danube dam project as well as in long-term measures laying down conditions for the elimination of ecological risks in the long run. I am thinking, for

example, of the construction of effluent treatment plants in localities representing the largest sources of pollution along the Vah and Morava Rivers, the preservation of the quality of Danube water coming from Austria, and such things.

In connection with the note of the Hungarian Republic of 30 November 1989, Minister Ivan Vesely, together with the commissioner for the construction of the system of hydropower projects on the Danube, will present to the Slovak Socialist Republic Government in the course of January material on the further course of action to be pursued. After the incorporation of comments, this material will be discussed by the CSSR Government. The talks with Hungary could be resumed in the second half of February.

### Dienstbier To Visit Poland, Hungary

*LD0901202890 Prague CTK in English 1415 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Prague, Jan 9 (CTK)—"Czechoslovakia is substantially changing its foreign policy whose main concept is openness and equality in mutual relations. Czechoslovakia is coming back on the European scene sticking to the principles of full independence", new Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky told journalists here today.

He stressed the interest in further promoting the ties with all neighbouring states. In this connection he pointed out that the recent one-day visit of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier to the two German states has confirmed this orientation. Originally a symbolic visit has become very useful for all the three states. The spokesman said that in February 1990 Jiri Dienstbier will pay the first official visit to the FRG, at the invitation of his West German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

On January 10, the minister will visit Poland and on January 12 he will leave Warsaw for Budapest. On Saturday he will be back in Prague. Head of a Foreign Ministry department Miroslav Vetrovec said at the press conference that it is the forthcoming talks with the Polish and Hungarian partners that should create new prerequisites for bilateral relations in all spheres. Approaches towards settlement of disputable issues in relations between Czechoslovakia and its neighbours will also be cleared up, e.g. problem of the purity of the Oder, the water-dam system Gabcikovo-Nagymaros.

As to the relations with the Soviet Union, Foreign Ministry spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky described the talks of groups of experts about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia as the most important. The talks, led by the deputy foreign ministers of both countries, will open in Prague on January 15, he said.

The Czechoslovak side considers the agreement on the provisional deployment of Soviet troops null from the very beginning and will insist on their gradual withdrawal by the end of 1990, Lubos Dobrovsky added.

He also pointed out the significance of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's visit to the Soviet Union planned for the beginning of February, and expressed a possibility of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Czechoslovakia still in January. Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier met with him already during the one-day visit to Moscow late December when he accompanied new Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa.

Minister Dienstbier intends to tke part in a session of the Council of Europe in Venice in January to meet there with the foreign ministers of several West European countries. On his way to Venice, he will make a stop-over in Vienna to sign an agreement on visa-free contact between Czechoslovakia and Austria, head of a Foreign Ministry department Miroslav Vetrovec said.

By the end of January, the Romanian foreign minister is expected to arrive in Prague and on January 16-17, the Yugsoslav foreign minister is to pay a working visit to Czechoslovakia, Miroslav Vetrovec said.

### Radio Examines Cuba, Relations With East Europe

*LD0901124790 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1100 GMT 8 Jan 90*

[Report by correspondent Michal Cermar from Havana via telephone relay—live or recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Let us now listen together to the assessment of the latest developments in the distant Republic of Cuba from our resident correspondent in Havana, Michal Cermak. We have at this moment a telephone connection, so I can say hello.

[Cermak] Good day to the listeners in Czechoslovakia. The internal political situation here in Cuba is, in all aspects and in every case, more complicated that it was for instance a year ago. first of all economic problems are not being tackled as successfully as the situation requires. The rationing system has been made even more rigorous and although official information about various data does not exist, this is apparent here in Havana in the markets and in shops, where some food was being sold freely as late as last spring. There is at present a shortage of meat, poultry, flour, milk. The availability of fish in shops is almost nonexistent and fruit and vegetables appear only sporadically. For instance for more than the last 6 months there have been no onions available in Cuba, including in the shop exclusive to diplomats.

Local rectification and elimination of mistakes and shortcomings, allegedly a kind of modified restructuring, is focused on galvanizing the population to revolutionary zeal and on strengthening the role of the party and its apparatus of power. In no case does the local power want to have anything in common with the market mechanism, let alone with private property.

[Announcer] Yes, you know, what would interest me most is how the developments in our country and other Eastern European states is reflected in Cuba's internal political arena?

[Cermak] It is rather difficult to give a precise answer to this. Officially this is clear. Last summer Fidel Castro characterized the changes as sad and incomprehensible matters, but already now these developments are termed as a systematic destruction of socialist values under the pressure of the subversive work of imperialism. Then there is another slogan here: "It is better to die than deviate from the path of Cuban Communism" and "Cuba will rather sink in the sea then take down the banner of revolution and socialism." No further comment is required.

Otherwise, local people if they trust me absolutely, tell frequently with a lowered voice and while continually looking around different things. There of course do not exist any opinion polls unless they are done secretly. I cannot speak for Cubans as a whole. They continue to assemble in large numbers at the behest of the leader of the revolution and chant anti-imperialist and pro-socialist and pro-party slogans. On the other side, according to THE MIAMI HERALD, 15 various dissident groups are already active here, a number of its members have been sentenced. In any case we know what the situation was like in our own country, and so I would only like to add that all this reminds me of a calm before a storm, but of the Romanian type. It does not look as if a gentle revolution is going to take place here.

[Announcer] Cuba will probably not help itself a great deal by its current isolation and by rejecting changes. What is its present attitude to the outside world. What is its position in Latin America?

However, I was in Chile recently, which is one of the few countries which is prospering here on the continent. But even the newly elected government is not rushing in any way to establish contacts with Cuba. The fall of Manuel Noriega has been a big blow. Panama has been playing a very important role in Cuba's commercial transactions of all kinds. There is now a danger that perhaps even diolomatic relations will be severed between both countries. People remark privately about Noriega' asking how could the Cuban Government offer an asylum to this drug dealer when General Ochoa, the former hero from Angola, and his three other companions, were shot last summer, allegedly for the same reasons. This was a peculiar trial in any case and various rumors are circulating about what really happened, and why the execution of the sentence was carried out so quickly. Simply, Cuba is going through a time which is not easy, and it is difficult to forecast when problems here will be successfully resolved—whether tomorrow or in 2 years' time.

## Foreign Ministry Official on Havel's FRG Visit

*LD0901203590 Prague CTK in English 1610 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Prague, Jan 9 (CTK)—The invitation of the FRG president for a visit to Czechoslovakia was renewed during Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's recent visit to the FRG. The visit is to take place soon, Miroslav Kocarek of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Territorial Department told journalists here today.

Speaking of the results of President Havel's visit to the FRG he said that the Czechoslovak prime minister will visit the FRG in third decade of February. [as received] The prime ministers of the two countries have agreed to name commissioners for bilateral relations - Vaclav Soukup, Czechoslovak Government Presidium Office International Department chief and Horst Teltschich, West German chancellor's foreign affairs advisor, Miroslav Kocarek specified.

He went on to stress that Czechoslovakia considers economic relations a priority in its relations with West Germany. Both countries stand for the conclusion of an agreement on the protection and backing of investments. However, the problem of profit transfer remains to be solved.

Both countries are also interested in the setting up of cultural and information centres in Prague and presumably Cologne as well as in activating personal contacts between the citizens of the two countries particularly in border regions and between the youth.

Commenting on the present-day practice of granting visas Vaclav Kocarek pointed out that Czechoslovakia's attitude is more liberal than that of the FRG. In the near future the opening of a new border crossing will be announced between the FRG and Czechoslovakia at Svaty Kriz-Waldsassen.

Potential opening of other crossing points depends on economic possibilities.

On the problem of recalling 30 Czechoslovak ambassadors, the decision taken by former foreign minister, the Foreign Ministry representative said that they would return in near future but he would not disclose their names until a definitive decision is taken since these officials remain plenipotentiary representatives of their country abroad.

The same source disclosed that an agreement on a visa-free travels between Czechoslovakia and Austria will most probably be signed in Vienna on January 18 this year by the foreign ministers of the two countries involved.

### PLO Ambassador Warns Against Ties With Israel

*AU0901202290 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 5 Jan 90 p 7*

["ta"-signed CTK report: "Interest in the Continuation of the Development of Relations; Palestinian Ambassador at the Communist Party of Slovakia Central Committee"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava— Jan Siroky, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia Central Committee, received Samih 'Abd al-Fattah, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the State of Palestine, in Bratislava yesterday. [passage omitted] The ambassador expressed interest in the development of relations of friendship and further cooperation with the Communist Party, regardless of its place in society. [passage omitted]

Yesterday in Bratislava, Ambassador Samih 'Abd al-Fattah also gave a news conference for journalists from Slovak periodicals. In his opening statement the Palestinian guest welcomed, inter alia, the developments which occurred in the last couple of weeks in Czechoslovakia and other countries in East Europe in the interest of securing democracy and implementing political and economic reforms. [passage omitted]

Asked by journalists about his assessment of the potential normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and individual countries of eastern and central Europe, the ambassador stated that this is exclusively the internal affair of every sovereign state. At the same time he voiced the concern, however, that Tel Aviv could present the possible resumption of diplomatic ties as its victory or even as an expression of support for the anti-Arab orientation of its foreign policy. As Samih 'Abd-al Fattah stressed, such a step would not assist in the efforts at a just solution of the Palestinian question and, in the final analysis, would not lead to the elimination of the hotbed of tension in the strategically important region of the Middle East.

### Text of Havel Telegram to Supreme Soviet

*AU0901124990 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 5 Jan 90 p 1*

[Unattributed CTK report: "Thanks for Congratulations"]

[Text] Prague— CSSR President Vaclav Havel sent the following thanks to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium for its congratulations on his being elected:

Esteemed friends,

I thank you for your congratulations. I, too, wish that relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union be friendly and bilaterally beneficial and that they significantly contribute towards deepening peace in Europe and all over the world. As regards myself, I shall do for it everything within my powers.

### Adamec, Gorbachev Hold Telephone Conversation

*AU0901120690 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 30 Dec 89 p 2*

["zr"-signed report from the "By Teletype, Mail, Telephone..." column]

[Text] In a telephone conversation on Friday [29 December], Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Chairman Ladislav Adamec and Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, exchanged information on the situation and current tasks of the two parties. Mikhail Gorbachev wished Ladislav Adamec much success in the efforts for the party's renewal. The two representatives wished each other all the best for the new year.

### Dobrovsky: Soviet Troop Withdrawal in 1990

*LD0901193890 Prague Television Service in Czech 1830 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Foreign Ministry spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky described changes in our foreign policy as very substantial. If Czechoslovakia wishes to enter the world, and in particular Europe, as a sovereign and completely independent state, it must do so without any specific relations. The specific ties with the Soviet Union must change into relations which are quite normal and based on mutual equality, the press spokesman said.

Speaking about the talks of the Czechoslovak-Soviet commission of experts on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from our territory, he said the following:

[Begin Dobrovsky recording] We expect the Soviet troops to leave Czechoslovakia by the end of 1990. Our point of departure is that the agreement on the temporary deployment of forces on the territory of Czechoslovakia is null and void. Naturally we will not insist in any way that the Soviet side should accept this formulation in a formal, legal way, but we wish to act in essence as if this decision has been adopted. Our standpoint is not based on any, shall we say, compromise position concerning Soviet requirements, but simply on technical possibilities of withdrawing the troops, transport, and so on. [end recording]

In the Foreign Ministry spokesman's opinion, the Vienna disarmament talks and their progress are not essential for solving this question. The Czechoslovak requirements are aimed at renewing normal relations, and these were violated with the entry of the troops in August 1968. Foreign Minister Dienstbier leaves tomorrow for a visit to Poland, and from there he will go directly to Budapest.

### 1968 Events Viewed as 'High Treason'

*LD0901182790 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] The Czechoslovak Prosecutor General's Office has issued a standpoint on instances requiring the criminal prosecution of persons who took part in the military occupation of our republic in August 1968.

The organs of the Prosecutor General's Office have reached the conclusion that possible action by persons which caused the military occupation of the country amounted to the criminal act of high treason carried out in the form of the crime of subversion of the republic. In the said case, interference in the sovereignty of the state took place. Through this action an extremely serious consequence took place, because by 3 September 1968, 72 citizens had been killed and 266 were seriously wounded. Developments after April 1969 made it impossible for the organs of the Prosecutor's Office to make the necessary investigation of the crime and conclude the criminal responsibility of specific persons. At the present time, the organs of the Prosecutor's Office see the possibility of criminal prosecution as being expired.

### Jakes Cited on 1968, Recent Events

*PM0901151090 London ITV Television Network in English 1900 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Report on interview with Milos Jakes, former general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium, incorporating remarks by the Civic Forum's Jan Urban, by reporter Klaus Schwagrzinna in Prague, on Channel 4's "Europe Express" program; date not given—recorded in Czech with English subtitles]

[Text] [Schwagrzinna] Finding Jakes was not easy. Out of power, he seemed to have vanished from Prague. The party would not help. But with the help of our interpreter, Eva, we tracked him down for the first interview he has given since he lost his job and was thrown out of the party. These days he lives behind a locked gate in a quiet suburb—private, discreet. In his own awkward way, he seems to enjoy a little attention. After 40 years' service to the party, he is on his own: no office to go to, no meetings, no conferences. I brought some flowers for his wife, but she was away. There was just Milos Jakes and his empty house, spotless, almost antiseptic—no ornaments, no photos, no homey touches. Forty years climbing the ladder, and now he is grateful for the chance to tell his story.

[Jakes] I'm 67. I've asked for a pension. I shall live as a pensioner. I'd like to help the party even if I'm expelled—to help it regain people's trust and give it more influence.

[Schwagrzinna] Do your friends still talk to you?

[Jakes] Yes. When we meet we talk about politics, but the comrades now in power have to distance themselves from the past. Part of that process was expelling me from the party. I've become a sort of scapegoat.

[Schwagrzinna] Portrait of a party apparatchik: the peasant stock, little education, but hardworking and ambitious. Loyalty to the party machine carried him up through the ranks, through the inner circles of power, close to Alexander Dubcek—a fellow student during 3 years' political training in Moscow. The memories are mixed.

[Jakes] Dubcek was sociable, but he had quirks: He liked to attract attention to himself. He'd deliberately arrive late in class when everyone else was already sitting down, but he was pleasant. He liked sports—we used to play volleyball together.

[Schwargrzinna] Were you friends?

[Jakes] We knew each other, but we weren't real friends. He was liked by the Soviets because he spoke fluent Russian, and we were only just learning it. Then in April '68 I became chairman of the Control and Audit Commission, and I worked with Dubcek. But then events came between us: We ended up on different sides.

[Schwagrzinna] Jakes picked the winning side. Soviet tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia to cut short the Prague Spring. Military and police power made sure any further protest was short-lived. With order restored, it was time to settle political scores. As head of the purge commission, Jakes shot to prominence and became a hated figure among ordinary Czechs. Under instructions from the party's leadership, one-half million people were expelled from the party. Dubcek himself was sacked and ended as a forestry worker constantly watched by the secret police. Jakes was blamed for it all.

[Urban] There were hundreds and hundreds of people—some of them even died—because of being given no chance to work in their jobs. It was all right for my father who was quite strong, but when you think about university professors who taught, I don't know..., 30 years of philosophy, and suddenly had to go to work with pickaxes—it sometimes was quite traumatic.

[Jakes] That is a false version that's years old. The trouble is, the purge was ordered by the party Central Committee—I was not on that committee. I headed the Control and Audit Commission: We just heard appeals against the decisions of other party bodies.

[Schwargrzinna] But that meant discrimination, no university education, etcetera.

[Jakes] That's not true. Look at Dubcek and others: All their children finished university. Yes, there were mistakes, but the purges didn't just happen at the top, but locally too. Sometimes the treatment didn't match the fault. Many left voluntarily: They didn't wait. There weren't many activists supporting '68.

[Schwargrzinna] Today, Jakes may try to shift the blame for the purges on the collective will of the party. At the

time, he was ready to take the credit. The purges were the making of Milos Jakes. The party circles, his reputation soared, and he climbed still higher [sentence as heard]. Eventually, he became general secretary of the party in December '87. He talked about reform and restructuring, but he had learned the lessons of '68: Politics was not about ideas—it was about control. Stability and discipline were the priorities.

[Urban] He was there for 2 years. We've never had so many political prisoners like we had in the last year of his reign. We've never had so many what we call... cases of what we call "silent terrorism," with secret policemen kidnapping people, taking them to the forest outside the cities, beating them, and driving away. And just when you read all his speeches in the last 2 years—you can just see it—the tone is... the image is harder, harder, and harder.

[Schwagrzinna] But when the wave of reform reached Czechoslovakia, his determination to keep total control destroyed him and the communists. On November 17 a peaceful student protest came face-to-face with riot police. The opposition insists it was a careful, planned operation: Hundreds were injured in the violence that followed. Once again, Jakes maintains that it was a collective mistake: He and the Central Committee had been misled; the security forces were out of control. You were the most powerful man in Czechoslovakia, but on this crucial day you were powerless?

[Jakes] Powerless, no. I received inaccurate information. I reacted on the basis of that information—not just me, but the whole Central Committee. When we knew the facts, we changed our attitude: We said it was an action which should not have taken place and that during this action there was roughness, and we reacted to this.

[Schwagrzinna] But November 17 was the turning point. The people demanded Jakes must resign: One week later he did. Soon after, he was purged from the party.

[Jakes] It doesn't feel good, but it's been whipped up—you know what a weapon television is. For weeks they talked negatively about me: That creates a certain atmosphere, and people like to see a villain. The party's problem was that because of centralized control, the party's power monopoly, and lack of an opposition, we couldn't fight political battles anymore.

[Schwagrzinna] As a final insult, huge crowds greeted his old enemies now as heroes. Suddenly he was in the wilderness, and Dubcek and Havel riding high. But Jakes insists Dubcek's great return has no real political importance.

[Jakes] I'd say that people who worked with Dubcek and know him see in him a sort of a symbol. But after his speeches at the big demonstrations, everyone believes—or at least, the majority do, especially the young—that Dubcek's return to political life wouldn't contribute much.

[Schwagrzinna] The world Jakes knew—the world he moved through with confidence—is gone: Even the '68 invasion has been denounced as a mistake by the Soviet Union. But Jakes still can't bring himself to admit that 20 years' work was based on a mistake.

[Jakes] It wasn't considered a mistake then, but a step to strengthen the socialist community. History will be the judge. It's only been 20 years: That's too little time. While those who took part are alive, one can't be objective. From the point of view of today's events like perestroyka, glasnost, and democratization, it seems like a mistake, but history can't be changed.

[Schwagrzinna] But history can be rewritten: History moves on, and history has left Milos Jakes behind. To change and adapt is not the apparatchik's way. The ideas are discredited; the power is gone. It's not General Secretary Jakes anymore; it's not even Comrade Jakes anymore—just Milos Jakes, pensioner: wanted to be remembered, hoping he's forgotten.

## Jakes Denies Approving Action Against Students

*LD0901233990 Prague CTK in English 2230 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Prague, Jan 9 (CTK)—Former Czechoslovak Communist Party General Secretary Milos Jakes reiterated in his interview to CTK today that the Czechoslovak Communist Party Presidium gave an order not to take an action against students on November 17, 1989.

"I did not approve any action 'Student' about which former Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior Frantisek Kincl informed the Commission of the Federal Assembly," Milos Jakes stressed. He denied that the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee directly controlled the security bodies.

Asked whether the statement of former department head of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee State Administration Rudolf Hegenbart published in today's youth daily MLADA FRONTA and claiming that Milos Jakes gave an order to chief of staff of the People's Militia Miroslav Novak to bring militias to Prague and capture universities, theatres, crossroads, etc. is truthful, Milos Jakes replied that "the proposal to bring militias to Prague on November 21, 1989 aroused from the impetus of chief of staff of the People's Militia Miroslav Novak. Its aim was to reinforce security forces and not to capture various objects. The proposal to reinforce the security forces was supported by the Czechoslovak Communist Party Presidium. The meeting of leading secretaries of district committees of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Prague showed that these measures were not necessary".

Asked how he evaluates the past 40 years in Czechoslovakia, Milos Jakes said that the view that all has been bad, including February 1948, is wrong and does not correspond with history, nor with the achieved results.

As regards the decision of the Czechoslovak Communist Party extraordinary congress concerning the entry of troops in August 1968 into Czechoslovakia, Milos Jakes said that is a logical result of the change of stands of the five Warsaw Treaty countries on this issue. It is therefore correct that the extraordinary party congress followed from these facts and adopted necessary resolutions on this issue as well as on the questions of those expelled from the party.

Asked about his possible abuse of power and personal enrichment, Jakes said that his conscience is completely clear.

## Urbanek Interviewed on Jan, Nov Demonstrations

*AU1001094390 Prageu MLADA FRONTA in Czech 4 Jan 90 pp 1,2*

[Unattributed report: "He Did Not Give Congratulations"]

[Excerpts] Yesterday's hearings of the joint commission of the Federal Assembly and Czech National Council which supervises the investigation of the events of 17 November in Prague could be called visitors' day. [passage omitted] The greatest attention of the journalists assembled before the closed doors of the meeting hall was aroused by K. Urbanek, former and current functionary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee. [passage omitted]

Urbanek said, "I have already said everything I knew. I told the commission that I was not in the country after 15 November. I returned on 17 November at around 1900 and went to Brno, the place of my permanent residence. The next day, upon a decision of the party Presidium, I left for Romania to attend the congress there and came back only on 22 November at 3 o'clock in the morning."

MLADA FRONTA: After the repressive actions in Wenceslas Square in January, you went to congratulate members of the stand-by regiment [pohotovostni pluk]. What prompted you to do this then?

[Urbanek] It was not to congratulate them, it was a visit. As is known—or, perhaps, it is not known—even at that time I was not in the country. I was on an official visit to Moscow for consultations with Comrade Razumovskiy, secretary for political and organizational affairs. The consultations concerned various matters of the structure of the apparatus. I returned after the events. The Presidium decided that someone ought to visit this unit. I was chosen, so I visited them and inspected the technical equipment which was there. Well, I believe that this technical equipment has never entered Wenceslas Square since then." [passage omitted]

## Reportage on Amnesty, Repercussions

### Text of Amnesty

*AU0901060590 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 2 Jan 90 p 2*

[Unattributed CTK report: "Amnesty Decree"]

[Text] Prague— On the occasion of his being elected head of state, CSSR President Vaclav Havel made use of his constitutional powers and decreed the following amnesty with effect from 1 January 1990:

Article I

I pardon the following sentences which have been or will be lawfully passed for minor [preciny] or criminal offenses committed prior to the date of this decree:

a) prison sentences, either unserved or their remainders, passed separately for minor offenses,

b) unserved suspended prison sentences,

c) unserved imposed corrective measures [napravna opatreni] or their remainders,

d) financial penalties or their remainders that have not been paid, unless they have been imposed concurrently with a prison sentence.

Effective with the date of the issuance of this decree, the offenders will be regarded as not having been sentenced.

Article II

1. I pardon unserved prison sentences or their remainders which have been or will be lawfully passed for criminal offenses committed prior to the date of this decree, unless they exceed

a) 2 years for criminal offenses committed intentionally,

b) 3 years for criminal offenses attributable to negligence,

c) 3 years for aggregate and cumulative sentences passed for criminal offenses committed intentionally and attributable to negligence.

2. Regarding other prison sentences or their remainders that have been or will be lawfully passed for criminal offenses committed prior to the date of this decree, I pardon

a) one-third, but at least 2 years, of sentences passed for intentional criminal offenses,

b) one-half, but at least 3 years, of sentences passed for criminal offenses attributable to negligence,

c) one-third, but at least 3 years, of aggregate and cumulative sentences passed for international criminal offenses and criminal offenses attributable to negligence.

3. The provisions of sections 1 and 2 [of Article II] also apply to aggregate and cumulative sentences for criminal and minor offenses.

Article III

I pardon prison sentences which have been lawfully passed for criminal offenses committed prior to the date of this decree, the upper limit of which does not exceed 1 year, with the effect that the offender is regarded, effective from the date of this decree, as not having been sentenced.

Article IV

I order that proceedings not be held for minor offenses which were committed prior to the date of this decree.

Article V

I order that proceedings not be initiated and, if already initiated, that proceedings be halted for

a) intentional criminal offenses committed prior to the date of this decree, if the set maximum prison sentence for them does not exceed 3 years,

b) criminal offenses committed out of negligence prior to the date of this decree, if the set maximum prison sentence for them does not exceed 5 years.

Article VI

1. The provisions of Articles II and V do not apply to

a) the criminal offense of abusing the powers of a public official under Paragraph 158 of the Criminal Code and criminal and minor offenses committed concurrently with that offense,

b) attempting or completing the criminal offenses of terror under Paragraph 93 of the Criminal Code; general menace [obecne ohrozeni] under Paragraph 179, section 3 of the Criminal Code; homicide under Paragraph 219 of the Criminal Code; robbery under Paragraph 234, sections 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code; rape under Paragraph 241, sections 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code; and sexual abuse under Paragraph 242, sections 3 and 4 of the Criminal Code,

c) persons who have been sentenced as especially dangerous habitual offenders under Paragraph 41 of the Criminal Code.

2. I pardon 1 year off the sentences which have or will be lawfully passed on offenders listed in sections 1 b) and 1 c) [of Article VI] for criminal offenses committed prior to the date of this decree.

Article VII

I instruct the general prosecutor of the CSSR, the ministers of justice of the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic, and the minister of defense of the CSSR to submit to me for a decision, on the basis of a reexamination, proposals to halt criminal proceedings or proposals to pardon or reduce sentences for criminal offenses committed prior to the date of this decree in the case of persons to whom this decree does not apply, or to whom it applies only partially, if they are

a) pregnant women,

b) mothers looking after a child under the age of 15 or other persons themselves looking after such a child,

c) men above the age of 60 and women above the age of 55,

d) persons suffering from a serious illness or disabled persons,

e) persons accused of, or sentenced for, criminal offenses under Chapter I of the Special Section of the Criminal Code and for the criminal offense of deserting abroad under Paragraph 283 of the Criminal Code.

Article VIII

I instruct the prosecutor general of the CSSR, the ministers of justice of the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic, and the minister of national defense of the CSSR to ensure that this decree is carried out by 21 January 1990 at the latest.

## Commission Report

*LD0901213390 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Summary] By evening on 8 January, more than 16,000 persons have been released from the corrective-training institutes in the Czech Socialist Republic on the basis of the amnesty. This was announced today, 9 January, at the session of the commission of the Czech National Council and the Justice Ministry, which supervises the conditions for the execution of punishment.

Dr Zdenek Hajek, its deputy chairman, said that the commission dealt with the questions connected with ensuring job placements and accommodation for all released prisoners, so that the prisoners could return to civilian life without further problems and difficulties. Of the whole number of released prisoners, only a tiny percentage gets involved again in criminal activity. This situation has been very successfully tackled with the help of the security and Czechoslovak People's Army bodies. In the future, the commission will draw up a new legislative amendment, which will guide our penal system along the principles of humanity and justice. However, despite the fact that the situation in prisons has calmed down, the Czech National Council will have to continue monitoring the situation in prisons in the future.

### Former Prisoners Assisted

*LD0901151190 Prague CTK in English 1340 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Prague, Jan 9 (CTK)—A total of 24,433 persons are being released from prisons in Czechoslovakia these days.

The assistance provided to the persons released under the amnesty declared by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel is directed by a group of specialists of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and put into practice by social departments of individual national committees. Charitable institutions and religious organisations.

Mass media inform the released prisoners of centres where they get money, accomodation and information about job opportunities. Many building and industrial enterprises offer jobs to former prisoners, but information about vacant dormitories is rather delayed. Unfortunately, not all the released prisoners are ready to earn their living honestly—so far 144 persons have committed criminal offences again.

Former prisoners also give evidence of serious shortcomings in prisons. They say they have no control of their earnings during their stay in prison. They do not know how much is being taken off to cover their debts, alimonies, etc. Prison libraries provide insufficient opportunities for prisoners to increase their qualification. Sport opportunities as well as medical care are also insufficient. And the possibility of maintaining contacts with partners, not only because of sex, but from the point of view of preserving the family, is also of great importance.

All these issues are being discussed currently by special commissions attached to the Czech and Slovak National Councils.

### Soldiers To Work in Businesses

*LD0801193590 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1730 GMT 8 Jan 90*

[Text] Colonel General Miroslav Vacek, minister of national defense, has, on the basis of a decision of the federal government, decided to release 1,500 soldiers to secure the running of some branches of the national economy. At present, 850 soldiers are working in Czech industry, 150 in the Czech construction industry, and 500 soldiers are to work in the Skoda Mlada Boleslav motor car complex.

### Security Service Concerned About Crime Trends

*LD0901132290 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1130 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Members of the Public Security Service in the Czech Socialist Republic are deeply concerned about the trend in the security situation in the current period, when criminal activity has substantially increased. One of the main reasons, according to information received from the Czech Interior Ministry is the decline in legal awareness of a section of the population and the overall decline in the authority of the National Security Corps as a result of the disparagement of its work.

Members of the Public Security Service go on to stress that they want be by their work a pillar of our society. The security service must not, however, lose its capacity to act, which is a key condition for a successful fight against criminal activity.

They have appealed to all fellow citizens with a request to give their support to members of the Public Security Service in their endeavor to protect the legitimate interests and rights of citizens. In their statements a number of members of the National Security Corps demand the adoption of specific measures. They demand, for instance, that the president of the Republic appear on television to take a clear stand on the work of members of the National Security corps, the establishment of independent trade unions along the departmental lines as well as the chance to comment on the National Security Corps draft law.

### Prison Guards Threaten Protest Actions

*AU0901062490 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 3 Jan 90 p 4*

["ml"-signed report: "Demands on the Minister"]

[Text] Ostrava (from our correspondent)— Members of the Corrective Education Corps at Ostrava-Hermanice have turned to the minister of justice of the Czech Socialist Republic with demands for the creation of better conditions for the proper execution of their service duties.

In their catalogue of 35 demands they stress the need for the supply of objective information to the public about the situation in prisons and about convicts from the viewpoint of their criminal activity. They demand, furthermore, the expeditious amendment to the law on the conditions of service by members of the corps and to the regulations arising from this law in conjunction with the Labor Code, as well as the creation of an independent section [at the ministry of justice] that would defend their interests and rights. A number of demands concerns better social conditions, improved medical care of members of the corps, a reduction in the number of convicts per educator, and the like.

Members of the Corrective Education Corps at Hermanice demand that the minister of justice assumes a specific stand on their demands by 5 January 1990. In the event that her standpoint, and the manner of meeting their demands, is not conveyed to them by then, they will enter an unlimited protest action, in the course of which they will turn up for service but will steer clear of contact with the convicts.

### Army Replaces 'Comrade' as Form of Address

*LD0901115290 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak 1100 GMT 9 JAN 90*

[Text] Colonel General Miroslav Vacek, the Czechoslovak minister of national defense, has issued an order about how soldiers are to address each other in the future. Article 4 of the Armed Forces regulations dealing with how soldiers of the Czechoslovak People's Army address each other in mutual contact has been amended by replacing the address "comrade" with the address "mister." Other amendments will be carried out in line with the amendment of the Federal Constitution. The order becomes effective as of 15 January this year.

### More on Personnel Changes in Army

*AU0901061790 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 30 Dec 89 p 2*

[Unattributed CTK report: "Changes in the Czechoslovak People's Army"]

[Text] Prague— By his order of 27 December (that is, prior to the election of a new president), CSSR Premier Marian Calfa, standing proxy for the CSSR president, decided on cadre changes in the Czechoslovak People's Army [CSLA] command.

He appointed Major General Anton Slimak as chief of the CSLA general staff and CSSR first deputy minister of national defense. He recalled Lieutenant General Emil Liska from the post of CSSR deputy minister of national defense and appointed Major General Rudolf Duchacek to the post. Antonin Rasek, who had until 1970 been a career soldier, was appointed deputy minister of national defense for culture and education in the CSLA. Following his release from the Army, Antonin Rasek worked as researcher in the field of industrial sociology.

Furthermore, the federal premier recalled Colonel General Jaroslav Klicha from the post of chief of the CSLA Political Main Administration; Lieutenant General Oskar Marek and Colonel Stefan Fabian from the post of chiefs of the Political Administrations of the Western and Eastern Military Districts; and Lieutenant General Jiri Reindl from the post of chief of the Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy in Bratislava. At the same time the CSSR minister of national defense decided to release them from active military service.

### Further on 6 Jan CPCZ CC Session

#### Resolutions Adopted

*AU1001124990 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 8 Jan 90 p 5*

[Resolutions adopted at the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee Session held in Prague on 6 January]

[Text] The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] Central Committee:

I. Approves:

1. Political and organizational provisions for the conclusions adopted at the extraordinary CPCZ congress;

2. Suggestions for Communists', party primary organizations', and party district committees' activity;

3. The organizational arrangement of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia apparatus;

4. The draft amendments to the salary scale for employees in the CPCZ apparatus;

5. Directives for conducting CPCZ economic affairs;

6. Draft principles for managing CPCZ funds, the solidarity and support fund statute, and the CPCZ election fund;

7. The CPCZ Central Committee rules of procedure;

8. The candidacy of Jiri Michalik, Zdenek Masopust, and Vasil Mohorita as CSSR Federal Assembly deputies and of Frantisek Adamek as a Czech National Council deputy;

II. Approves the composition of:

1. The commission responsible for evaluating political responsibility for crisis development in the party and society;

2. The commission responsible for objectively evaluating the years 1968-69 and subsequent development in the CSSR;

3. The commission responsible for preparing organizational regulations and, if appropriate, the party's articles which will be submitted to the scheduled 18th CPCZ Congress;

4. The commission responsible for preparing draft principles for the party's program, a program which the scheduled 18th CPCZ Congress will debate;

5. The commission responsible for preparing an election campaign for the new elections to be held in 1990;

6. The commission established to deal with materially and technically safeguarding CPCZ activity under the new conditions, including the purposeful utilization of CPCZ property.

III. Elected:

1. A CPCZ Central Committee Political Executive Committee;

2. CPCZ Central Committee secretaries.

IV. Charges:

1. The Political Executive Committee with preparing and submitting to the next CPCZ Central Committee session a draft policy for the preparation of the scheduled CPCZ congress;

2. The CPCZ Central Committee commission responsible for preparing an election campaign for the new elections to be held in 1990 and the CPCZ Central Committee Political Executive Committee with drafting and submitting to the next CPCZ Central Committee session a draft CPCZ election program and principles for the party's and the central election team's course of action during the election campaign;

3. CPCZ Central Committee commissions with submitting to the Political Executive Committee before 31 January 1990 draft objectives for their activity, including a timetable;

4. The Political Executive Committee, in harmony with the political agreement reached at the roundtable, with approving the candidacy of CPCZ members as CSSR Federal Assembly and Czech National Council deputies from among the ranks of members of the CPCZ Central Committee, the CPCZ Central Control and Audit Commission, and the RUDE PRAVO editorial board, and, if applicable, from among the ranks of Communists and leading functionaries in vital social organizations. Suitable candidates for CSSR Federal Assembly deputies in the Slovak Socialist Republic should be decided upon jointly with the Communist Party of Slovakia Central Committee. The candidates should be from among the ranks of its members. At the same time, it is necessary to pay heed to the principle that the proposed candidate should have some connection with the electoral district which he is to represent.

5. The Political Executive Committee with guaranteeing a discussion on the resignation of those deputies representing the CPCZ in the CSSR Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council who have lost the electorate's and the Communist Party's trust. In case they reject their well-founded resignation, it will be necessary to make a decision on proposing their recall.

6. The Political Executive Committee with establishing a CPCZ Central Committee commission for social and legal issues;

7. The Political Executive Committee with convening a CPCZ Central Committee session on 17 February 1990 which will have as its program "CPCZ Preparations for the Elections".

V. It Entrusts:

1. The Political Executive Committee with adopting decisions on topical organizational and political issues in the period between CPCZ Central Committee sessions and with subsequently informing the Central Committee about them;

2. The Political Executive Committee with further discussing the method of supplementing and reconstructing legislative committees;

3. The Political Executive Committee, in the spirit of the principles adopted at Central Committee talks, with urgently conducting personnel and organizational restructuring within the CPCZ Central Committee apparatus.

VI. It Makes Note of:

1. The speeches delivered by the CPCZ chairman and the CPCZ Central Committee first secretary;

2. Reports on the situation in select party district organizations in the Czech Socialist Republic.

## Executive Committee Elected

*AU1001084590 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 8 Jan 90 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "The CPCZ Central Committee Executive Committee Elected at a CPCZ Central Comittee Session Held on 6 January 1990"]

[Text] Ladislav Adamec, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] chairman;

Vasil Mohorita, CPCZ Central Committee first secretary;

Frantisek Adamek, desk officer at the Prague IPS [Civil Engineering Works] State Enterprise—Prague;

Milan Alexovic, director of the District Educational Center in Svidnik—East Slovakia;

Vladimir Cvrtnicek, worker at Zbrojovka Brno—South Moravia;

Jaromir Gebas, deputy director of the Krkonos National Park Administration in Vrchlabi—East Bohemia;

Vaclav Habart, miners' foreman at the West Bohemia Uranium Mines in Zadni Chodov in the Tachov District—West Bohemia;

Eva Hralova, workshop planner at Electrosvit in Nove Zamky—West Slovakia;

Pavol Kanis, secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia [CPSL] Executive Committee;

Peter Kneppo, leading scientific officer at the Slovak Academy of Sciences Institute of Metrological Technology in Bratislava;

Libor Kostya, career soldier—South Bohemia;

Marian Kovac, chairman of the Socialist Youth Union District Committee in Humenne—East Slovakia;

Jiri Machalik, lecturer at the Palacky University Marxism-Leninism Institute in Olomouc—North Moravia;

Libor Nejedly, electrician at the LIAZ [Liberec Automobile Works] State Enterprise in Jablonec nad Nisou—North Bohemia;

Zdenka Nocarova, chairwoman of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement Plant Committee at the Caslav State Farm in the Kutna Hora District—Central Bohemia;

Petr Novotny, leader of an artistic ensemble and director of the Karlin Music Theater—Prague;

Josef Pinta, chairman of the Kovarov Local National Committee in the Pisek District—South Bohemia;

Rudolf Reiner, director of the municipal political college in Prague;

Simon Svitok, secretary of the CPSL District Committee in Prievidza;

Ondrej Saling, CPCZ Central Committee secretary prior to the extraordinary CPCZ congress;

Jan Siroky, chairman of the CPCZ Central Committee Executive Committee;

Vladimir Tolar, chairman of the Miletin United Agricultural Cooperative in the Jicin District—East Bohemia;

Marie Vildova, teacher at the Zajecov primary school in the Beroun District—Central Bohemia;

Peter Weiss, secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee Executive Committee;

Frantisek Adamek, Jiri Machalik, and Ondrej Saling were elected as CPCZ Central Committee secretaries.

### Biographies of New Secretaries

*AU1001132590 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 9 Jan 90 p 3*

[Unattributed report: "We Introduce the New CPCZ Central Committee Secretaries"]

[Text] Frantisek Adamek

Comrade Frantisek Adamek was born on 28 February 1955; he is a Slovak and comes from a working class family. He has been a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] since 1979.

After graduating from high school, he joined the Kovosluzba enterprise in Prague where he worked as a measurer [vahar]. From 1974-76 he worked at the Military Construction Works in Prague. In 1976 he joined the Prague State Farm. Since 1978 he has worked at the Prague IPS [Civil Engineering Works] State Enterprise. Since joining this enterprise, he has progressed from being a worker to an expert officer, a post which he held until recently. Since 1989 he has been a member of the Prague CPCZ City Committee Presidium.

Jiri Machalik

Comrade Jiri Machalik was born on 19 June 1945; he is a Czech and comes from a working class family. He has been a member of the CPCZ since 1970.

In 1969 he graduated from the Faculty of Natural Sciences at Palacky University in Olomouc. After graduating, he began working at the Seliko State Enterprise in Olomouc. From 1970-73 he was employed by the Regional National Committee in Ostrava as a high school teacher. Since 1983 he has been working at Palacky University in Olomouc as a lecturer in the Marxism-Leninism Institute. He occupied the post of chairman of a CPCZ primary organization.

Ondrej Saling

Comrade Ondrej Saling was born on 10 December 1940; he is a Slovak and comes from a civil service family. He has been a member of the CPCZ since 1961.

After graduating from the Forestry Faculty of the Forestry and Lumber College in Zvolen and after basic military service, he worked until 1967 as a forestry technician in the Forestry Enterprise in Pezinok; later he became an independent technician in the State Forestry Enterprise in Bratislava, and from 1969-70 he was a specialist officer in the Slovak Socialist Republic Ministry of Forestry and Water Economy. From 1970-78 he has been the head of a department, a secretary in the Slovak Central Committee, and a secretary in the Socialist Youth Union Central Committee. In 1978 he transferred to the CPCZ apparatus where he was head of a section and deputy head of a CPSL Central Committee department, a leading district committee secretary, a secretary and leading secretary in the CPSL West Slovak Regional Committee, and a secretary in the CPSL Central Committee. In 1988 he was co-opted into the CPCZ Central Committee. From 1976-81 he was a CSSR Federal Assembly deputy.

### CPCZ Asked To Return Property To Aid Economy

*AU0901150690*

[Editorial Report] Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech on 2 January on page 5 carries a 1,200-word article by Eva Prochazkova entitled "By What Right?; About a Hotel Which Cost Us Kcs1.2 Billion But Belongs to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee." The article discusses the circumstances of the construction of the 7-story, 202-room Hotel Prague in the sixth district of the capital and questions the right of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] Central Committee to own this hotel, which was built from "state coffers" at a cost of Kcs1.2 billion. The author also objects to the secrecy surrounding this building, which is "hidden behind a mighty white wall," carries no inscription, and does not have its number listed in the Prague telephone directory. Speaking about the hotel, which was built between 1975 and 1980 and is reserved for "party and state visits," Prochazkova also emphasizes the wastefulness which accompanied its construction, owing to the fact that it was "exempt from all norms." She points out, for example, that the entire wood-paneling made of Canadian elm had to be taken down because Vasil Bilak "did not like the color" and that each seat in the conference hall of the hotel, supplied by domestic

manufacturers, cost Kcs42,000 although comparable foreign-made seats would have cost only Kcs9,000. Even so, imports for the hotel from hard-currency countries reportedly amounted to Kcs250 million. As Prochazkova reveals, these included bullet-proof glass for all doors and "the strategic U.S. Delta computer, which was excluded from the embargo after 1 year of negotiations."

Prochazkova's article is followed by a 250-word statement signed by 13 members of the "strike committee of the Housing Enterprise in Prague-6," in which they point out that there are several buildings in this municipal district which "are used by CPCZ or Ministry of Interior bodies although originally they were earmarked for a different purpose." This is reportedly the case of the Masaryk student dormitory, occupied by the Ministry of Interior; a seminary in Kolejni Street, which now houses the PEACE AND SOCIALISM publishing house; three buildings in Lermontov Street, which are occupied by the foreign employees of the PEACE AND SOCIALISM publishing house; as well as Hotel Prague. In their statement the employees of the housing enterprise demand that these buildings be returned to their original owners or used for the benefit for the public. The "luxurious" Hotel Prague, for example, should in their opinion be used as international hotel, for the benefit of the national economy.

### Adamec Meets Expelled CPCZ Secretary

*AU0901161890 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 30 Dec 89 p 1*

["zr"-signed report: "Adamec-Mlynar Meeting"]

[Text] Prague— Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Chairman Ladislav Adamec met Professor Zdenek Mlynar in Prague on Friday [29 December]. In a frank conversation they exchanged views on the current political situation in our country and in the world.

Their attention was focused on questions related to the process of restoring democracy in Czechoslovakia and building a modern pluralistic political system in our society.

Zdenek Mlynar briefed Ladislav Adamec on the course of his meetings and findings acquired during his recent visit to the USSR.

### Adamec, Mohorita Congratulate Havel on Election

*AU0901061190 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 30 Dec 89 p 1*

["zr"-signed report: "CPCZ Representatives Congratulate"]

[Text] Prague—Ladislav Adamec, chairman of the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party], and Vasil Mohorita, first secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, have congratulated Vaclav Havel on his election as CSSR president:

Esteemed Mr President; on behalf of the CPCZ Central Committee we congratulate you on your election as CSSR President. We are doing this with the conviction that your election renews the historical tradition which demands that this highest office of our state be occupied by a personality with no party affiliation who enjoys general respect and international prestige. You have demonstrated high moral integrity in the regrettable tests you had to undergo in the past.

We regard as particularly significant the fact that you took the presidential office for the period up to the general elections, when a new parliamentary system of our state will be formed.

The Federal Assembly elected you—the sole and common candidate of the decisive forces of our society—as president. Deputies, who are members of the CPCZ also gave you their votes. By giving you their votes, as recommended to them also by the extraordinary CPCZ Congress, they expressed the will and wishes of their electorate. At the same time, the support for your candidacy is the evidence of the irreversible CPCZ's decision for democratic socialism and its resolve to contribute to national understanding and cooperation. It is also the expression of our will to be a part of the current process of the profound social changes continuing to be in the spirit of democratic rules, deliberations and agreements, tolerance and mutual respect.

We are aware of the solemnity of the office of the president, his responsibility for safeguarding the constituionality, the democratic rights and freedoms of citizens. Therefore, we wish to assure you of our cooperation in the fulfillment of your constitutional duties.

Estemeed Mr President; we wish you robust health and successes in your statesmanly activity for the prosperity of our fatherland.

With profound respect, L. Adamec,

V. Mohorita

### Carnogursky Discusses New Political System

*AU0801132790 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Dec 89 p 2*

[Unattributed CTK report: "J. Carnogursky Among Representatives of Journalists' Organizations; A New Political System Is Being Created"]

[Text] Prague—A friendly meeting of Miroslav Kusy, the new chairman of the Federal Office for Press and Information, with representatives of Czechoslovak journalists' organizations and institutions before the advent of the new year took place in Prague yesterday [28 December]. The meeting was also attended by CSSR First Deputy Premier Jan Carnogursky, who addressed the meeting, and by ranking officials of the CSSR National Front Central Committee, political parties, and social organizations. Members of the Prague diplomatic corps also were present.

In his speech, Jan Carnogursky said, among other things, that the new government of national understanding has been carrying out its constitutional functions for 18 days now. It has come into being on the basis of an agreement reached by the state's political forces after 3 weeks of mass demonstrations by the people. The government has fulfilled its first task by constituting itself, a matter which calmed down the situation in the state and facilitated the further functioning of constitutional institutions. The government's establishment did not stop the process which preceded it, however. Setting up the bodies on the basis of civic initiatives continued on a level lower than the middle level.

The government began its activity in a dynamic political setting and it is carrying it out in this setting. The dynamism of the political setting is mainly in that the political content of the political institutions is changing from the very foundation. Institutions, which were operating for 40 years on the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism, are beginning—almost from one day to another—to function on the traditional democratic principles. The government's most important task is preparaing free, democratic elections. This gives the government the stamp of being provisional. Despite that, the government is trying to build into its activity as many long-term elements as possible. I regard the creation of the republic's new political system to be such an element. This element appeared as early as during the talks on establishing a new government. The main expression of the new political system will be basic political laws, which are being prepared. The government is preparing the law on political parties, the law on assembly, the law on association, the law on the right to petition, the church law, and some other laws. The Federal Assembly will coordinate the preparation of the election law. The work on these laws is in an advanced stage.

J. Carnogursky also said that it is envisaged that the adoption of the law on political parties, as well as of other political laws, will take place in February. In order to bridge the time gap until the adoption of that law, the government intends to submit the Federal Assembly Presidium's draft law or a legal measure, which will enable the preliminary registration of political parties before the adoption of the law. The law on the right to assembly will make it possible for citizens to assemble peacefully and in a democratic spirit without having to obtain a state body's permission in advance. A gathering's sponsor will only announce it to the national committee. The law on association in social organizations will guarantee the citizens' right to found and join associations, movements, societies, clubs, and such things. Also, the genesis of such organizations will not be subject to approval by a state body. It only will have to be registered. The law on the right to petition will give citizens the right to submit petitions, to sign them, and to canvass for signatures.

Considerable cadre changes occurred in the command structure of departments of the Ministry of Interior and in the internal structures of some components. The regional Investigation Administrations of the State Security Corps [StB] were abolished. In the future, only a small group of StB investigators will be left in the center, in Prague, which will investigate some grave crimes with jurisdiction over the entire republic. The powers of this group of investigators will be laid down by the law. Rooms in telecommunications facilities, in which telephone calls had been monitored, have been sealed.

The CSSR first deputy premier stressed that for journalists the present is a period of exciting knowledge and painful disappointment, a complex period of correct orientation, and of choosing attitudes and standpoints. It is a period of overcoming dogmatic stereotypes in thinking, clashing against the inertia of habits. In this connection the words of Vaclav Havel, candidate for the office of the president, apply to journalists. He said that in our republic there must not be a hunt for communists. They are citizens with equal rights, and there are quite a few among them who had, like the rest of the population, to keep silent for 20 years. However, precisely because they are communists, they have the responsibility for the internal renewal of their party. At the same time, there must not be quick and unprincipled changes of coats. We do not need phenomena of opportunism or, in other words, settling personal accounts. We renounced soulless ideology, but we did not renounce ideas. We abandoned party approaches and instead of them we demand professional reliability, commitment to the cause, and responsibility. I remind you that all journalists who were unjustly persecuted for their stances in the past have been rehabilitated. Those who are interested are returning to their respective jobs.

The new law on the press, too, is one of the government's legislative projects. The amendment annuls Law No 127/1968 on some temporary measures in the area of the press and other mass information media, and will make it possible for a citizen to engage in publishing activity. It is necessary to create conditions for free, unfettered publishing activity; however, the current limits arising from the insufficient capacities of the paper and printing industries continue and must be respected.

## New Minister Addresses Interior Ministry Staff

*AU0901060290 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 3 Jan 90 p 2*

[Unattributed CTK report in the "By Teletype, Mail, Telephone..." column]

[Text] On Tuesday [2 January], the Federal Ministry of Interior made available to CTK a report, which states inter alia: At a meeting of the chiefs of Federal Ministry of Interior subdivisions on Tuesday, Jan Carnogursky, first deputy federal premier, inducted Richard Sacher into the office of federal minister of interior. In his address, the CSSR minister of interior stressed that he welcomes as his fellow workers all those who have a clean moral record, who are not compromised, and who want to assist the president and the Government of National Understanding in implementing the government's security policy. He stressed that his clear-cut sense of compliance with the law, responsibility, and order and his disagreement with lawlessness and license will be among the primary principles implemented in the management of the Federal Ministry of Interior.

## Citizens Initiative for Reunification Founded

*LD1001112790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1049 GMT 10 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—A citizens' initiative, "German Unification", was founded in the past week in Berlin. A communication sent to ADN today states that its objectives and demands include a referendum on the German question by 30 March 1990, and the appointment of bodies for the supervision of media sources "which are not SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] organs but the editors of which are predominantly SED members".

The "German Unification" advocated the "reappraisal of the history of the SED and the recognition of the collective guild of all members", the "immediate dissolution of the security organs and people's militia", and the "complete dismantling of the wall—not a fence!". "Socialism—never again", the communication states. The citizens initiative supported all democratic forces which had on their agenda the objective of German unification.

The founding members did not belong to any party, and the citizens' initiative would not be organized as a party. Having achieved its supreme objective, it would be disbanded.

## Prosecutor Reacts to Schalck-Golodkowski Release

*LD0901180590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1718 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The prosecutor general at the supreme court in Berlin (West) announced today to the GDR prosecutor general that he will not extradite the former GDR state secretary Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, imprisoned in West Berlin on the basis of an arrest warrant issued in the GDR, and that he has therefore already released him from custody. The West Berlin prosecutor general stressed that he does not doubt that the assurances given by the GDR side would have been kept. The prosecutor general said this to ADN.

The GDR prosecutor general expressed his displeasure concerning the decision because it prevents, at the moment, Schalck-Golodkowski, who is accused of serious crimes, from being called to responsibility. It is incomprehensible that daily political events and their reflection in the media influenced a legal decision by the prosecutor general at the Supreme Court in Berlin (West).

The GDR prosecutor general says that, in view of the decision made in Berlin (West), the search requests directed toward numerous governments in the world last year will be maintained.

## GDR, U.S. Officials Discuss Trust, Disarmament

*LD0901151790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1331 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Mutual trust, the elimination of hostile prejudices, and stability are important elements of securing peace. This has been affirmed by the chairman of the National Defense Committee of the GDR People's Chamber, Dr Wolfgang Herger, and Ronald K. Machtley, member of the Armed Forces Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, today at a talk in Berlin.

Wolfgang Herger briefed his guest on the achievement of the GDR'S unilateral disarmament initiatives and explained the security model 2000, introduced by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism, with which the GDR People's Chamber will also deal. The proposal is designed to further expand the treaty-based community between the GDR and the FRG in the military sphere. He described total demilitarization as a vision for Europe and both German states.

Machtley described the dialogue as a good opportunity to gain a picture on the spot of the GDR's rapidly advancing developments. He is interested in how other countries can be convinced that a united Germany does not represent a threat to them.

In this connection Herger expressed the view that two German states have existed over a lengthy period but are getting increasingly close within the framework of the European process. "A German Europe cannot be the aim;" it would represent a retrograde step in history.

Machtley also had questions on the possibilities for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from GDR territory and the upcoming elections.

## New Forum Threatens To Leave Roundtable Talks

*LD0901145190 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1300 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] New Forum plans to leave the roundtable next Monday if Modrow's government does not abandon the creation of an office for the protection of the Constitution. Speaking to Sat 1, the representative of the organization, Ingrid (Koeppe), said that it is hoped the government will fulfill the opposition's demand and postpone the foundation of the office for the protection of the Constitution until after the elections.

The spokesman for Democracy Now, Konrad Weiss, did not join in this demand on behalf of his movement. He said on the same program that the opposition should now make a constructive approach visible to GDR citizens. It must first become clear what ideas there are and these ideas must then be put across clearly.

## Interior Minister Discusses Security Tasks

*LD0901162690 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1519 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Stabilizing the GDR's order and security in the process of democratic renewal is the most important task at present facing the German People's Police and the other organs of the GDR Internal Affairs Ministry, Interior Minister Lothar Ahrendt emphasized in Berlin today to the directors of the People's Police departments in the GDR.

In general, there is great interest among parties, political groups, and organizations, in effecting the country's process of radical change in a nonviolent manner. Security partnerships, which have been entered into in demonstrations in many places, have proved valuable. It is increasingly the case, however, that parties and citizens movements are refusing to take responsibility for such events any longer.

In order to develop trusting relations between the police and the citizens, a qualified legal activity must be performed at all levels. It is essential here to increase legal knowledge, Ahrendt said.

Since opening the borders, according to the interior minister, there have been no peculiarities in the GDR's general crime situation. But an increase in neo-Nazi threats and vandalism and a greater inflow of addictive drugs must be registered. He referred to the fact that initial talks with the relevant FRG departments are underway. The most important thing here is the clarification of punishable offenses and the increasing traffic between East and West.

Lothar Ahrendt announced that he will be travelling to Bonn in January for a meeting with Wolfgang Schaueble, FRG federal minster of the interior.

## Krenz Relinquishes People's Chamber Mandate

*LD0901211890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2036 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Egon Krenz has relinquished his People's Chamber mandate. He conveyed the following statement on his decision to ADN:

At the request of the leadership of my party, I am relinquishing my People's Chamber mandate. My action is a result of similar reasoning regarding my resignation as chairman of the Council of State of the GDR on 6 December, 1989. I am obliged to say to the electors in my constituency that I always gave my best to fulfill their electoral mission. I will participate in the renewal of our country in the future as well, with all my powers.

## Eberlein, Mueckenberger Speak on Politburo Role

*LD0901200790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1837 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—With the hearing of Werner Eberlein, former Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] Politburo member, and Erich Mueckenberger, former chairman of the SED Central Party Control Commission, the ad hoc people's chamber committee—examining cases of abuse of power, corruption, personal enrichment, and other actions suspected of violation of the law—continued its investigations in Berlin today.

Eberlein, who became first secretary of the SED belirk [area] executive of Magdeburg and joined the Politburo 3 years later, admitted that he took on these offices "out of misunderstood party discipline". Really, he felt himself too old for such positions, stating that he was born in 1919. The Politburo was no longer able to make decisions. It occupied itself exclusively with its own affairs and was not capable of taking action.

Eberlein, himself a victim of Stalinism—of his 20-year stay in the USSR, he spent 8 years in exile—felt he shared in the responsibility for the fact that the SED leadership had not seen things as they really were. He considered one of the causes of the crisis to be the social policy introduced by the eighth party congress, "which in the final analysis had no material underpinning". A further "serious error" was the failure to effect the long overdue rejuvenation of the Politburo, Eberlein said.

He had not been able to play an active role in the Politburo. During the short time in which he was chairman of the Central Party Control Commission, the discipinary proceedings against Honecker, Mittag, and other members of the former Politburo were instituted and numerous party members were rehabilitated. Mittag admitted nothing in the disciplinary proceedings. It was his impression, however, that Mittag had deliberately concealed connections so that it was not possible to obtain an overall view.

Erich Mueckenberger, who has lived in Wandlitz since 1971 and is to move to an old people's home in Berlin next week, described the atmosphere in the former residential area as "cold". His wife, in particular, suffered from this. Her subscriptions for the women's organization, the Democratic Women's League, was mostly collected by the housekeepers of Politburo members. "I hardly saw the inside of any of the houses."

Mueckenberger told the investigatory committee that the Soviet magazine SPUTNIK was banned in the GDR on the orders of Erich Honecker and his chief of agitation, Joachim Herrmann, at the end of 1988. "We weren't even asked about this", said the former president of the German-Soviet Friendship Society.

Because of perestroyka in the Soviet Union, said Mueckenberger, there were clashes between himself and Honecker in which the ex-SED chief told him: "Here you have your friendship." Honecker added: "What more do

you want; it was decided, even by Gorbachev, that every country and every party is responsible for the policy it pursues."

Mueckenberger said that the Politburo was "divided". "There was one group which knew everything and decided about everything." This included Honecker, Mittag, Kleiber, Mielke, and at times Stoph and others. "And there was a group which was needed to endorse matters." Here he included Hager, Eberlein, and himself.

The deputy chairman of the committee, Professor Dr Volker Klemm, National Democratic Party of Germany, referred to two aspects which the committee will address. First, there is growing suspicion that construction enterprises "lined their pockets" in building special houses for officials. They will also examine the circumstances under which gold coins worth approximately 25,000 marks, earmarked as presents, were issued. Coins of this type, which appeared on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the liberation from fascism, meanwhile appeared abroad.

## Interim Report Implicates Ex-Politburo Members

*LD0901222290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2044 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Public criticism of cases of abuse of office and waste of public wealth by former members of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Politburo is justified. This is confirmed in the second interim report of the temporary GDR People's Chamber commission investigating cases of abuse of office, corruption, personal enrichment, and other actions where suspicion exists regarding the violation of the law. The report was sent today to People's Chamber deputies and the GDR media.

Significant financial resources, the commitment of large material-technical and construction capacities, and great deal of personnel expenditure for the satisfaction of the needs of a small number of privileged people had been deployed in the state hunting areas, to the detriment of society. This also included the considerable negative consequences of intensively increased game stocks, therefore producing damaging results for agriculture, and the intense use of concentrated feed for the game. According to the report, the Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry and Foodstuffs decided that only two state hunting areas would be maintained in the GDR.

A particularly negative example of a special hunting area of the Army, which was used above all by Honecker, Mittag, Sindermann, Kleiber, and Krolikowski, was the Schorfheide area, comprising 20,558 hectares. "Mass shootings were carried out here. For example, in 1 year, 800 red deer, 800 wild boar, 400 fallow deer, and 200 mouflonn were shot. Several of the prominent hunters also pocketed thousands of marks as their marksman's share," the report notes.

Special hunting grounds had also been established in areas and districts. These areas had been established without any legal foundation, in an arbitrary way, in varying sizes, and with different levels of buildings and hunting facilities, for special persons or groups.

The first report by the parliamentary investigatory committee has already dealt with the use of the 44th Air Transport Squadron, also known as Government Squadron. It is now specified that since 1987 there had been over 300 flights every year. "These were used mainly by former members and candidate members of the Politburo, in some cases by Deputy State Council chairmen, and to a limited extent, for special reasons, by members of the Council of Ministers. About five percent of the flights were used by those with a legitimate right to do so, and their family members, for holiday purposes."

On the question of personal privileges, and in particular the residential settlement of Wandlitz, the committee states: "Rent was paid for the houses; the service personnel and domestic staff were free. The retail outlets for industrial goods, food and luxury items, sold largely imported goods. According to a statement by State Finance Auditing, seven million valuta marks were made available in 1988, and 8.2 million valuta marks in 1989."

The committee has substantial evidence concerning the trip to the United States by former Politburo member Hermann Axen. However, the committee was unable to summon Hermann Axen because of his stay in the USSR, due to health reasons. Investigatory proceedings against him are now in progress.

## Modrow To Ask for Confidence Vote by Referendum

*AU1001102290 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1000 GMT 10 Jan 90*

[Text] GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow will possibly ask the People's Chamber for a vote of confidence by referendum tomorrow [11 January]. Sources from the coalition parties, Liberal Democratic Party of Germany [LDPD] and Christian Democratic Union [CDU], said that the possibility could not be ruled out that Modrow would ask the People's Chamber to hold a referendum on his coalition prior to the planned elections in May. The LDPD has said that it will only continue in the Modrow government if a change is brought about soon of "the power policy pursued by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED]" and the State Security Service is disbanded.

The CDU, which is also represented in the cabinet, also voiced harsh criticism in its party organ NEUE ZEIT about Modrow's course regarding the State Security Service. It says that by its policy the government is putting the coalition to severe tests, the outcome of which is uncertain.

Government spokesman Wolfgang Meyer said that Modrow would make an extremely important statement to the People's Chamber. The SED, together with the deputies of the social organizations that are associated with it, has a clear majority in the People's Chamber.

### Third Way, Social Democrats Issue Stands

*LD0901113390 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0937 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—Following the communist platform, two more platforms in the SED-PDS [Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism] have been set up at the start of January. The 'Third Way' political platform and the social democratic platform announce this today in 'NEUES DEUTSCHLAND'.

The 'Third Way' platform notes in a "first position on the developments following the extraordinary party congress" in December a current "lack of orientation" in the party. "Analyses of the situation in the country and in the party are lacking, central guidelines are absent." The SED-PDS immediately needs a program on the basis of which the members can organize themselves.

A call is also made for the party to declare itself radically in favor of the territorial principle of grassroots organization. The new structures of the party must be presented in detail and exposed to public and democratic influence. "Relations with the government must be determined in a fundamentally new way," it continues. "At long last we must adopt a political position toward it as one party among others." It is of particular importance to introduce at the roundtable the specifically democratically socialist lines of the SED-PDS. Finally, the role of 'NEUES DEUTSCHLAND' must be determined; it must be upgraded as a decisive organizer of the party grassroots.

This position paper's authors are the authors of the theses "For a Socialist Party of the GDR," which were presented for discussion prior to the extraordinary congress. "The organization is carried out by the representatives of the SED-PDS at the Humboldt University," the paper says.

The social democratic platform of the SED-PDS was constituted on the 140th anniversary of the birth of Eduard Bernstein [founder of the 'revisionist' school of German social democracy] (6 January) as the Social Democratic Study Cricle (SDS) in the SED-PDS. This is aimed on the one hand to form a platform "in order to develop social democratic ideas, to bring them up in discussion and to utilize them in a practical political way." On the other hand it is open to all sympathizers. The study circle does not see itself as a competitor to other democratic socialist and social democractic endeavors in the GDR "but as a guarantee that in the heat of efforts to establish a profile, to establish limits, in the heat of the election campaign and the polarization of parties, if possible no ideas of value for the further development of democratic socialism are lost." The organization is to take place in grassroots groups. The circle will aim for friendly relations with all European and international social democratic and socialist organizations and parties which feel committed to the ideals of democratic socialism. [passage omitted]

### SED Criticized Over Neo-Nazi Issue

*AU0901122990 East Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 6 Jan 90 p 3*

[Kurt Stiele article: "Reversing the Change?"]

[Text] What does a GDR citizen think when he reads the press controlled by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS] and other publications without being critical? What do our foreign visitors think, and what do our friends in the Soviet Union and in other states think if they study the views of the GDR press that are presented to us?

The GDR is facing an invasion of neo-Nazis, of fascists, and "nationalists" that are all lumped together, the press makes us believe. This is, of course, a result of the Wall's opening. One almost feels like crying—of course not tears of joy. This is quite clear. Crowds of people are rushing to smear anti-Soviet, fascist, and anti-Semitic slogans on monuments. This can only be stopped by a "United Front" headed by the SED-PDS—at least this is what the press suggests. Is that true? What role is the SED-PDS playing in this connection? By adding the letters PDS, has it become a party that can be trusted and that is making sincere attempts to struggle against the "right," as it wants us to believe. Or does the SED-PDS want something else? One still has the impression that the supplement PDS is not justified because the SED-PDS is acting in a way as if it wanted to reverse the change that has been initiated!

There is a force in our republic that wants to achieve the following:

—It wants to depict as untrustworthy the democracy movement, to which the SED-PDS does not yet belong, but also the old parties that want to express themselves in a democratic manner now.

—It wants to prove to the Soviet Union, in particular, that a GDR without a SED-PDS or with a weak SED-PDS becomes a playground for the right, mainly of fascists!

—It wants to furnish proof that the seeds of anti-Semitism will sprout after 6 May, and that the old dangers will rise again in case the Soviet Union agrees to German unity.

Thus, who benefits from these provocations? In this connection, the SED-PDS, in an unjustified manner, also accuses those who support nonchauvinist nationalism, from which the GDR groups and parties that forced the SED-PDS to adopt a more democratic course, which, however, has not yet become irreversible, do not distance themselves for good reasons. Memories of the

Reichstag fire provocation are bound to obtrude on one's mind, and those numerous members of the SED-PDS who were treated as fools and then betrayed politically by the old SED should bear this in mind. It has been known for a long time—those who did not know about it should at least know this since the provocation at the Zionskirche Church on 17 October 1987—that there are fascists in the GDR. Film director Konrad Weiss ran the gauntlet with his films about fascism and neo-Nazism under the SED leadership. The party criminalized everyone who discussed this topic or who wanted to write about it. Events that were devoted to this issue were attended by whole armies of state security officials, which may even have included those who literally tortured victims whose experiences were recorded in protocols, in a fascist manner according to Amnesty International standards. Has all this been forgotten?

Soviet memorials and monuments are the wrong place for provocations of any kind! One can openly state this without adding fuel to the flames of the election campaign that is beginning: The SED-PDS would invent fascist and neo-Nazi specters if they did not exist! However, they already existed before the change. What a pity that Gregor Gysi did not realize this and became guilty of vicious culumny through his exaggerated description of the problem. Should the United Front against the right be a substitute for the block parties? This is not the right way!

The former SED used to be a completely undemocratic party and has not developed into a really democratic party despite adding PDS to its name. It is learning democracy under the pressure of forces in the GDR that are pioneers in this field. This is also being demonstrated by the way it builds a psychosis now in order that influential forces may rescue it from the danger of a possible fall. It is quite astonishing in this connection that the SED's former friends react so moderately in view of the findings on how Erich Honecker and others deceived them before the changes were initiated in almost all spheres, particularly in the sphere of the GDR's economic efficiency. Maybe these friends should be more careful now if those who are responsible for our country's political and economic bankruptcy are talking about the specter of fascist danger, which does not really exist in this form, as we will soon see.

We do not need an office for the protection of the Constitution in the GDR before 6 May which could pretend to take action against neo-Nazis and fascists, but which would concentrate, as happened under the old SED, on democracy movement members in all groups and parties, including the old parties. The CDU, too, would never again bow to the uncontrolled view of a party, not even on such sensitive issues as fascism and neo-Nazism. It also wants to protect those who are being unjustly slandered.

Above all, we do not need an office for the protection of the Constitution which, in view of the scarcity of sincere democrats, would be filled with people who have turned out to be unable to observe democratic rules and who were instruments of the Stalinist terrorism that we experienced in our country. We do not need one-eyed pensioners of the secret police, either, who prepare a future coup that might be supported by reactionary circles while being paid by the state. Above all, we do not need a new intimidation instrument before 6 May, of no matter what type.

Currently, the SED-PDS cannot count on a majority among our population's broad public for new "socialist" experiments. It has not yet told the whole truth about the dilemma into which it has almost deliberately brought our part of Germany. The supplement "PDS" is no guarantee that the party will develop in a way that the one-sided work against democrats will not be continued in the same way as before the changes were initiated.

The new democratic movements, which can rely on the unrestricted support of the CDU, which is also preparing an independent and, in its view, solid program, are forces that will prevent neo-Nazis and fascists from ever becoming powerful again. After 6 May, all political forces in the GDR will have a democratic legitimacy. This includes an antifascist and democratic legitimacy. If the SED-PDS is sincere, it will be among those parties. However, we will not renounce free, secret, and democratic elections because of specters that are conjured up.

We will not tolerate a manipulation of opinion by the SED-PDS. Basically, fascists from the West have not visited the GDR. They are in this country, and we will struggle against them here. We will struggle together with the SED-PDS if it stops manipulating political views, and if it does not deprive the GDR citizens of the prospects of elections on 6 May by threatening to draw conclusions in order to win the time it so urgently needs.

## Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed

*AU0901094190 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 8 Jan 90 pp 19-20*

[Unattributed report: "Silent Fascists"]

[Text] The unidentified perpetrators came with ladders and spray paint. Under the cover of night they prowled past the Soviet guard who, in the East Berlin district of Treptow, was protecting the central memorial on top of the 5,000 graves of Russian soldiers who fell in the final battle for Berlin.

Two days after Christmas they committed their act at the memorial, parts of which consist of the marble from the ruin of the Chancellery of the Reich'. With letters up to 40 centimeters high, they sprayed on the dark stone slogans such as "Occupiers out" or "Nationalism for a Europe of free peoples."

When it was all over, the perpetrators desecrated eight sarcophagi as well as the crypt's base, thus putting an end to the legend that there was no right-wing radicalism in socialism. For many years, the GDR leadership refused

to admit the existence of these brown dregs, which were washed to the surface together with pan-German emotions and the demands for unification.

The suppression of nationalist feelings and the frustration about permanent paternalism have given rise to masked right-wing extremism in the GDR—parallel to, though independent of, developments in the FRG.

Since the early eighties there have been frequent trials against desecrators of graves, SS supporters, and skinheads. However, in most cases hardly any attention was paid to them and they were mostly conducted "as if they only involved insignificant brawls," as a journalist of JUNGE WELT, the paper of Free German Youth, deplored.

Estimates of the number of GDR skinheads range from 1,000 to 3,000. The number of criminal proceedings on the grounds of right-wing extremist actions increased from 44 in 1988 to 144 in the first 10 months of last year.

During the days before and after slogans were painted on the Treptow memorial, a great number of actions by right-wing extremists occurred all over the GDR. On new Year's Eve some 300 drunken youths spraypainted the memorial for the victims of Fascism in Halle with slogans such as "SED—no thanks." In Pirna, in the district of Dresden, unidentified perpetrators painted the slogan "Hitler is alive" in red and yellow. In Goerlitz, the slogans written on walls by right-wing extremists read "Foreigners out" and "Jews out."

The Jewish community of Erfurt has received anonymous telephone calls: "The oven of Buchenwald is still waiting for you." At the cemetery of the Adass Jisroel Jewish community, in the East Berlin neighborhood of Weissensee, the burial place of Rabbi Moritz Moses Stern, who died on 13 January 1939, was damaged—the fourth desecration of a grave in Weissensee within 1 year.

Harri Mueller, district state prosecutor of Erfurt and counsel for the prosecution in the trial of former Nazi criminals, has received anonymous threats to his life. For the "former German Reich, from the Mass to the Memel, from the Adige to the Belt, we fight," the authors of the letter stated, "and not for the GDR, which is now on the ground, or the bit called the FRG."

The head of the memorial of the former concentration camp at Buchenwald, where some 56,000 inmates lost their lives, has received pamphlets of an "underground movement of Republicans": "Keep the ovens open, for every shot a Russian ['Jeder Schuss ein Russ'] and a communist."

Up to now, the GDR's neo-Nazi scene seemed to be isolated and without any significant links with people sharing the same ideology in the West. However, Heinz Galinski, chairman of the Jewish Central Council in Germany, said there is no longer "the least doubt," that the East German neo-Nazis have "close contacts with radical right-wing groups in the FRG."

An act of fraternization was prevented only recently. Members of the extremist right-wing West German Viking Youth held their New Year's meeting in eastern Hesse, near the GDR border, and wanted to force the opening of a border checkpoint. With cooperation between FRG police and GDR border guards, the planned march to the East was stopped and 50 hooligans arrested. The Republicans (Reps) of Bavarian populist Franz Schoenhuber have given their name to and provide hope for quite a few nationalists in the GDR, following the borders' opening. Schoenhuber has claimed for weeks that his Reps already had "intact groups" in the East. Last week the party head announced the imminent founding of associations of GDR Republicans.

According to the GDR press, material of the Republicans, such as postcards with the picture of Chairman Schoenhuber, hats, lighters, ball-point pens, and party programs, has been distributed in Leipzig. Following information from the population, the People's Police secured "some 5,000 leaflets, flyers, as well as 150 posters and 500 newspapers belonging to the Republicans" (NEUES DEUTSCHLAND).

Until the radical changes took place in the GDR, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] and the authorities, if they were not able to hush up such incidents, tried as hard as they could to conceal any signs of acts of right-wing violence, condemning them as detestable imports from the West. For many years the apparatus limited itself to making stereotyped confirmations that in the worker-peasant state there was "no room for such views and actions," which the SED Central Committee stated as recently as 1987.

When, in the same year, GDR fascists, together with skinheads from the western part of the city, caused havoc at a punk concert in East Berlin's Zionist Church, (East) BERLINER ZEITUNG sneered at the incidents: "Anyone can imagine that this place would be teeming with certain people if we were not to have secure borders."

Moreover, according to official opinion, neo-Nazis existed only in the West. Meanwhile, however, even East Berlin police officials, such as Colonel Wolfgang Pauleit, of the Criminal Investigations Department in the Interior Ministry, self-critically speak of the former "tendency to conceal" right-wing extremism. There can no longer be any doubt that in the GDR there exists a "hard core" of young radicals with "strong neo-Fascist, racist, or xenophobic attitudes."

According to a survey of the East Berlin "Central Institute for Youth Research," approximately 2 percent of the young people of the GDR have "right-wing" inclinations, a percentage that reaches some 6 percent in urban centers such as East Berlin and Leipzig.

Wolfgang Brueck, criminal sociologist of the Central Institute, believes that "the developing right-wing radical scene" is still in an initial stage. However, the East German skinheads have organized themselves in illegal command structures, protecting themselves systematically against official observation.

Those who study the causes of such developments in the GDR have long been aware that neo-Nazism came to the GDR not from the streams of visitors or via the Western media, but that its reasons have to be sought in the GDR itself.

Bad social developments, for example, have contributed to this shift to the right. Erhard Hexelschneider, head of an institute at Karl-Marx University in Leipzig, for example noted that the young people are looking for a "valve for social deficits in this country." Hexelschneider was able to watch this phenomenon personally: A week before Christmas right-wing groups assembled in front of the university's residence halls and shouted slogans that were hostile to foreigners.

GDR experts believe that the reason for right-wing inclinations lies mainly in the sphere of education. The "Stalinist version of socialism" has had a negative impact on society, Manfred Behrend, of the East Berlin International Politics and Economics Institute, lamented in early December. The state has not only encouraged alienation in the production sphere, but also "education leading to an average level of achievement and an ambiguous way of speaking."

The product of such education is mostly "Fascists that do not appear to be such," young people who would otherwise be regarded as diligent students and good workers. In many cases, JUNGE WELT wrote, these people are "appreciated staff members" in enterprises because of their "Prussian virtues" such as orderliness, cleanliness, and discipline.

The stereotyped discussion of Nazism, as carried out by the state and the party, has obviously also encouraged this trend. For many years the GDR's founders, including many former resistance fighters, spread the doctrine that the Fascists, and not the Germans as a whole, conducted the atrocious war.

Peter Merseburger, a long-standing East Berlin correspondent of [FRG's] ARD television station, has noted that "this view has permitted the allegedly better German state to somehow steal itself away from this evil chapter of joint history."

The historic theses, invariably presented in schools and universities with the absolute claim to truth, have nourished the spirit of resistance among the young people. Based on the example of a young skinhead, VOLKSZEITUNG of Leipzig has described this in the following way: "Monotonous learning and permanent repetition of views and opinions—even though they are right—as well as spoonfeeding people and a know-it-all manner make young people dull and produce the opposite effect from what one desires."

### Defense Minister on Need for Army

*AU0801070190 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 28 Dec 89 p 3*

[Interview with GDR Defense Minister Admiral Theodor Hoffmann by Rainer Funke; date and place not given: "Do We Still Need an Army?"]

[Text] Funke: In the course of the expanding contractual relations between the two German states our readers ask: Do we still need an army at all?

Hoffmann: I think that we will need it for quite some time. Every state has the right, even the duty, to preserve its sovereignty and to protect its citizens and its territory against military attacks. Also in line with our international obligations, we will have to ensure the GDR's defense capability in the future to a degree that is sufficient for military protection toward the outside.

There are still different states and different military alliances. The FRG is a member of NATO and a considerable part of the military power of this alliance is concentrated on its territory. These are very modern and very strong tank and mechanized divisions, naval air groups, and naval forces.

As long as both military blocks continue to exist and their existence as well as the balance of power between them is one of the most important factors of European security, we will have to maintain the National People's Army [NVA] as part of the Warsaw Pact at such a scope or reduce it to such a scope which is sufficient for the principle of mutuality and equality.

Both German states bear an extremely great responsibility for the preservation of peace in Central Europe. They are an important part of the sensitive military-strategic balance on the continent.

Objective dangers to our external security, however, also arise from the possibility that an actually unintentional armed conflict might break out as a result of a failure of technical systems or a wrong assessment of military actions by the other side.

This only shows how urgently necessary it is to come as quickly as possible to agreements in Vienna on further confidence and security building measures as well as on conventional armed forces and their decisive reductions on both sides.

Funke: How do you assess the Vienna negotiations' prospects?

Hoffmann: I think it is likely that the goal of concluding a first agreement in 1990 will be achieved. In any case, the GDR is doing what it can to this end.

The decision to reduce our Army by 10,000 men and to cut defense expenditures by 10 percent regardless of agreements in Vienna, is being carried out according to plan. Unfortunately, NATO has not taken similar steps so far. We welcome the statement by FRG Defense Minister Stoltenberg that the peace strength of the Bundeswehr will be reduced from 495,000 to 470,000 men by the mid-1990's if an agreement is achieved in Vienna. However, these are just announcements. Not a single unit of the Bundeswehr or the U.S. Army has been actually disbanded.

On the contrary: Only a few weeks ago the Bundestag adopted a new record armament budget of DM54.2 billion. The opposition protested against this, but it was unsuccessful. Its demand to stop the construction of the "Fighter 90," the most expensive armament project of the Bundeswehr so far, was also rejected. We have to take this into consideration, too.

**Who Would Benefit If We Were Defenseless**

Thus, it remains our task to contribute to the preservation of peace through sufficient defense readiness in the socialist military coalition. We see our constitutional assignment in protecting the GDR's security against outside dangers—military threats, provocations, or an armed attack.

Our military doctrine rejects any first use of weapons and any use of means of mass destruction. At the same time, the defense readiness of the Armed Forces must be such that we cannot be taken by surprise. If we were to renounce this or lay down our arms unilaterally, scrap them, and make ourselves defenseless, we might risk that some wishes to annex the GDR, to eliminate our state and social order could give rise to efforts to establish a "fourth Reich."

Funke: What does this mean for the staffs and the troops?

Hoffmann: The ready-alert systems of air defense and of the other forces as well as the command readiness of the staffs and field headquarters must be kept intact also under the current circumstances, and the troops' necessary training for mastering their weapons must be insured. Otherwise we cannot fulfill our obligations within the socialist military coalition.

In addition, under the current circumstances we have another task we cannot reject. This is the comprehensive help and support that is given by NVA members to the national economy, in the transportation sector, and in the health sector. One can feel great readiness to do this among all NVA members. And I would like to convey to them the thanks and respect of the government and the Army command. I consider this readiness for work a sign of their sense of responsibility toward our population.

However, let us not forget: The Army members who are working in the economy or in the humanitarian area are missing from the troops. This poses higher demands on those who stayed there and who have to fulfill the tasks through greater efforts, because there are fewer people, particularly in such unattractive work as guard duty.

**The Military Reform Aims at More Democracy**

Funke: In this case, one certainly feels little—as many soldiers wrote us—social renewal in the Army. What about the military reform in the Armed Forces?

Hoffmann: Above all, we are trying to integrate the Army even more into society, which is renewing itself. A consistent separation of state and party has already been carried out in the Armed Forces. Given all the particularities of the military sector (order and obedience, principle of individual command by the respective military superiors), it is necessary to enforce democracy and codetermination, social justice and legal security, moral purity, and economic efficiency also in the NVA.

This results in numerous and far-reaching consequences, in particular for the leadership of the Armed Forces, their parliamentary control, the defense budget's publication, the Armed Forces' assignment, life in the barracks, the army members' political and military activity, and the Army's entire public relations work.

All in all, in the future the Army's training and education must be supported by the entire society. Which methods and forms of organization are used to do this must be discovered in joint thinking, discussing, and experimenting.

During these days and weeks various forms of representation of the interests of soldiers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers and officers are forming as are spokesmen aktivs and soldiers' councils which have the right to be heard and to present proposals. An association of professional soldiers and a reservists' association are on the point of being formed.

In order to outline a second direction of the military reform, we need more modern and efficient structures in the Ministry of National Defense and in the entire Army. A basic separation between ministerial and military tasks, the reduction of command echelons, and cutting back the administrative expenditures are being prepared. This work is being done, above all, by the military reform committee, which was formed by the government and is headed by the defense minister.

A third direction of the military reform is aimed at thoroughly changed conditions of providing personnel for the Army and finding young professional soldiers. This requires a new shaping of all forms of employment and also of civilian employees' status. Military service of 12 months or civilian service of 18 months are being discussed. In general, service—whether as a professional soldier or a temporary soldier, as a soldier in basic military service or as a reservist—for the fatherland and for peace, for safeguarding the state borders, the airspace, and the territorial waters—is to be made more attractive and more interesting.

However, since we have to expect less rather than more financial and material means, it is necessary to shape service, working, and living conditions in and outside the barracks in such a way that they correspond to GDR citizens' demands today and tomorrow and do not contradict our soldiers' demands as much as they did in the past. By the way, some things have already been done and settled in this field. The opportunity to leave the barracks in civilian clothes is an example of this.

In general, we are ready for far-reaching steps toward a modern Army, one that is open to society, willing to carry out reforms, and exercises equity in conscription. The travel regulations, for instance, which we have drawn up for our Army members and civilian employees, are not such a matter of course in other places. We want to act with as much determination and consistency in other areas. In this connection, I am thinking of regulations of service time and leave for our Army members, of enforcing the performance principle, and of similar questions.

A number of changes in everyday military life were introduced by us immediately, some change are on the point of being introduced, and some will take a bit longer. All restrictions concerning receiving Western media have been abolished. Furthermore, we have drastically reduced the number of militarily restricted areas. The Army's medical institutions are made available for use by the local health sector. By April 1990, that is, before the next draft, the law on civilian alternative service, which has been sent for discussion and decision to the People's Chamber is to be passed. The drafts of the new defense law, the military service law, and the border law are being worked on.

Funke: What about legal security in the Armed Forces and the certainty of the professional soldiers' future?

Hoffmann: Like any other sector of our society, the Army has a basis of actions—this is the Constitution, the laws, and other legal stipulations. The equality of all Army members and civilian employees before the law, the observation of their rights and their dignity must be secured more clearly by juridical acts, any kind of arbitrariness by military superiors must be eliminated or strictly punished. Military employment must be made binding for both sides. This will include the conclusion of service contracts and an agreed preparation for vocational advanced training after the minimum service period. Pensions for our professional cadres will be set down legally, not only by pension decrees of the Ministry of National Defense. In this connection, too, the legal stipulations are being prepared.

Let me also say that, before they are decided by the People's Chamber, all draft laws will be submitted for public discussion, not only by the Army.

**By Far Not All Ceremonies Are "Trash"**

Funke: Many of our readers' questions refer to military ceremonies. What is your view on this?

Hoffmann: One can certainly not call all traditions "trash." Some should remain. At the "Unter den Linden" monument we honor the millions of people who fell victim to German fascism and militarism. Or think of the swearing of the oaths at historical sites of antifascist resistance, such as Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen.

However, I am in favor of removing superfluous things. For instance, when I visit a unit to work there and to hold discussions with the Army members, I can gladly do without the honor guard and the orchestra. Parades in Karl-Marx-Allee? We military men have always judged them very soberly and have compared costs and benefits. The NVA did not demand them in order to present itself. They meant weeks of hard military work for thousands of Army members. Such parades should not take place in the future. But I can certainly imagine a field parade at the end of an exercise.

Funke: A last question: Will you soon have a talk with your counterpart in Bonn?

Hoffmann: I have been in office for only a few weeks, and, naturally, I have to hold intensive talks with the ministers of those states which belong to our military coalition, the Warsaw Pact. But, of course, I am ready for a meeting with the FRG defense minister at any time.

The agreements made between Premier Modrow and Chancellor Kohl in Dresden make such a meeting not only possible but even necessary. Both heads of government proceeded from the common responsibility of the FRG and the GDR for peace in Europe and advocated a community of treaties between the two states. There is no doubt that this includes the safeguarding of peace, disarmament, and confidence-building in the military area.

There is no doubt that it would benefit the active continuation of the disarmament efforts in Vienna and Geneva and of the CSCE process, which was agreed upon in Dresden, if both sides brief each other and come to an understanding about this also at the level of the defense ministries.

Why should some sort of security partnership, as it was discussed in Dresden for the field of radiation protection and the combating of drug-related crimes and other serious crimes, not also be possible in the field of preventing war, which is no less important for both sides, and in the safeguarding of peace, to which the armies of both German states have pledged their allegiance?

There have already been a great number of meetings between military men of the Bundeswehr and of the NVA here and in the FRG. At international negotiations there are contacts and sometimes cooperation between military experts from both states—also concerning the observation of maneuvers and inspections within the framework of the Stockholm agreements. Thus: We are ready for talks, without any preconditions, and we are also open for ideas from the other side.

### Environment Minister Resigns Due to Age

*LD0901182390 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1740 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—Hans Reichelt has resigned as minister for the protection of nature, environmental protection, and water management. In a letter to the chairman of the Democratic Peasants' Party of Germany (DBD), Guenther Maleuda, he gives his age as the reason for this step. The Secretariat of the DBD Executive agreed to his request at a session today in Berlin. [passage omitted]

### Honecker Undergoes Kidney Operation

#### Admitted to Hospital

*LD0801174790 Hamburg DPA in German 1618 GMT 8 Jan 90*

[Excerpts] East Berlin (DPA)—The former GDR state and party leader, Erich Honecker, under investigation for abuse of office, has been in the urological clinic of the Charite in East Berlin since the weekend. It became known from the clinic today that he faces an operation for a kidney tumor. The 77-year-old Honecker was in the Charite last week for a computer-tomogram examination. "Honecker looks as well as can be expected," patients report. He often wears a track suit and bath robe in the corridors.

The former Politburo member, Hermann Axen (73), also under investigation by the state prosecutor, is still abroad. He underwent an eye operation in Moscow some weeks ago. It is now being asked in East Berlin when Axen will recover and return to the GDR. [passage omitted]

The Honecker family has also received an offer of accommodation, but apparently not yet accepted it. The Evangelical Church in the GDR has declared itself ready, under certain circumstances, to give the Honeckers a place to live. After the operation, Honecker's fitness to be in custody is again to be examined. Investigations are continuing.

#### Surgery Deemed Successful

*LD1001150290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1422 GMT 10 Jan 90*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Erich Honecker underwent an operation today, in the urological clinic of the Charite Hospital, on a malignant tumor on the right kidney. The Health Ministry informed ADN of this today. The tumor was completely removed, the operation was a success. The patient is as well as can be expected, given the circumstances.

## Foreign Minister Calls for Talks With GDR

*LD0901115990 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1100 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] In Hungarian Foreign Minister Horn's opinion, Hungarian and GDR representatives should sit down together as soon as possible to try to bring a new beginning to bilateral relations. Speaking to GDR Radio, Horn said today that the changes in the Republic provide a new basis for considerably closer and firmer cooperation. The political links could now be determined anew and economic cooperation be reconsidered. Hungary wants to improve its relations with the CEMA countries primarily on a bilateral basis as a priority matter. This should go hand in hand with an opening up in all directions. Regarding the conflict with Budapest caused by the mass escape of GDR citizens last year, Horn said tensions had never extended to other areas.

## Romania's Kiraly Arrives for 'Medical Treatment'

*LD0901221090 Budapest MTI in English 2108 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Budapest, January 9 (MTI)—Karoly Kiraly, deputy president of the Council of Romania's National Salvation Front, arrived in Hungary on Tuesday to receive medical treatment here. The politician, belonging to the Hungarian ethnic minority, met Laszlo Kovacs, state secretary of foreign affairs, at the airport. Ioan Chira, charge d'affairs ad interim at the Budapest Embassy of Romania, was also in attendance.

## MSZP Presidium 'Communique' on Romania

*LD2912183689 Budapest MTI in English 1702 GMT 29 Dec 89*

[Text] Budapest, December 23 (MTI)—The Presidium of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP, MSZP] has forwarded a communique to the national press service. In this, the Presidium stresses:

'The Presidium of the Hungarian Socialist Party welcomes the effort of the Romanian National Salvation Front Council for the creation of democracy and a law-governed state, which it has voiced from the very beginning. The Presidium expresses its hope that the strengthening of the victory of the revolution will make it possible to lawfully judge the grave crimes committed in defence of the hated Ceausescu regime, through court proceedings that accord to the country's legal system, and with the involvement of the public. Just verdicts passed by courts of justices on the basis of European legal principles will most assuredly meet with the understanding of broad European society also beyond the borders of the country.'

## SZOT Issues Solidarity Statement on Romania

*AU0501165390 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 23 Dec 89 p 5*

["SZOT Statement"]

[Text] The members of the Hungarian trade unions welcome the freedom gained by the Romanian people. The Romanian workers are not alone in this struggle accompanied by sacrifices of blood.

In the wake of the appeal of the National Coordination Council of the Hungarian Trade Unions, the International Association of Free Trade Unions and the World Federation of Labor expressed their solidarity with the oppressed Romanian people struggling for freedom and human, political, and trade union rights.

The trade unions belonging to the National Council of Trade Unions [SZOT] are confident that Romania will also succeed in creating a social and political system that guarantees living conditions worthy of man. The sacrifices of blood and the difficult conditions experienced by the Romanian population prompted thousands of people to provide whatever help they could from the first moments of the Romanian revolution.

There is a continuing need for this help, for blood, clothes, medicine, and food. We call upon the trade union members to turn to blood donation centers to give blood and to Red Cross organizations to donate goods. This procedure will guarantee that the transports of aid will reach those in need in the shortest time possible.

The trade union representations of the border-area counties will also contribute to this as much as they can. Generous aid will probably be needed for a long time, and therefore, the trade unions will find the way within their own organizational framework to most efficiently contribute to improving the the Romanian people's situation.

Representing more than 4 million Hungarian organized workers belonging to the SZOT, we can assure the Romanian people and the National Salvation Front of our support for our fellow trade union members who have been deprived of rights, and we hope that they will implement public will without the sacrifice of more blood and defend their revolution and their freedom! They can feel the solidarity of the Hungarian workers and the solidarity of the workers all over the world!

The first reactions to the appeal by the National Coordination Council of the Hungarian Trade Unions have arrived from the international trade union organizations, an appeal in which the Council asked the world's organized workers to provide help for the Romanian workers fighting for freedom and democracy. In numerous telegrams and telexes addressed to the SZOT, firm support for Hungarian trade unions' initiative came from the International Federation of Free Trade Unions, the World Federation of Labor, the West German Trade Union Federation (DGB), the three large Italian trade

union centers (CGIL, UIL, and CISL), the French Democratic Workers Association (CFDT), the General Workers Association in Portugal (CGTP-IN), the Swedish Trade Union Association (LO), and the Central Council of CSSR Trade Unions.

### Nyers Comments on Romanian Events

*AU0901162290 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 30 Dec 89 p 15*

[Interview with HSP Chairman Rezso Nyers by unidentified correspondent: "Ceausescu No Longer Understood Anything"; date, place not given]

[Text] What was Nicolae Ceausescu like on the occasion of his last official appearance? We asked this question of Rezso Nyers, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], who participated in the Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow 3 weeks ago and was able to speak with Ceausescu there.

[Nyers] This was not my first meeting with Nicolae Ceausescu. He was a personality—remember the scepter he held when posing for photographers—who was extremely proud of his rank and he refrained from communicating with anyone he considered to be of a lower rank, like myself at the time, and therefore we could not have genuine contact then. There was a tragicomic situation at the latest summit in Moscow. Because Romanian had not participated in the mistaken intervention by the other Warsaw Pact countries in the CSSR, Ceausescu was able to follow events with self-confidence and satisfaction. He must have felt that, in this respect, history had justified his policy at the time. In addition, not long before the Moscow meeting, he was unanimously reelected head of the party in Bucharest, with the usual full glorification and public acclamation. He was convinced that this was the peak of his power and glory, and it was impossible to hold a dialogue with him on problems of mutual interest.

Looking back at this latest meeting in Moscow, it is now clear that, hardly 3 weeks before the dramatic explosion of the people's uprising in Temesvar [Timisoara] and its wildfire-like spread all over the country, we were dealing with a self-contented leader who no longer understood anything, because he was totally blind and he had completely lost contact with reality; all the signs show that he had no idea of what was going on in his own country.

[Question] What information do you have about the latest events in Romania, and how did you react to the events in Temesvar and their continuation?

[Nyers] I was absolutely sure that the time would come when the people would revolt against the Ceausescu dictatorship, but I did not expect such a sudden realization of this event. I did not think that the dramatic series of events in Temesvar would spread all over Romania so quickly. I also had doubts because, as we all know, nationalism which had been artificially incited for years represented the basis of this regime. The events that had taken place by the time of our Presidium meeting on Friday—where new information from Romania repeatedly interrupted our agenda—have, in fact, answered the question whether the reform process would stop, or can be stopped at the Romanian border. By the time of our Presidium meeting on Saturday, we had concluded that the Army had succeeded in overcoming the difficulties, although there was still fighting going on with Securitate forces. As the MSZP, we find it necessary to act firmly and exercise political pressure.

[Question] In your view, has our international situation changed in the wake of this development?

[Nyers] Hopefully it has, because now we will have open borders all around us. I find it extremely important to express our solidarity with all those who are suffering in Romania, and it is also very important that we, the MSZP, have turned as a party to Romania's National Salvation Front and assured them of the Hungarian socialists' solidarity and of the fact that, with joint forces, we can dismantle the artificial obstacles hindering relations between our peoples.

### Pozsgay Comments on East European Reforms

*PM2812161689 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 17-18 Dec 89 p 12*

[Interview with Minister of State Imre Pozsgay by Fabio Cappelli in Rome; date not given]

[Excerpt] [Introductory passage omitted] [Cappelli] Minister, what is the present role of reformist Hungary in an Eastern Europe which is opening up completely to reforms? You said that in your country "the reforms are carried out through the ballot box and not on the streets." Does this mean that your party was the only one of the many in power in Eastern Europe which was able to anticipate the events?

[Pozsgay] Yes, I think that Hungary was first in carrying out reforms, long before the other nations. Political pluralism was introduced in our country first, as was the decision to hold completely free elections.

[Cappelli] But the absence of a people's movement may also bode ill, observers note. Does the abstention in the recent referendum (the one held in November to decide the method of electing the president of the republic—AVANTI! editor's note) not make you fear that the population might respond with indifference to the positive impetus which you seem to embody?

[Pozsgay] I hope that there will be an authentic people's force behind our initiative and I am not pessimistic about the referendum result. It is clear that the population could only reply in this way to the badly phrased questions. When the elections become a real practical challenge, the abstention problem will no longer exist.

[Cappelli] So do you think that the Hungarian Socialist Party will really be able to regain the people's full trust?

[Pozsgay] I think so. I think that this is possible in Hungary because this socialist party is once again becoming a great people's force.

[Cappelli] What are its values?

[Pozsgay] The first thing is to make the Hungarian people understand that the party no longer has anything to do with the past because it has made a clear break with it. Its rules and program provide all the evidence of that. The nature of the new members is also a confirmation of this "purging." They show that they have taken up the issues of recent times, they have assimilated them, and it is from this that a truly new party will emerge. The fact that there is real confidence in the Hungarian Socialist Party is confirmed by the fact that some people have joined it who have never been members of a party before. It can be said that at present ours is the biggest party because it has around 55,000 members, whereas the second party does not even have half that number.

[Cappelli] Marion Donhoff and Helmut Schmidt wrote in DIE ZEIT that the West is not keeping up with changes in Eastern Europe in terms of aid. German Foreign Minister Genscher said that we are sometimes too busy giving pats on the back to look in our pockets. Do you agree?

[Pozsgay] That problem did exist, but it can be said that after the Brussels meeting (the one which decided to allocate 600 million European Currency Units to Poland and Hungary—AVANTI! editor's note) the situation is changing and the ideology of spending is changing. They have realized that it is not just a matter of aid for Eastern Europe, but that the Western countries' interests are also at stake.

[Cappelli] Is this the "common adventure" to which Minister De Michelis referred....

[Pozsgay] Yes, precisely.

[Cappelli] But is the rate of aid not still too slow for you?

[Pozsgay] We are obviously very impatient because dissatisfaction is growing among our people. It is also necessary to explain that Hungary is not expecting pure aid but investment capital which will enter the production cycle. The Western countries must realize that they stand to gain from investing in Hungary because, as you recalled, our country's transition is taking place peacefully, which is a guarantee in itself.

[Cappelli] You met with Italian Socialist Party [PSI] Secretary Bettino Craxi yesterday. You congratulated him on the recent post conferred on him by the United Nations, but you urged him not to forget the East European countries. You obviously think that the Italian Socialists can play an important role for your country?

[Pozsgay] We have recognized the PSI's importance with regard to Eastern Europe both as a government party and, at the international level, in interparty relations. We would like the PSI to maintain its importance and attention in the future, too.

[Cappelli] A final question: You have described your party as "an autonomous force in the European socialist movement" and have expressed a desire for the Hungarian Socialist Party to join the Socialist International. What does the word Europe mean to you at present?

[Pozsgay] Going beyond a paternalistic and messianistic concept of the party, we want to join with those who are proposing new values, and with those who are accepting a plurality of values. And the values of private initiative and individual activities also have a place in this context of solidarity and cooperation.

This is also true at international level: Europe today must mean precisely solidarity and cooperation.

### Szuros Congratulates CSSR President Havel

*LD2912194889 Budapest MTI in English 1744 GMT 29 Dec 89*

[Text] Budapest, December 29 (MTI)—Matyas Szuros, interim president of the Republic of Hungary, cabled his good wishes on Friday to Vaclav Havel, on the occasion of his election as president of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

### Suzuki To Manufacture Cars at Esztergom

*LD0901121590 Budapest MTI in English 1102 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Budapest, January 9, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—A joint venture set up by Suzuki and C. Itoh of Japan, Autokonszern LTD. of Hungary and IFC, a World Bank affiliate, plans to start the production of Suzuki cars in Hungary by the second half of 1992, a press conference was told here today.

An assembly plant near Esztergom (Northwest Hungary) will be built and equipped with Suzuki machinery to manufacture the one and 1.3-litre Suzuki swift models.

Production is planned to reach 50,000 cars annually by 1995.

### NATO Plane Overflies Hungary for First Time

*LD0601163890 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1509 GMT 6 Jan 89*

[Text] Budapest, Jan 6 (TANJUG)—A Canadian Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft today overflew almost the entire Hungarian territory in the first ever such flight.

The Defence Ministry in Budapest issued permission for the flight to proceed along the requested course (Budapest-Miskolc-Debrecen-Kecskemet-Keszthely-Zalaegerszeg-Dombovar-Budapest), although important military facilities lie along the route.

The aircraft was not equipped with surveillance equipment, and the principal objective of the flight was strengthening mutual confidence. The Hercules, which landed at Budapest's Ferihegy Airport on Thursday, is the first NATO plane ever in a Warsaw Pact country.

Today's flight is the first step in the realization of the "open skies project," under which surveillance aircraft from each bloc will be able to overfly the other bloc's territory. Negotiations on the issue will start on February 12 in Ottawa, and should be continued late in April in Budapest.

### Parties, Groups React to Price Hikes

*LD0801230190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2100 GMT 8 Jan 90*

[Text] The organizers of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] call on the economic organizations to demonstrate self-control to prevent inflation from letting loose in Hungary.

The acting body of the National Smallholders' Party protests against the price hikes, demanding at the same time that those leaders who have induced the current economic crisis be brought to task.

The Hungarian Social Democratic Party [MSZDP] leadership recommends that Hungarian citizens launch a disobedience campaign and refuse to pay the tax levied on the interest payments on housing loans.

### Council of Ministers 4 Jan Session Detailed

*LD0401232990 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 2100 GMT 4 Jan 90*

[Report by Gabor Bankuti on 4 January Hungarian Council of Ministers session; date and place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] As of this afternoon, television has a new president, in the person of Istvan Nemeskuerty. The previous leadership has been relieved of office and in its place a Presidium has been named in which recognized television personalities are present, for example, Alajos Chrudinak and Tamas Vitray.

In the wake of protests, the government has amended the sphere of influence of the committee supervising radio and television. Its work will primarily be to supervise the maintenance of equal opportunities in the election campaign, first and foremost in the form of observations afterwards. Although it can make personnel proposals, the Council of Ministers has taken back the right of job appointments and given it to the state minister. The supervisory committee will operate only until the new parliament is convened.

A decision was made that for the construction of the new National Theater, an investment study must be completed by May, for this is connected with the cultural program of the Vienna-Budapest World Expo.

A bill will be submitted to parliament on changing the forced treatment system for alcoholics. It will also be proposed to discontinue the State Prize, and, in the future, to award only Kossuth Prizes, which can recognize any kind of achievement, as was the case in 1948 when it was first awarded.

Imre Szokai was appointed deputy foreign minister.

The government discussed the state attitude concerning the fate of children and young people, but did not find that the ideas submitted had been adequately thought through, and the few concrete proposals that there were, were not in harmony with the budget. They did agree that a new law on family rights is needed and that our homeland must join the international agreement on children's rights.

The reform committee put down a volume-length study on its ideas and was dissolved. The questions in connection with state assets will be put to the parliament.

Location of the Constitutional Court was also discussed because the National Assembly decision marked Esztergom as the headquarters, but there is no suitable building. The building that is there will cost at least 600 million forints and will take several years to build, but there is no time.

However, in Budapest the party's previous headquarters at Angyalfoeld would be suitable for this purpose. The part according to the norm of which was also suffered by the government. [as heard]

The utilization of four significant Workers' Guard institutions was also discussed, for which 37 tenders were received.

The government also talked about the help given to Romania. It listened to a report on this subject. In addition to the actions directed by the state, as this was ascertained, the initiatives of parties, social organizations and groups, churches, and individuals were outstanding. According to data from the border guards alone, up until 1 January, 10,000 tonnes of food, medicine, and clothing were sent out. Therefore, the government expresses its thanks to all those who initiated and arranged these actions.

### MSZMP Members Blamed for 'Crisis'

*LD0801011390 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1800 GMT 7 Jan 90*

[Interview with Ivan Vitanyi, member of Hungarian Socialist Party Presidium, by unidentified reporter on "The Week" program; date and place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] Ivan Vitanyi, Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] Presidium member, is our guest. We would like to ask him about an announcement that was long awaited but that nonetheless turned out to be a little bit ambiguous. Many of our viewers no doubt remember

that on 5 January we heard the following statement in the television newsreel, and I quote: The MSZP does not wish to accept any kind of association with Bela Biszku, Sandor Gaspar, Mihaly Korom, Karoly Nemeth, and Arpad Pullai. They consider that these people are responsible for our country's political and economic processes having sprung a leak and for Hungary having entered a moral, political, and economic crisis. Tell me, why are these people in particular held responsible?

[Vitanyi] I don't know why this is necessarily ambiguous, but perhaps we should speak about that later. This is part of a longer standpoint that was (?reflected) in the sentence you singled out. The essence of the standpoint, and I emphasize this once again, is that the MSZP does not accept, in any form, a direct political inheritance with the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP]. Apart from this, or within this, it believes that in the matter of leaders being at fault with regard to the MSZMP's economic policy, or who committed abuses, it has to be examined and brought before the public who was at fault, to what extent, what offense he committed, and what conclusion has to be drawn from this. The fact that we have singled out precisley these people—how shall I put it, this was a sample, looked at sociologically—they are people about whom the members of the Presidium have proof, from their own experience, that they wre in any event at fault, [word indistinct] within the MSZMP in stifling the reforms, in ruining the economic situation.

[Reporter] I would like to explain what I meant by ambiguous. The reason why I, at least, considered the statement in this form to be ambiguous is that this description was too general—the phrase: for the deterioration of general conditions, in other words, for the country's economic, political, and moral deterioration. Furthermore, alongside the names one did not find concrete facts, something I think very many people in this country are curious about.

[Vitanyi] The situation is that the MSZP Presidium is not a court and in the present situation it does not have the time to examine it fully and to take definitive stances.

[Reporter] Should I understand by this that an examination is in progress?

[Vitanyi] What we propose [word indistinct] we propose that such an examination should take place, but not necessarily within the party's framework because the accusation or the suspicion could arise that abuse of power of an economic or some other nature also occurred. Apart from this, it must also be examined who, in the last resort, is responsible for the economic mistakes the old leadership committed, how, and to what extent. I do not think that the party Presidium itself is qualified to decide this. Neither do I believe that this necessarily requires judicial proceedings or anything similar. In any event it requires perhaps a parliamentary examining committee, or some other method, which is something that has to be decided.

What we wanted to underline by this is that we agree that these problems should be examined, that the public should be briefed about this, that those responsible should be named, and that at the same time those also should be named who, let us say, may well have erred but who do not bear responsibility to the extent that they can no longer hold their heads up high, because, how should I say it, the atmosphere of suspicion is worse than speaking clearly.

[Reporter] Yes, in this we are in total agreement. When could this kind of examination get under way? If you say that, understandably, it is not the MSZP that must begin it, but let us say parliament, then I wonder, will somebody put this proposal before the new parliament, and if so, who?

[Vitanyi] We will make a proposal for this soon in this parliament, but obviously parliament will not be able to carry it through, because I do not think this is a question of days. In other words, I do not think that this could be settled by some people getting together and once more pointing out who is to blame and who is responsible.

[Reporter] So, if I understand correctly, the new parliament will have to reach agreement in what what manner and with the involvement of which organizations they should carry out the examination in which they will finally name those responsible.

[Vitanyi] Yes.

[Reporter] Then just one more thing. It will obviously occur to many people that after all, there was a general secretary who, at the time of the party-state, was the boss of these people, and of others as well, and there was a premier, whose name does not figure in this list, whereas the hierarchy would seem to show that his name should also figure here.

[Vitanyi] A lot of other things could still arise, but if you read through our proposal, what it says is that the members of the MSZMP political committee and other committees must be involved in the sphere of the examination, in other words the Politburo members elected at various times. We likewise propose the involvement of county first secretaries and county council chairmen. So this extends to a wider circle.

[Reporter] But you, too, feel that naming names is unavoidable here?

[Vitanyi] No, we do not think that these five people [changes thought] but on the other hand, it would not have been just. How shall I say it, the assumption of innocence has to be maintained here as well. So, we cannot decide, we do not have the necessary material, we do not have the necessary documents, we do not have the necessary method of examination. We also have to ask those people who are in question. Therefore, we do not have the means to carry this through here and to say, for example, I could name county first secretaries whose names are on every tongue in this matter, but it would

not have been correct if we had entered into this. This would have been tantamount to judgement without trial. We from our own point of view are certain that those we have listed are definitely responsible, at least in the question of why a healthy advancement process toward reforms was hindered within the MSZMP.

[Reporter] I suppose it won't be too protracted, because I think you must agree with me that although it is better late than never, perhaps this should have been started earlier. Thank you very much for having come into the studio.

## Groups Discuss Dam, Boes Accident

*LD0501220890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 5 Jan 90*

[Text] [Announcer] Representatives of 40 Hungarian organizations, parties, and movements have held a discussion on the future of the Boes-Nagymaros dam. Government Commissioner Laszlo Udvari spoke not just about the plans, but also about the consequences of the accident which happened recently at Boes. Szuzsa Vajda reports.

[Udvari] Political changes have happened in Czechoslovakia as well. We do not now wish to talk about the partial amendment of the interstate contract, but at last an opportunity is opening up for a joint scientific experts' examination, and the future fate of the dam, minus Nagymaros, should depend on this expert examination.

[Vajda] But other things are also involved, which you are planning, which you will have to implement. Is it a question of financial revision or financial totaling?

[Udvari] The government has taken measures, beginning with the initial step involving the dam up until the present day, to make public and carry out an itemized examination of the expenditures: the whole system of budgetary relations, the burden on the country, the comparison with the then hoped-for, expected, profit. Hungarian society must be clear about all the effects of the dam.

[Vajda] You, too, have visited the scene of the accident which happened at Boes. What happened exactly, and what conclusions do you draw from this?

[Udvari] The water burst through a temporary closing mechanism there. This is a huge gate, around 10 meters tall, 30 meters wide, and this was swept away by a column of water around eight meters tall. If this had happened during worktime with 30-40 people working, it would have meant certain death for them. The investigations to date, in which Hungarian experts are also participating, have established that either a planning or manufacturing error caused the accident. Otto (?Hasta), doctor of technical sciences, established that the this gate's burden-bearing capacity was only 50 percent of what was needed. So, it is a question of a gate structure which was extremely under-planned, or manufactured from other materials.

What is the conclusion? How could such a thing happen at such a huge establishment, where repeated quality control steps have to be taken, where they have built a structure and it is subjected to burden, but nevertheless this is not supervised as to how it behaves under pressure. They fail to do all this, it points to discipline against the construction technology. We discussed this there, with the Czechoslovakian experts, and we agreed that by the end of January, all the planning documentation on the gate, examination of its material, will be reevaluated, and will be completed. We also decided, with the Czechoslovakian side, that they should carry out this examination of planning and materials on all the structures built into the dam.

[Vajda] But, should we also do this, as well as them?

[Udvari] On our territory, we have this kind of fitting, or structure element, at the Dunakiliti dam. We will examine this, too, in this half of the year, independently of the Dunakiliti dam's fate.

### Further on Bialystok PZPR Building Occupation

*LD0901173290 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1615 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] A [word indistinct] group of students of the branch of Warsaw University, occupying the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Voivodship Committee building in Bialystok since yesterday morning, were attacked by a gang of 10 unidentified people. After a brief tussle, the assailants were repelled.

Talks between the two sides, which had broken off, were supposed to recommence in the afternoon with local authorities participating. The area clearly belongs to the state. Let us remind you, the students are demanding the transfer of the voivodship committee for the use of the university branch. [interview with student indistinct]

### Occupation Ends

*LD0901192490 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1800 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Excerpts] The occpation of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Voivodship Committee building by students in Bialystok ended today when representatives of the city and voivodship authorities, and also students of the branch of Warsaw University, signed an accord. [passage omitted] A communique on the situation and the accord has been issued to the mass media.

### Majka Comments on Constitutional Changes

*AU0901140990 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 2 Jan 89 pp 1, 2*

[Editorial by Jerzy Majka, TRYBUNA LUDU editor in chief: "Cooking in One's Own Sauce"]

[Text] Early on New Year's Day, I listened to a radio broadcast of the Senate debate discussing the amendments to the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic which the Sejm had adopted the day before.

This broadcast was very enlightening. It confirmed all the fears and reservations we had voiced previously.

The senators agreed that a fundamental change had been made to the system in Poland. Many of them rejoiced over the erasure of the achievements of the Polish popular-democratic revolution of 1944 and 1945. Some of them were annoyed that terms which are painful to their ears, such as "socialist," had been overlooked in several places and remained on site.

In triumphant tones, they bade farewell to the class concept of social interests contained in the Constitution so far, with its guarantees of working people's social security and its restraints on the domination of capital over economic and social life. One senator said that there was still no law on compensation for the owners of land that was taken from them in the 1940's. He was also upset by the assets owned by the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] today.

They proved the superiority of an eagle with crown over an eagle with no crown as a symbol of an independent Poland, but overlooked such trifles as the fact that Jozef Pilsudski's cap bore an eagle with no crown and that during periods of uprising, democratic movements had often reverted to the tradition of the Piast dynasty and adopted an eagle unencumbered by a crown on its head. They also hoped society would be willing to cover the costs of altering the emblem and changing the name of the state.

They paid homage to the anti-people's armed underground movement of the 1940's, proclaiming 29 December as the day of its victory. But they said not a word about the 30,000 members of the People's Guard who were killed or murdered in the civil war during that period.

The senators way of thinking clearly shows that there are at least two different concepts about the reforms that are supposed to lead Poland onto the path of development. Both of them accept as the point of departure a development of parliamentary democracy and of a market economy, and both of them reject antidemocratic ways of assuming power and government. But that is where the similarity ends.

The left-wing concept is guided by the class interests of working people. It equates Poland's success with their success, for it is they who constitute the majority of the people and are the salt of the earth here. At least that is how I understand the reform line of the PZPR and of its successor after the 11th Congress.

The right-wing concept, which the senators described in their speeches without beating about the bush, is basically aimed against the people. By means of a national slogan, it camouflages the fact that people are to be dominated by capital. This right-wing alternative is unacceptable to left-wing parties.

I base my assessment of what happened in the Sejm and Senate on 29 and 30 December on the above two alternatives, and I have no reason to be proud or jubilant.

Neither can I understand the urgency of such extensive constitutional changes. The most urgent amendments, eliminating those parts of the constitution that have lost all their validity (for example, the leading role of the PZPR, the coalition, the role of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth), raised no doubts whatsoever and would have been carried through without a problem.

Making changes to the political and socioeconomic system so suddenly causes surprise, and raises suspicions about the intentions of the initiators of these changes. Why were they carried through without a proper first reading in the Sejm? What determined such haste?

The argument that they were meant to be a New Year's present is not very serious, unless they were supposed to be a colorful wrapping paper for other, less attractive

presents, such as the increased burdens on the family budget and other things in store for us in the coming weeks. Were these amendments supposed to be a diversion, to draw society's attention away from other matters? That would be rather short-sighted. One clearly forgets about the wrapping paper.

In this debate, the Senate clearly presented itself as a right-wing and conservative body. For a certain time, I have had the impression that the Senate, and also perhaps in a major part of the Citizens Parliamentary Club, are the chief centers of right-wing radicalism.

Compared to this, as far as the constitutional changes are concerned, the PZPR Deputies Club seems at the opposite extreme, a body that is rather nebulous. I hope the PZPR deputies will forgive this bitter, personal opinion. Whenever at various party meetings party deputies were accused of being submissive and of not being militant, I used to defend the PZPR club. I used to say that the club offers guarantees that the constitution will contain no changes that are directed against socialism and the people. But that turns out not to be the case. Therefore I apologize to all those comrades whom I have misled.

The statement by Marian Orzechowski, the club's chairman, does not explain much. I do not think he was able to convince our party's members and sympathizers. I respect the one single vote against the changes. Two hundred years later, Reytan [a Sejm deputy who committed suicide in protest against the partition of Poland in the 18th century] is remembered and discussed with respect, even though he was unable to alter the course of history, whereas all the arguments of those who said yes [to the partition] have been forgotten.

Against the background of these issues, the Saturday meeting between Mieczyslaw Rakowski and Lech Walesa appears very important. In his television statement, Mr Walesa said something very interesting. He said Poland needs two responsible and moderate forces, one left-wing, and the other right-wing, but not reactionary.

Healthy Polish political thinking can best take shape out of competition between these two forces. Such competition need not divide people. On the contrary, without ruling out the possibility of violent disputes, it can lead to compromise and unite people.

The Senate debate illustrates a return to old divisions. It is an example of cooking in one's own sauce and feeling pleased with that. It proves a lack of understanding of Polish society's varied, pluralistic feelings. It opposes Poland's interests and the spirit of the times.

## Politburo Critical of Constitutional Changes

*AU0901132690 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 29 Dec 89-1 Jan 90*

[Statement by the Polish United Workers Party Central Committee Politburo issued in Warsaw on 28 December—"What Are The Suggestions To Expand the Constitutional Changes Aimed At?"]

[Text] On 28 December, the Politburo of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] Central Committee authorized the Central Committee spokesman to issue the following statement:

Yesterday, the Sejm was presented with a deputies bill to make further changes to the Constitution, changes which considerably exceed those presented during the first reading of the bill to amend the constitution at the 30 November 1989 Sejm session. Pressure is being applied to have the Sejm adopt these changes before the end of the year. In this way, sudden action is being imposed on the Sejm. Many very important constitutional changes which have been suggested come as a surprise not only to society, but also to a considerable number of Sejm deputies.

Apart from the changes which we consider justified and which we support, there are also ones which concern many fundamental spheres of life but which have never been the subject of any serious social debate. This applies particularly to the idea of removing articles 4 and 5 of the Constitution, which lay down the state's responsibility to society. Serious concern is aroused by the intention of deleting article 10, which says that the Polish Armed Forces guard the sovereignty and independence of the Polish people, and the security and peace of Poland.

Thus, society has been caught by surprise by these proposals for far-reaching changes, which would restrict society's rights. The PZPR is in favor of profound reforms. It is taking constructive and energetic part in all debates and all work on establishing the rules and principles of a new, reformed political and economic system. However, we feel that most of the latest additional proposals to amend the constitution ought to be examined under normal procedures by the specially-convened Sejm Constitutional Commission, whose task it is to work out the draft of a new constitution.

The Central Committee Politburo is of the opinion that issues which are fundamental to the future of the entire people should always be the subject of nationwide debate, including a general referendum.

## National Defense Minister Grants Interview

*LD0401215190 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1901 GMT 4 Jan 90*

[Interview with National Defense Minister General Florian Siwicki by reporter Slavomir Pszonda; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Pszonda] In a television interview in January last year, you announced the restructuring of the Armed Forces. A year having passed, I would like to ask about specific changes. Minister, have you succeeded in implementing them?

[Siwicki] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Naturally, we have succeeded. The program for the restructuring of the Armed Forces anticipated for 1989 has been fully carried out. It was naturally not easy; we came up against many difficulites. However, in carrying out the changes in the Army, we were striving as soldiers, as citizens, towards these changes happening jointly with the changes in the state.

Simultaneously, training of soldiers took place in most of the military units. Its results can also be regarded as fully satisfactory, in spite of serious material and technical limitations. Thus, the fact that we have an efficient Army, well prepared to carry out its functions, and at the same time already considerably reformed, is probably gratifying. I would like to take this opportunity to warmly thank the staff for their committed service and effective measures, as well as all the soldiers who contributed to this.

[Pszonda] In other words a smaller but better Army. That's how the importance of this program of restructuring can be presented most briefly. Why is it being carried out precisely at this time?

[Siwicki] The organizational shape of the Army, the size of its armaments, is dependent most generally speaking on two factors: firstly, the degree of the threat to the security of the state and secondly on the economic possibilities of Poland

We have considered it possible and necessary to introduce fundamental reforms in the armed forces. Thus, the restructurization is our measurable contribution to the building of international trust and reiteration of the ideas and proposals contained in the Jaruselski plan which, generally speaking, boil down to the building of trust betwen the states of Central Europe, to deconcentration of weapons and to an improvement of the situation. Consequently, the program of overcoming the crisis in the country has also required from us to introduce an arms reduction and a reduction in expenditure for the maintenance of the Army.

[Pszonda] You have made a general assessment. Can you be more specific?

[Siwicki] Yes, I will give specific details. The maintenance of the Army cost the country in 1989 in real terms over 16 percent less than in 1988 despite enormous inflation. This is the lowest in the budget structure of the country level of expenditure on the Army in the postwar period. Mainly the restructurization, all that we have done so far in reforming of the Army contributed to this. The armed forces have been reduced by a further 33,000 soldiers. Sixty-eight military units have been disbanded and 147 have been structurally transformed. A great amount of military equipment has been withdrawn from use, including 400 tanks, 700 cannons and mortars, 600 armored transporters, and about 80 planes. So far, we have handed over 30 military buildings to meet civilian needs.

Basically, we are also reconstructing the Army, laying stress on its decidedly defensive character. This is expressed in the change to the structure of divisions in which there will now be considerably fewer tanks than hitherto. In fact, the armored division concept is disappearing from our dictionary. The merger of the country's air defense forces and the air force is in progress. Military training is being given a new form.

[Pszonda] There is great public interest, positive and negative, in the conditions of military service.

[Siwicki] Indeed, we have a great many questions and doubts ourselves about how to act and what to do in order to reduce the number of these weaknesses. We have already done a great deal. Nonetheless, we still have negative opinions about military service. We are, therefore, including a program of humanization in Army life within the restructuring. We have eased many of the service regulations with the aim of freeing the cadres and soldiers from unnecessary onerous duties which result from the need for very high parameters of battle readiness to be maintained by Army units. We are doing everything, or a very great deal, for there to be more homeliness in the barracks, more warmth. We remember that the soldier not only has duties but also has rights, which we should guarantee. I do not need to add that we must overcome very many old customs, human weaknesses, and bad habits here. Morever, we have already done a great deal to change the training processes.

We have appointed an officers' education corps in place of the party political apparatus. The program of soldiers' civic training is fundamentally changing. The Polish military tradition and the patriotic duty to serve the nation and the state are strongly highlighted. I think that this important issue will, before long be publically put forward by the chief of the Main Education Board of the Polish Army.

[Pszonda] But, Mr Minister, let us return to the issue of restructuring. Can it be said that its results also go beyond the Armed Forces?

[Siwicki] We are trying to ensure that due to the disbanding of units, nothing which could be useful to the economy, which could be of service to people, should be wasted. In this way, for example, we have sold over 5,500 cars and mobile technical workshops to farmers over the last year. Also, some of the equipment which cannot be used in a practical way is not rusting away in huge military (?stores) but is being directed to steel works after the more valuable parts and subassembly have been dismantled. Thus, 800 tanks and tank transporters are already at the steelworks. As an interesting detail, let me

say that after their equipment had been removed, several dozen airplanes of the older generation were purchased for hard currency.

[Pszonda] Which of the problems tied to the Army's restructuring have caused the most trouble?

[Siwicki] Well, Mr Editor, there are very many problems—if only those of work and time-intensiveness—resulting from the need to take the technology apart before it reaches the steelworks. Many problems are also created by the most advantageous management of vacated premises by disbanded units.

Various institutions often put forward their wish to use these buildings. When we, in good faith, make a decision to hand over a building to one of them, then the other institution complains and conflicts arise. Often, when we act totally in good faith, we bring about some local frustrations. Thus, we are reaching a conclusion that the best solution—and maybe we shall do it in the near future—will be to hand over vacated buildings to the local administration because it can resolve this problem in the best and most favorable way to benefit society.

However, we are devoting most attention to solving human problems. The issue is to reconcile the interests of the service with personal interests of the staff from units which are being disbanded or reorganized. We guarantee each soldier the possiblility of continuing his service. However, it is often connected with the need to be moved to another garrison or with acquiring different qualifications. Of course, this results in the fact that not everyone accepts our proposals. Hence, it is not always possible to reconcile all arguments. Also, conflicts appear in this area. So far, abut 45 percent of staff from the disbanded units are continuing their service in other units, 30 percent are leaving to join the ranks of the reserve because of age or their own requests, and about 25 percent are requalifying or are still debating what to do.

[Pszonda] Minister, what else can we expect as far as the further restructuring of the Armed Forces is concerned?

[Siwicki] Everything we have started we shall certainly finish. We intend to dissolve a further 57 military units and reform some 70 others. We are withdrawing a further 450 tanks, 200 guns and mortars, and about 100 armored transporters. In sum, the state of the Army will be reduced by a further 10,000 soldiers and at the end of 1990, the Polish Army will number some 300,000 people, that is, 0.8 percent of the country's population. This figure makes the Polish Army the thirteenth largest in Europe.

Now, the most important information for recruits and national servicemen. From this autumn onwards, we are going over to an 18- month national service, with the exception of soldiers serving on Naval ships.

In the new academic year, new colleges will begin to operate, including the National Defense Academy and the Higher Officers' School of Military Engineering, and the Higher Officers' School of armored troops will implement a general training program for the whole Army. One can infer from what I have said that the changes, which are varied in scope, of course, will embrace all organizational units of the armed forces. A reduction of the budget of the Ministry of National Defense oy about five percent in relation to last year is envisaged. This will make it necessary to further reduce the purchase of military technology and its exploitation.

There will remain—and I want to stress this very unequivocally—spheres of military life whose protection will be unchanged. This means chiefly the conditions of social welfare for cadres and soldiers on national service, health protection, and housing construction. These problems that I have mentioned are at present, when it is so hard for all of us to cope with the difficulties of daily family life, of particularly great significance.

[Pszonda] Do we already know the answer to what will happen afterwards, that is, can we foresee the shape of our Army in the future 5-year period?

[Siwicki] Naturally, yes, although only in general outlines. We are implementing, after all, as it were, the first stage of restructuring. If favorable tendencies in the international situation are going to be intensified and the epilogue of the agreements on bilateral reductions in conventional arms in Europe is going to be favorable, then conditions will arise for a further reduction in the size of our Army. The options for the coming 5-year period are being prepared. However, the common denominator of all undertakings both in matters of restructuring and other reforms of our Army, was and will always be the maintenance of the potential of our Armed Forces at a necessary level of defense sufficiency.

[Pszonda] I wish you success in the implemenatation of the restructuring program of the Army and thank you, Mr Minister, for the interview.

[Siwicki] Thank you very much.

### Jaruzelski, Kiszczak Discuss Militia Reform

*AU0901132990 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 29 Dec 89 - 1 Jan 90 p 2*

[Text] PAP—Wojciech Jaruzelski, president of the Polish People's Republic, received the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the Belvedere Palace on 28 December, in connection with the New Year. General of Arms Czeslaw Kiszczak conveyed warm New Year wishes to the president on behalf of the ministry's officials, soldiers, and employees.

The interior minister briefed the president once again on the subject of the Interior Ministry's intensive work on changes to the ministry's organization, structure, and functioning.

These changes include the creation of a police force instead of the Citizens Militia. A final name for this

force will be suggested during the course of further work and talks. It would involve new uniforms, new service ranks and titles, and new vocabulary. The police would perform independent activity, limited solely to preserving law and order and protecting citizens lives and property.

At the same time, instead of the intelligence, counterintelligence, and security services, there would be an office for the protection of the state, separate from the police. This office would take over the task of protecting the internal security of the Polish People's Republic.

Both of these suggested organizations would fall under the interior minister's command. However, for reasons of economy, they would share the same logistics infrastructure, in other words they would both have the same supply and administrative backup.

Concrete suggestions concerning these changes are contained in the draft amendment to the Office of Minister of Internal Affairs Act, which has been placed before the relevant Sejm deputies and government members for preliminary consultation. The president will be informed of the results of this. After he has gathered remarks, conclusions, and suggestions, Minister Kiszczak will apply to the chairman of the Council of Ministers for permission to put the draft amendment through normal legislative procedures.

President Jaruzelski conveyed thanks to all officials, soldiers, and employees of the Interior Ministry for their effort and conscientious service for the good of the state and society, and expressed best New Year wishes.

## Senior Armed Forces Appointments Made

*AU0901061990 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 27 Dec 89 p 1*

[Unattributed PAP report: "Cadre Changes in Key PPR Armed Forces Posts"]

[Excerpts] Further changes have been instituted in the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Republic [PPR]. The changes affect key positions in the Main Education Board of the Armed Forces and the Navy. The PPR President recalled Rear Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk from the post of commander of the Navy. He entrusted the performance of these duties to Rear Admiral Romuald Waga, who has been Navy chief of staff until now.

Rear Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk has been designated chief of the Main Education Board of the Polish Armed Forces.

General of Arms Tadeusz Szacilo was recalled from the post of chief of the Main Education Board of the Armed Forces and Rear Admiral Ludwik Dutkowski was recalled from the post of first deputy chief of the Main Education Board of the Armed Forces.

The minister of national defense made the following appointments:

—General of Brigades Tadeusz Kojder was made first deputy chief of the Main Education Board and was simultaneously recalled from the post of deputy chief of the Main Education Board of the Polish Armed Forces and chief of the first department;

—General of Brigades Miroslaw Hermaszewski was made deputy chief of the Main Education Board of the Polish Armed Forces and chief of the first department.

He entrusted Ryszard Lukasik with the duties of Navy chief of staff.

### Biographies

Rear Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk was born into a workers family in Poznan in 1939. He joined the Armed Forces in 1956. He is a graduate of the Naval College and of the General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces. He has served as ship commander, fleet commander, and Navy chief of staff. He was also commander of the Polish Military Contingent to the Temporary UN Forces in Syria. He was commander of the Navy until recently. He is a Sejm deputy.

He is married and has two grown sons.

Rear Admiral Romuald Waga was born into an intelligentsia family in Lublin in 1936. He joined the military in 1954. He is a graduate of the Naval Officers School and of the Naval Academy of the USSR. He has held posts in all key units of the Navy. He has served as ship commander, staff chief and fleet commander, and until recently he was chief of staff and deputy commander of the Navy.

He is married and has a grown daughter.

## Urban Discusses PZPR Internal Relations

*AU0801113290 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 2 Jan 90 p 3*

[Jerzy Urban article: "Boys, Let's Get Rakowski"]

[Text] Marian Orzechowski has unwittingly started a public competition for leadership over the party. He started it with his interview for the 27 January TRYBUNA LUDU.

There have always been personal contests, which usually become more intensive shortly before a congress or at a time of crisis. However, accepted rituals have kept these contests hidden. Mutual antagonists, seething with rage, have always appeared in public as fraternal comrades toward each other, embracing each other and bearing their teeth in sweet smiles. This deceit prevailed in the party until 27 December, when Orzechowski did away with this holy tradition. He attacked Rakowski, and at the same time subtly praised both himself and Fiszbach. In this way, the pre-congress campaign has finally got down to business, because previously, every single

potential leader merely bandied about the same cliches about freedom, democracy, parliamentarism, and renewal. We know that the point is to achieve a place at the party summit, which is well-trodden and has been reduced to the size of a hill, but is still a tempting objective nevertheless. Movements, platforms, and factions are nothing but declarations of personal wishes. Now the curtain has gone up, revealing the real meaning of the pre-congress events and of the Congress itself, which, unfortunately, could be a big personal battleground.

Professor Orzechowski's interview, entitled "We Are Part of the New Party," is easy to summarize: The PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] Deputies Club is delicious, but the PZPR leadership is revolting. Professor Orzechowski first sat in the PZPR leadership 8 years ago, and he always liked it. His change of heart stems from an erroneous feeling of strength and from a misinterpretation of the significance of the post of chairman of the party deputies club. For it is accepted that the PZPR may split into several groups, or may collapse altogether. The party leadership can always be changed, says Orzechowski. The deputies club is the only important, permanent, and influential factor, for it influences power over the state and has a guaranteed 4-year mandate. The club can even exist without the party if necessary, but the party without the club would be meaningless.

I interpret the situation differently. I predict that "Solidarity," that is to day the entire governing apparatus, will hold new elections as early as next year. Of course, this time they will not be based on any prior accord about a division of seats. The deputies clubs of the PZPR, Polish Peasant Party "Rebirth," and Democratic Party, with a tendency toward suicide that is typical of them, will be slow to respond to the initiatives of the Citizens Parliamentary Club and agree to hold the election. Some people foresee that the PZPR Deputies Club will be drastically diminished. I am one of them.

Therefore, the left wing's future position depends not so much on the PZPR Club as on whether the PZPR will remain one party, what it will be like, and who will head it. That will determine whether what is left of pluralism in Poland will survive, or whether the only major force in Poland will be the right wing, extending its right wing even further to the right. If the party (which Rakowski and his colleagues have so far managed to safe from collapse with great difficulty) does disintegrate at the Congress, it will take more than just 5 years to establish an alternative left-wing force in Poland. Maybe it will take decades.

So I would not worry that if the leadership of the PZPR Deputies Club does not assume leadership of the new party, Orzechowski and Fiszbach might be upset and say that henceforth, the club itself will be the party.

Marian Orzechowski's entire status in the country's political life and in the PZPR is based on the fact that he belongs to the Politburo and that he won his deputy's mandate only because most of the other names on the national list of candidates had dropped out. That enabled him to assume chairmanship of the club. However, these tragicomical circumstances are now receding into a past era. It is necessary to look to the future, however difficult and sorry it is.

"I firmly believe," says Professor Orzechowski in his interview, "that there will be great opportunities once the first congress of the new party, a socialist party of working people, begins the difficult process of winning public confidence, our long march toward the revival of the idea and causal force of the democratic socialism. Dear friends, we should do everything possible for this to happen, guided by the slogan that was put forward by Tadeusz Fiszbach: 'integrity, democracy, socialism'."

If one weeds out all these long marches, revivals of ideas, democracies, socialisms, and causal forces, then someone who understands the code of political jargon will know what Orzechowski is talking about: Marian Orzechowski describes Tadeusz Fiszbach as the teacher of a new slogan to guide the party, in other words he places Fiszbach at the head of the new party. And now the question arises: What is going to happen to Orzechowski, for God's sake?

The answer to this question slowly emerges from the text of the TRYBUNA LUDU interview: The PZPR leadership should be taken over by 30-40 year olds; a change of generation is essential, says the professor. Of course, there are exceptions, he hastily adds (he is, after all, almost 60), and stresses that he has only been in the party leadership for 8 years, he got into this leadership on the crest of the reformist wave of the Ninth Congress. One should note that even when there is talk of a dictatorship over the PZPR Deputies Club, he and Fiszbach are regarded as a duo.

So the reader should understand that Marian Orzechowski is a new figure in the party. His opposite is Rakowski, whom he does not mention by name, and who has been in the Central Committee for 25 years. We learn in the interview that the present party leader is incompetent because the party leadership team of which he is head is always late with everything and is lagging behind the Deputies Club, which is quicker and more energetic in breaking with the past.

The adopted method of discrediting one's rival, in other words Mieczyslaw Rakowski, is very typical of current moods inside the PZPR. The PZPR is the only party in the world where a lack of a political past is considered a virtue. Just as in the matrimonial market virgins without a past have an advantage over virgins with a past, likewise in the PZPR a lack of experience and previous non-existence are considered synonymous with newness and freshness, in other words leadership qualities. In this way, personnel selection becomes a search for mediocrity. Yet in every political movement in the world, people without a past, in other words people who have not been tested, count for nothing. Activists there are

always asked about their past,and in what way the past shapes a candidate's policies.

If one were to accept Orzechowski's criteria, one could ask why he, who has been in the party leadership for 8 years, should be fresher than Rakowski, who has been in the party leadership for 2 years; and why Rakowski should be considered an old leader if he has only been a leader for a few months. According to this, it does not take long for a party leader to become used up. How can a political movement with a Don Juan complex, in other words a movement whose entire energies are taken up by frequently changing the object of its affections, exist?

Before Marian Orzechowski suddenly found himself at the head of the PZPR Deputies Club before the election, he was Central Committee secretary and chief PZPR ideologist. The ideas he advocated were not particularly worth hearing (except perhaps for his book, published in 1984, in which he rebuked Professor Schaff after Schaff's expulsion from the PZPR as a non-Leninist). But they never went ahead of the time in which he was active, nor did they approach the limits of political risk.

Mieczyslaw Rakowski was in the Central Committee not only as candidate member (which he was for 11 years), but also as a member of the so-called plenum. He held this honor for over 20 years because he was editor in chief of the influential POLITYKA. If between 1958 and 1961 there existed inside the PZPR some sort of stable reformist stream, a body propagating economic, political, and legal reforms, a permanent pressure group in favor of an open cultural policy, an oasis of pragmatism and common sense; then such a stream was the POLITYKA editorial board. This board fought hard for and achieved a certain measure of independence, thanks to which for decades it was the only stable and consistent source of reform in the entire left wing, speaking out in favor of healthy economics, the rule of law, and a stronger role for the Sejm. When the wave of xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and nationalism appeared in 1968, POLITYKA was the main voice of opposition in the party. When anti-German feelings raged, POLITYKA pursued Polish-German rapprochement. When the door to the West was slammed shut, Rakowski's POLITYKA put its foot in this door and made it difficult to close. Through it, the left-wing intelligentsia kept in touch with other streams of thought in the world.

In fact, all the democratic changes which today's reformers have suddenly pulled out of their hats during the past 5 minutes have their origins in POLITYKA's writings; the defensive role of trade unions instead of their previous function as intermediary bodies, the abolition of the death penalty, liberal legislation, the militia's accountability to society, partnerlike relations with the allied parties, and self-management. Entire generations of left- wing intelligentsia activists, professionals, and managers grew up on POLITYKA and its intellectual matter.

It is Rakowski, not Orzechowski, who was accused of social democratism, pro-Western sympathy, and liberalism in the 1960's and 1980's. It is he, not Orzechowski, who challenged the anti-Semitic, anti-intelligentsia, and anti-pragmatic campaign in the economy all on his own in the 1960's. It is he, not Orzechowski, who wrote in an article entitled "A Good Professional, But Not A Party Member" that the road to promotion in state service should not be reserved for PZPR members. It is he, not Orzechowski, who greeted the emergence of "Solidarity" with the article "Respecting One's Partner." It is Rakowski, not Orzechowski, whom Gomulka dismissed from the post of POLITYKA editor for printing the opinion that the death penalty in Poland ought to be abolished, 25 years before Orzechowski voted for the same thing in the Sejm. It is Rakowski, not the ex-Foreign Minister Orzechowski, who was and remains the best-known and most respected Polish politician in the world. It is Rakowski, not Orzechowski, who was so distrusted by his neighbors that it only became thinkable and possible to elect him to the PZPR leadership 2 years ago. Finally, it is not Orzechowski who wrote books toward the end of the 1970's ("The December Turning-Point," "The Republic on the Threshold of the 1980's") calling for a change in the system of government and warning against the growing crisis of real socialism.

One can be of the opinion that someone is a more outstanding politician than Rakowski, is undeniably a reformer, has better leadership qualities, a better international reputation, and should therefore head the new party. The only thing is one should be able to name him. However, it is startling when Rakowski is attacked using the fact that he has been a member of the Central Committee for quarter of a century without mentioning his role in the party and when the PZPR's chief ideologist before the elections suggests that Rakowski is politically burnt out.

As leader, Rakowski is now pursuing a policy that is rooted in his identity and past. So it is even ridiculous that he should now be heckled by people seized by reformist radicalism who have only been reformers for the past 5 minutes; people who suddenly experienced a democratic revelation following the June elections. It is as funny as 60-year-olds calling for a change of generations.

Political leadership requires some measure of authenticity.

Mieczyslaw Rakowski is being attacked in the PZPR for being the one who, in his speech during the first half of the 10th Central Committee plenum, used blackmail tactics to effect a breakthrough in party policy, the adoption of the concept of parliamentary democracy, pluralism, and agreement to the registration of "Solidarity," which paved the way to the "roundtable" talks. Now, in light of the course of events in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and in Romania in particular, these charges of surrendering power look rather weak. Indeed, it is to Jaruzelski's and Rakowski's credit that they possessed

the foresight that saved Poland from the Romanian alternative. Rakowski is at the same time being attacked for being an insufficiently radical reformer by the newly established wing of those seeking renewal. Yet it was Rakowski the premier who went as far as was then possible in creating reform faits accomplis, among which I would include the scrapping of the economic system and the "roundtable," which led to the registration of "Solidarity" and the elections.

This line of criticism of Rakowski draws its strength from the antipathy toward Rakowski that is felt by some "Solidarity" activists, who no doubt prefer to deal with compliant yes-men. They are striving to create a new party that will be a weak and numerically small satellite of the Citizens' Parliamentary Club, a party that is deprived of genuine politicians who have minds of their own and are capable, like Rakowski, of pursuing a separate, independent line and of engaging in polemics.

There are various motives behind the campaign against Rakowski, a campaign that is now being waged from various directions at the same time, but it will only have one effect: It will deprive the party of its identity and diminish the influence that it can exert. The danger is that following the next elections there will no longer be a left-wing opposition in Poland, but only an impotent facade, a pale imitation, which will perform the same role toward the Citizens' Parliamentary Club that the Democratic Party used to perform with respect to the PZPR. This would pave the way to free reign for what would presumably be authoritarian right-wing rule that would ensure that such a party could lend some pluralist decoration to public life.

Tadeusz Fiszbach, who has been suggested as an alternative to Rakowski by Marian Orzechowski, did not suddenly emerge as a politician in 1980 and he is no political virgin. He became a worker in the party apparatus as many as 25 years ago and followed the typical career path of a local (since 1963) instructor and secretary. From 1971-82 he was first a secretary and then first secretary of the voivodship committee in Gdansk. His historic achievement is the very close cooperation that he engaged in with "Solidarity" during the years 1980-81 and the confidence of the union that he acquired at that time. This led to Fiszbach's removal in 1982. He has something in common with Lenin, in that when circumstances were not in his favor, Fiszbach, like Vladimir Ilich, bided his time in Finland. However, unlike Lenin he did not spend his exile in a hut, but in the Polish Embassy.

In my opinion, there would be two faults in following Orzechowski's suggestion that Fiszbach should lead the new party, the successor to the PZPR. First, there would be a risk in giving the leadership to an activist who, despite circumstances that are now in his favor, has not so far displayed leadership qualities and has not acquired the status of a national level politician. The second danger stems from the fact that Fiszbach was supported by "Solidarity" in the Sejm elections, and he is currently being promoted by "Solidarity" as the PZPR man that it would find most palatable and is closest to it. The danger is that of a loss of identity or even the loss of independence by Poland's party of the left.

The campaign against Rakowski—the last PZPR premier and someone who, according to the findings of the Center for Public Opinion Research, still enjoyed the support of 70 percent of the public in November 1988 (and about 62 percent in June 1989), even following the August-September strikes, that is, when the party was already in decline—has been going on below the surface for a long time now and has recently increased greatly in its intensity. It is a good thing that Marian Orzechowski brought all this kicking each other under the table out into the open in the columns of TRYBUNA LUDU.

However, the attack on Rakowski prompts thoughts of a more general kind: What chances will the new party have, as all PZPR leaders ended up being more or less trampled on by their own ranks? Can Orzechowski, should he succeed in putting Fiszbach and himself forward, count on then being able to depart gracefully, as renouncing one's leaders has already become a custom, a norm, and a reflex action in the PZPR?

P.S. To those who will say that Rakowski inspired Urban, I would like to say that I am not someone who receives inspiration, I only state openly whom I am for and whom I am against.

## Majka Calls for Left-Wing Government

*AU2712103189 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 18 Dec 89 pp 1, 2*

[Editorial by Jerzy Majka, TRYBUNA LUDU editor in chief: "The Members Are Most Important]

[Text] Why did we lose the election? Whose fault is it? Who is responsible for the compromise that was reached in Magdalenka? Is is those who conducted the Magdalenka talks, or those who permitted them to take place? During the "roundtable," the representatives of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] naively believed the "Solidarity" side's promises about confrontation-free elections. Whose fault is that? Why are the main actors of the 1989 Polish political stage not taking part in the pre-congress debate?

Why has the Central Committee's reaction to the attempts to abolish the 22 July national holiday been so lame? Why have we betrayed the Voluntary Civic Militia Reserve? Why are we allowing the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy to be disbanded? Who is going to oppose the constantly increasing demands of the right wing?

How can one calmly sit and watch the government try to restore capitalism to Poland? How can one fail to protest against the rising danger of totalitarianism? The remarks of many Sejm deputies and senators are doing nothing

but angering society. How can one support a right-wing government program? Should the party not become an all-out opposition party?

In such a situation, why are members of the Central Committee leadership, party deputies, politicians, and journalists not to be seen? Are they not deserting a sinking ship? Why do PZPR deputies love a center-right-wing government? Has the 8 July Movement escaped to the sidelines? What will happen to TRYBUNA LUDU? Are you not afraid?

These are some of the questions that were put to me during pre-congress meetings in the Warsaw district of Ochota. I think they were dictated mainly by emotion. Although some of them are unjustified, I think they reflect something that affects all of us party members.

A new party of the socialist left should emerge at the 11th Congress out of all this bitterness and anger, bitterness because noble aspirations have not been fulfilled, and anger because the right wing knows of only one road—back to square one.

While taking active part in the PZPR pre-congress debate, I have monitored it closely. At the same time, I have watched the activity of various "Solidarity" circles, those affiliated with Walesa and those opposed to him, plus the Citizens Parliamentary Club, the expanding network of "Solidarity" civic committees and trade union bodies, and the government circles that sympathizes with this political orientation.

I ask myself: Who started this aggressive increase in attacks against party policy, only a few months after the "roundtable," which is now being totally disregarded? I have only one explanation. Despite all the blows it has suffered, our party is still the chief obstacle on the road to a power monopoly by "Solidarity" right-wing governments.

If the right wing does not cause the PZPR to disintegrate and does not make the PZPR's successor its vassal, it will never achieve its objectives. It will not reestablish capitalism in Poland, for the National Trade Union Confederation, the left-wing trade union representation of working people in Poland, will have as its political ally a left-wing party which represents the class interests of working people. The right wing will be unable to overcome such a class barrier.

Not since the war has there been such a great need to oppose right-wing forces. We have the right to expect all the European socialist and communist parties to understand that. We expect solidarity also from them.

The policies pursued by Tadeusz Mazowiecki's center-right-wing government, which has been pushed even further to the right by various pro-"Solidarity" orientated bodies, especially the various civic committees, are making it more necessary than ever before for Poland to have left-wing policies and a left-wing party, for the sake of Poland and the national interests of the Poles. There are at least three reasons for this.

The last months of 1989 have seen a restriction of civic freedoms, especially the freedom of speech. The government has abandoned the formula of work in front of an "open curtain," adopted by Premier Jaruzelski years ago. Gorbachev's "glasnost" has also been deemed passe. There is much to indicate that we are dealing with a curb on democratic liberties in Poland.

So if Polish society is to defend the liberties it has gradually won during the course of 45 years, it cannot agree to a "Solidarity" monopoly over television and radio, and cannot tolerate this movement's greed in aspiring toward a new, monopolist position.

This greed is best illustrated by the speeches of some Citizens Parliamentary Club deputies in parliament and at the "Solidarity Ethos" conference. The PZPR is the only party that is demanding institutional, democratic guarantees.

Next, the "neoliberals" in Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government are directing their sharpest attack against the principle of the equality of all types of ownership, a principle that stems from social justice. Deputy Premier Balcerowicz's economic staff consider such an equality to be a danger on the road to establishing the private sector's domination in Poland (backed up, by the way, by the entire capitalist West).

Mr Balcerowicz's government policy is very straightforward. First, one should permit an uncontrolled increase in prices in the first half of 1990, then firmly keep wage rises under control, and the rest does not matter.

The price for curbing inflation by the middle of 1990 will be paid by those employed in the socialized economy, the public sector, as well as by pensioners and benefit recipients. They will finance the emergence from the crisis as well the birth of bourgeois Poland in 1990. That 10 percent of society that owns 70 percent of financial reserves today will buy some of the socialized enterprises that are going bankrupt for next to nothing and the rest will be bought up by foreign capital.

There is a third area of battle in which I see there being no better defender of Polish interests than the left. It concerns Poland's western border. The government's Christian Democrat policy does not arouse confidence. If the National Democrats or Christian Democrats turn to us—I do not know whether they treat us as communists or socialists—to propose an alliance on this issue, then we should treat the proposal with all due seriousness. If there were no strong party of the Polish left, then there would be no such proposals.

Today we already are a different party. However, how it differs from the PZPR, the one from before the 10th Central Committee plenum, will have to be clearly defined following the 11th congress. I consider this timeframe to be very important. If the converse happens,

then what we commit ourselves to and what we divorce ourselves from will be nothing other than hot air.

In what way should we be different? We have to announce the end of the historic mission of a party that is right by virtue of some supernatural force stronger than the will of the people. We have to humbly acknowledge the democratic, parliamentary principle that the degree of power one has is determined by the level of public support one enjoys. So, we have to come out in favor of parliamentary democracy.

It is time to bid farewell to the "state" party once and for all. We do not want to be any kind of administration or super- administration. We want to engage in politics like all parties elsewhere in the world.

Today, we can reach no agreement about ideology within our party nor with other parties. The confusion concerning ideas has reached a high point. However, we can agree on a political program and that is what we should do.

To return to party affairs, we do not have to be as artificially united on doctrine as was the case until now. I identify more closely with all those who think, rebel, and have their own private vision of a just world than with those who feel it essential to have things sanctioned with a party membership card.

Party members are what matter most. A lot is said about unity, but what sort of unity would a unity without members be. I do not believe in a party that people who consider themselves to be Poland's left today would not want to join. Most of them are in the PZPR, and today they are only organized according to left-wing criteria in the PZPR. There are surely many genuinely left-wing people outside the PZPR, but they are not organized.

A new resolutely socialist party can only emerge from the PZPR. PZPR members must decided what sort of party it should be. The delegates to the 11th congress are their representatives, and solely their representatives. Party members did not give anyone a mandate to destroy party unity, to produce creations in accordance with ambitions of various "ideologists" and "divine leaders." What they did was to ask many questions. These questions give rise to certain obligations and rights, and that is the only mandate that delegates to the 11th congress have and will have.

I think that the questions and arguments that I encountered in the Ochota district of Warsaw are repeated within the entire party. They are what matter most to me. Members are and will be what matters most in the PZPR and the new party. There is no party without members. I would not like to be involved in a party that has no members.

## Deputies, Senators on Czechoslovak-Polish Union

*AU0901202190 Warsaw SZTANDAR MLODYCH in Polish 4 Jan 90 pp 1, 2*

[Deputies' and senators' statements to PAP; date and place not given: "A Long Way Off"]

[Text] We have recently been returning, more and more often, to old concepts that were never realized. One of them is the concept of a federation with our southern neighbor.

It was among the topics discussed by Prof Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to the U.S. president, on Polish radio.

So, following the crowning of the eagle and the changing of the name of the state, we have a new issue to deal with. What do deputies and senators who belong to parliamentary foreign affairs commissions think about this issue?

Senator Stanislaw Hoffman: "I personally think that a union of the countries that belong to our block would be right: A union comprising Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary would act as a counterweight to other economic and political forces in Europe. I see a future within this group of states, because they possess a similar economic structure.

"It has become possible to create a union of this kind, because our countries are on a path of change. The changes are political at this stage, but I think that they will become economic in due course."

Deputy Jerzy Rusecki: "Prof Zbigniew Brzezinski's concept is not new. There are two initiatives that spring to mind: the prewar one, and the one that was put forward during World War II and was discussed by the governments in exile of our two states. I think that the concept is interesting and sound. I also support it, because the Czechs and the Slovaks are the Slavic peoples closest to us; they are our kinsmen. However, is this something that they will go along with? The new president's first foreign visit, to the GDR and the FRG, surely shows where their main interest lies. I think that our peoples should forget their old quarrels, disagreements, and conflicts and give serious consideration to this idea. Perhaps we will gradually move closer together; third time lucky, as the saying goes."

Senator Stanislaw Stomma: "I ardently support it. I think that it is a very sound proposal. The emergence of a strong new political organism would create a state of equilibrium in Europe. There are no disagreements between the two states, and they have many common interests."

Deputy Janusz Onyszkiewicz: "The idea of a Polish-Czechoslovak federation is not new. It was very widely discussed following the outbreak of World War II, and

this was even reflected in some of the declarations that were signed by both governments in exile. Currently, all of us want to find ourselves in some kind of single Europe, but at this juncture it is still difficult to say what sort of Europe it should be: I do not think that it could simply be an enlarged EEC. I think that our path to Europe would be much easier if we—I am thinking of countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary—were to proceed along it together, if it were the product of joint actions and agreement on the issue. It is still too soon to say whether it should take the form of local federations. At this point we should think about what a common Europe should be like, about the path that should lead us to it."

Senator Andrzej Szczypiorski: "I think that it is a long way off. We should begin by overcoming the various feelings of resentment that exist. Above all, we have to deal with the totalitarian legacy, which we have dealt with politically, but not psychologically. The same applies to the Czechs and the Slovaks. I think that we have to follow a straighter course—what De Gaulle called a Europe of Fatherlands, and what Gorbachev calls the common European home. This means a united Europe within current borders, but borders that are completely transparent, that is, borders that present no obstacles to and can easily be crossed by ideas, thoughts, people, and goods. Actually, that is the only course of development for present-day Europe."

### Further on Trial, Sentencing of Militia Officers

*AU0901182090 Paris AFP in English 1812 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Excerpt] Bucharest, Jan 9 (AFP)—A special military court at Sibiu, central Romania, Tuesday sentenced two members of the country's militia to 12-and-a-half years in prison for murder and attempted murder, informed sources said.

The two men, Liviu Vanga, militia chief at Cisnadie, near Sibiu, and Aurel Marcu from Sibiu, were accused of firing their submachine guns at demonstrators at Cisnadie on December 21, the eve of Nicolae Ceausescu's downfall.

Two members of Romania's Hungarian and German minority died and 11 other people were injured in the shooting. One of the casualties had a foot amputated Tuesday.

Sibiu was the stronghold of Nicu Ceausescu, the son of the late dictator.

The two militia members were deprived of their civil rights for nine years in addition to their prison sentence.

The court authorized relatives of the victims to sue the two for damages. [passage omitted]

### Brucan Interviewed on 'Young People's Revolution'

*PM0901141090 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 4 Jan 90 p 10*

[Report on interview with Foreign Ministry official Silviu Brucan by Andrea Tarquini in Bucharest—date not given]

[Text] Bucharest—"Why is the West so worried about saving Romania's Communists? Why do you trouble yourselves so much about the future of a party that has condemned itself in the face of history? This revolution was carried out by young people and it is up to them to take command; it is not for us septuagenarians of the generation of Honecker, Husak, and Kadar to lead the new Romania."

It was late evening in Bucharest but the old Bolshevik, Silviu Brucan, was still at work in his office—a large room on the third floor of the Foreign Ministry.

The stronghold, under siege and protected by tanks, looks like a Bastille or Winter Palace recently stormed by revolutionaries.

A former member of the Executive Political Committee (the party leadership) and a leading communist intellectual, a former ambassador to the United States, and for the past couple of years a contributor to the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE at the risk of his life, Brucan is the old theoretician of the disintegrating Communist Party. He received us in his spacious room at the ministry. He had just launched a television appeal for national unity against the communist past—he, the old Bolshevik who has chosen to fight his last major battle not for the party but for his homeland. A large map of Romania hangs on the wall opposite Brucan's desk, while on another wall in this office—where hitherto an unknown servant of the tyrant worked—a pale patch on the wallpaper is all that remains of the newly removed portrait of Nicolae Ceausescu.

His desk was covered in newspaper cuttings. Wearing a blue sweater, old English shoes, and gray wool trousers, Brucan crossed the room quickly, smiling, proudly displaying a photocopy of an article published in the TRIBUNE 3 September 2 years ago: It forecast the end of communism. "I have waited a long time to see whether or not I was right. I barely avoided losing my bet at the end of this unforgettable 1989."

[Tarquini] Dr Brucan, were you expecting this revolution? Did you plan it at secret meetings?

[Brucan] I have just written in one of the new free newspapers that this is the young people's revolution, that the young people manipulated by the party for decades have given history its due. So in Romania the generation of the septuagenarians—the Brezhnevs, the Zhivkovs, the Ceasescus: in other words, my generation—was swept aside when the youngsters' revolution overthew the dictator on 22 December. The party was taken unawares and missed the boat of history. So, if we want to be fair and consistent, we must give those youngsters crucial positions of command. The revolution must be sincere, and I personally refuse to occupy executive posts.

[Tarquini] But had not you and other critical communists and military leaders not been preparing for some time for the end of the tyrant?

[Brucan] I do not know—except from the foreign press—of any preparations in this regard. We could only speak in secret, and for years I had been awaiting the blow that would mark Ceausescu's end, but the blow came from the people.

[Tarquini] And yet you critical Communists did act...

[Brucan] I repeat: Why are you so concerned about salvaging the future of a party that will receive a maximum of two percent of the votes in a free election? Why should you?

Here the thinking sector of the party would have had two options—to lead the movement for democracy or to submit to its pressures. One or the other of these options has been taken in Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and even the Soviet Union. Not here: Here the last opportunity was missed and no reformist groups managed to organize themselves. It was not until the late morning of 22 December that it became apparent that the clock of history had chimed for the last time.

[Tarquini] Is there no future for anyone on the Left?

[Brucan] Left, right, center—What do these definitions mean in a country dominated until just the other day by a medieval system? What sense do ideologies make here where until just the other day food, heating, and electricity were only forbidden dreams? [Brucan ends]

Brucan broke off to answer the telephone, then shook hands with one of the Army officers—in combat uniform and carrying a machine gun—that make up his escort.

The young soldier had just entered to deliver a confidential message from another room. The old Communist wrote the secret reply on a piece of paper, which he handed to the soldier. The youngster clicked his heels, saluted, and hurried off. Then the aging luminary resumed, pointing to another newspaper cutting that conveys his thinking: "I have just published an article entitled 'Without Isms or Party.' I want to say this: The Front may be basically left-wing, but without ideologies. The only ideology will be the people's prosperity."

[Tarquini] Will the Front contest the elections or will its communist and noncommunist components split before the vote?

[Brucan] I believe that a split could occur not after these elections but, if anything, after the next elections. No, the Front will field democratic left-wing candidates in these elections as representatives of the leading force of transition and national unity—but without becoming a party. We shall see: Perhaps some kind of political force will emerge from this idea and from the response that it receives from the voters.

[Tarquini] Is April not to early to vote?

[Brucan] I believe it is. The political forces need time to organize, but the young people are impatient: They carried out the revolution and we must respect their will.

[Tarquini] Dr Brucan, I repeat: Did you and other Communists and military leaders really not plan a coup?

[Brucan] We could not do so, because we were unable to meet. We had been expecting the final blow for some time, but unfortunately it did not come from the workers' revolt in Brasov in 1987.

[Tarquini] Why not?

[Brucan] Because the reasons for the Brasov revolt were economic and related to salaries, not political; so after the repression the regime was able to try to satisfy them in part. And also because 2 years ago the international context was not the same: Too many septuagenarians were still in power in the socialist world.

[Tarquini] Do you not fear an election victory by the right-wing forces, such as the Peasants' and Christian Democratic Parties?

[Brucan] I will not make any forecasts: The old Peasants' Party had a majority in post-war Romania when most of the population lived in the countryside. Now urbanized Romania is a different country.

[Tarquini] You are over 70; how do you judge the younger Communists?

[Brucan] I regard the new team—Iliescu, Roman, the old Manescu, Foreign Minister Celac—as excellent, and I admire their captain, Roman: an excellent teacher at the polytechnic, who graduated with flying colors from Moscow and Paris, who was in the front line in the assault on the party building during the days of the revolution, an honest and courageous statesman. All his men are in their proper places. Voters will see this, too.

[Tarquini] How do you judge Ceausescu?

[Brucan] He was a typical Stalinist with a pathological history. I remember when we had to draft political documents with him: What struck me most was his ignorance. He and his wife were not educated beyond the fourth grade.

[Tarquini] Do you want to condemn Ceausescu in order to absolve communism?

[Brucan] What political color do you identify with, in view of the fact that the Left worries you so much? No, communism is in a state of crisis because, despite all its theoretical formulations over the decades, it finds itself without political theories and sciences capable of dealing with the world of computers, television, and satellites. Romania is the perfect example of this, because here more than anywhere else communism has prevailed only by force in the past. With Lenin, communism started to become suitable only for the Third World: To have failed to realize this is perhaps a shortcoming on Gorbachev's part. Be that as it may, what do I care? I have no regrets: I lost my battle in the party, then the young revolutionaries granted me the joy of political and moral revenge.

And yet for us politicians and for you journalists Marxist theory remains the best instrument for understanding real conditions.

## Brucan Grants Interview to AFP Correspondent

*AU1001112790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0948 GMT 10 Jan 90*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 10/1/1990—"The total number of the people who died during the revolution in Romania does not exceed 10,000," stated Silviu Brucan, member of the Executive Political Bureau of the Council of the National Salvation Front [NSF], in an interview with an AFP special envoy in Bucharest. Silviu Brucan specified that the genocide of 60,000 reproached to Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu corresponded to all the executions in the 25 years of dictatorship and the victims of the revolution.

Answering a question related to the NSF's Council Mr. Brucan said that the Front "is a political organizations

without a defined ideology." "The only ideological element that can be applied to the Front is the fact that it belongs to the left in a very broad meaning," he said. The NSF "is not and will never become a political party, the Front is a product of the revolution. It holds a leading place in the political life and we are of the opinion that were it not to take part in the election campaign a political vacuum would be created which no party coming into being now could not fill."

"That is why," Silviu Brucan said, "we have considered that the Front must take part in the elections as a pluralistic political organization open to all the political forces harbouring various ideas, conceptions and philosophies, with only one condition: they agree with several questions the Front has considered as priorities.

"The NSF will have its own candidate (sometimes several candidates in one constituency) to fight against the opposition parties. I would like to specify that these opposition parties will be able to opt: to take part in the elections within the Front or outside it."

In connection with the free access to the radio and television stations of the opposition parties, Mr Brucan said that "the Front intends to organize a roundtable meeting with all the political parties to discuss these questions, the date of the elections included, to the detail.

"At present we are working on a new election law," Silviu Brucan also stated, "which we hope to present in the press, on the radio and television to submit it to a broad public debate. The bill will be finalized only after this debate."

In connection with the assertion of former Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer according to which dictator Ceausescu was a paranoiac, Silviu Brucan answered that that was also his opinion. "But", he added, "I regret that Maurer had never taken any stand against Nicolae Ceausescu during his life. Moreover, he once again embraced him publicly in January 1988 on his birthday."

In connection with the possibility of former King Michael's return to Romania Silviu Brucan said: "he can come whenever he wants as a tourist or a mere citizen."

### Roman on Ceausescu, Democracy, Free Elections

*AU0801163990 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 8 Jan 90 p 120*

[Interview with Prime Minister Petre Roman by unidentified DER SPIEGEL reporter; date and place not given: "There Were Plans To Free Ceausescu"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr Roman, who is now in power in Romania?

[Roman] "The Council of the National Salvation Front," which was born out of the revolution, now exercises power. Its core emerged on 22 December; subsequently, it was extended to include a total of 145 persons. Today it represents the political power in the state.

[DER SPIEGEL] How did you seek your ministers?

[Roman] Since we have to work with the old, outdated structures—because there are no others—we can only tap a single source: the reservoir of intelligent and competent personalities who were never recognized or used by the dictator.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are these men who did not compromise themselves during the 24 years of despotism?

[Roman] Yes. They are people who, politically, did not soil their hands, even though some of them may have been technocrats under the old regime. They are people who suffered themselves because their competence was neither desired nor recognized. Moreover, now we particularly need young leaders; people between the ages of 30 and 40 must be included in the leadership.

[DER SPIEGEL] Have you already drawn up a balance sheet? How much money has Ceausescu left you?

[Roman] The state budget is not a very difficult problem. As is known, Romania no longer has a foreign debt. However, the price that we had to pay for it is absurdly high. This has put us in an extremely difficult situation, because we have virtually no key technologies.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are there at least sufficient supplies? Will the available food and fuels last until the end of the winter?

[Roman] Yes, they will.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why were Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu so quickly executed?

[Roman] We had to try and execute them as quickly as we did because there were plans to free them. We had information that parachutists were preparing to attack the insufficiently protected location where the couple were staying.

[DER SPIEGEL] What is now going to happen with the Ceausescu clan?

[Roman] Ceausescu's children are under our protection. Two of his brothers, who were generals, have been arrested.

[DER SPIEGEL] And the rest of the family?

[Roman] Only the two generals were dangerous. We are not interested in his other brothers and sisters.

[DER SPIEGEL] What is to become of Ceausescu's monuments and palaces?

[Roman] We do not know yet, and we are really not discussing this question at this moment.

[DER SPIEGEL] If one talks to the people in the street one can feel the fear that, following the revolution, Romania might be ruled only by opportunists.

[Roman] This fear is, of course, not unfounded. After the revolution many Romanians are now claiming to have wounds, to be victims of the dictatorship, and they are calling for reparations of damages. However, these opportunists are not dangerous to us. After all, we are aspiring to a new political pluralism. We are not a closed circle into which we are forcefull with the people. The program of the Front includes all political trends. This is what makes it difficult for the opportunists, because they do not know what direction they should opt for.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is Communism in Romania finished?

[Roman] At the moment we do not have a Communist Party any more.

[DER SPIEGEL] Will there be one some time in the future?

[Roman] Maybe; I do not know.

[DER SPIEGEL] Yet this possibility does not worry you?

[Roman] No, not at all.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you think that, even today, Romania is able to survive democracy?

[Roman] Of course it is.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why are you so certain of this?

[Roman] I am so certain because of the revolution and the events of the past few days.

[DER SPIEGEL] However, the Romanians do not have any experience with democracy at all?

[Roman] This does not matter. How many people have experienced such a revolution as we have?

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you really intend to hold free elections in 3 months' time?

[Roman] This is what we have committed ourselves to. I have to do everything I can to secure free elections. I have to create not only the political, but also the material conditions for such elections. A man is only free when he ceases to suffer from acute material misery. Now my greatest challenge is to alleviate the misery in Romania.

### Defense Minister on Army's Role in Revolution

*AU0901155490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1445 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["The Romanian Defense Mnister on the Romanian Army's Attachment to the Revolution"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 9/1/1990—As it has shown along its history, the Romanian Army has again been on the side of the people, stated Army General Nicolae Militaru, minister of national defence, in an interview with the Bucharest daily TINERETUL LIBER. He specified that, despite the criminal order given by the Romanian dictator according to which the Army should open fire on the demonstrators, the military did not shoot the people. On the contrary, they fraternized with the youths, with the workers, with the participants in the revolution and afterwards started fighting the terrorists, the Ceausescu gangs. The minister also said hero General Vasile Milea (the late defence minister) was meanly murdered by the odious Ceausescu's clique. The circumstances in which he died are to be clarified.

The Army's fight against the dictator's forces, the collocutor said, had the character of a genuine urban guerilla as the terroristic groups, specially trained and armed with modern weapons and equipment of foreign origin, proved unconceivable cruelty and sadism, ferocious hatred shooting both military and children, youths, women and the old.

It is high time that the military resumed their posts and train appropriately to defend the people, the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of our homeland, the defence minister said in conclusion.

### NSF Officials Celac, Neagu Statements to Press

*AU0901220690 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 2040 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] On the occasion of the first meeting with representatives of the Romanian press, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergiu Celac referred to the role of his ministry in implementing the Romanian foreign policy on the international plane, saying, among other things:

[Begin Celac recording] First of all I want to mention to you the somewhat unusual, and in some aspects, dramatic character in which the new functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were crystallized; a ministry which, in the first stage, until the establishment of the new institutional machinery, had to take over the specific functions of a government instrument which implements and promotes the foreign policy as defined by the supreme executive. By law, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an institution which is not above but outside all political parties and partisan affiliations. We mean to strictly observe this rule in the spirit and the letter of the law.

The objective of the leadership of this ministry and of my own is, as we have already said to the press, to hand over, to the government elected in the first free elections in Romania, an efficient professional working instrument. In parallel with the specific functions which this ministry has been, is, and will be fulfilling, we have undertaken a radical reorganization of structures and of the functioning of this institution. This action is now

under way and is aims to increase, to the maximum, the professionalism of this institution. [end recording].

[Announcer] Ambassador Mr. Romulus Neagu, the official spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the government on matters of foreign policy, made the following statement:

[Begin Neagu recording] The victory of the revolution has created the preconditions for the beginning of a wide process of democratization of Romanian society, including in the field of legislation regarding the freedom of movement. This creates the necessary bases so that Romania's economic relations with the USA should be based on the full implementation of the most-favored-nation clause in accordance with the treaties concluded by the two sides. Consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is empowered to declare as null the abusive and unilateral declaration of 29th February 1988 in which the old regime renounced the granting of the most-favored-nation clause by the USA. Romania considers that at this moment all conditions are met for the resumption of bilateral exchanges between the two countries with the granting of the most-favored-nation clause, based on the agreement between the two countries concluded in 1975 as well as the commitments stemming from their participation in the general agreement for tariffs and trade, GATT.[end recording]

## More on Celac's Statement to Press

*AU0901184790 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1800 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] We present to you now a statement by Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an institution which is not above but outside any political parties and partisan affiliations. This is a clarification made by Romanian Foreign Minister Sergiu Celac in a first meeting with representatives of the Romanian press.

The speaker said that in the present stage, until a new institutional machinery is established, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken over the specific function of instrument of the government which implements and promotes Romania's foreign policy as defined by the supreme body of state and legislative power, the Council of the NSF. The objective of the leadership of the ministry and his own, stated Mr. Sergiu Celac, is to hand over at the date of election of a new government stemming from the first free elections in Romania an efficient, professional working instrument.

Referring to the process of radical reorganization of the structures and functioning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian minister stated that one of the main tasks consisted in raising to the maximum the professionalism of this institution by promoting within the new Romanian diplomatic service some young people through competition.

The journalists present there were informed that Ambassador Romulus Neagu has been appointed official spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the government regarding matters of foreign policy.

## More on Spokesman Munteanu's News Conference

*AU0901150890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0959 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 9/1/1990—During a press conference held at the press centre at the Intercontinental Hotel in Bucharest the spokesman of the Council of the National Salvation Front [NSF], Aurel Dragos Munteanu, answered questions of Romanian and foreign journalists.

Inter alia he said that a completely destroyed social and administrative framework had been inherited from Ceausescu's dictatorship. Hence the necessity to issue new guidelines, to govern by decrees.

The country is not led by a military government, he said. At present we are at the beginning of a process of restoring the legal framework of society.

Answering a question he said that the NSF was not a political organization, that it had a moral and legal platform which was set forth before the people. The NSF is now the legal representative of the people, an outcome of the revolution.

Referring to the forthcoming elections in Romania Aurel Dragos Munteanu said that although the time was too short they would be called because there was the wish that the government be formed legally, freely chosen by the people. The political parties will have their own candidates, just as their own newspapers and other mass media. The parties will have free and legal access to the national radio and television stations. They will have the right to hold their own election campaign.

In another string of ideas the speaker said that the problem of consumer goods was still serious, but urgent measures were taken and negotiations were held with the common market to import such goods from Western Europe. The situation of fuels is also difficult. Measures have been taken on an internal plane and we hope to improve the situation, he added.

Answering another question Aurel Dragos Munteanu said that CMEA had not operated properly before and was not operating properly at present. This state of affairs must be improved. As a matter of fact this is the mandate with which the prime minister went to Sofia: to seek possibilities of improving CEMA activity. CEMA will have to adjust to the situation created in East Europe. It will have to change to be able to continue its activity.

Referring to the students' meeting held in Bucharest on Sunday, Mr. Munteanu said that it was their right to

freely have their say, even in bigger meetings. They debated questions that concerned them directly.

On the occasion the speaker announced that an Extraordinary Military Court started its activity in Sibiu.

### Mazilu Issues Statement on New Constitution

*AU1001115090 Bucharst ROMPRES in English 0912 GMT 10 Jan 90*

["Statement by Dumitru Mazilu, first vice president of the National Salvation Front's Council"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 10/1/1990—The Romanian revolution helped us outline a new Constitution containing guarantees for the fundamental human rights and liberties, Dumitru Mazilu, first vice-president of the Council of the National Salvation Front, told a ROMPRES news agency editor. Our Constitution, he said, is subordinated to no "ism" whatsoever, socialism or communism, it serves man, his needs, concerns, and problems.

The political, economic and social structures that the new Constitution will promote aim to protect the individual and guarantee those sacred rights that the individual has, from birth to death. The new Constitution will retain those modern structures of the world today that serve this aim and respect the country's democratic traditions. All structures that were at odds with the aims of the protection of the individual were discarded and eliminated.

The Constitution will guarantee a consistently democratic parliamentary system in which decision-making should be free, sincere and respect all opposite points of view.

On the form of government, Mr. Dumitru Mazilu said the Romanian revolution had opted for a parliamentary republic in which a strict delimitation of the relations between various areas is made by virtue of the classical principle of any democratic system of administration—that of the separation of powers in the state. He stressed that the very first programmatic document of the 22 December 1989 revolution advanced the idea of the separation of the legislative power from the executive power and the judicial power. We favour the people's permanent control in its classical democratic forms. All political structures that we form aim to achieve the government's full subordination to popular interest in line with the principle that it is the government that is in the service of the people, not the people in the service of the government. Certainly, the first vice president of the Council of the NSF said, this cannot be achieved overnight, it takes effort to remove bureaucracy and promote the new principles.

On the role of the young generation in Romanian society, he said: I thought and continue to think that in the perspective of history the young generation has an exceptional role to play. I was sure, as early as 1985 when I was given the task by the UN to analyse what the situation of the youth worldwide was, that Romania's young generation will have a tremendous role in future.

The over 34,000 letters that I received from Romanian youths while I drafted my report convinced me that the youth wanted a democratic society. Not only did the youth want change, but it was also prepared to make it, and paid for it with its blood. I am proud of the youth of my country, of which my own son is a part, my son who stood by my side and accepted every sacrifice. I am sure the youth will continue to play an overwhelming role. I will always rise against any attempt to disregard its wishes.

### Geza Domokos Speech at NSF Working Meeting

*AU0501180590 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 2039 GMT 4 Jan 90*

[Speech by Geza Domokos, member of the Council of the National Salvation Front (NSF) and president of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, at a working meeting of the NSF in Bucharest on 4 January—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] On the occasion of this meeting, Geza Domokos read out an appeal by the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania.

[Geza Domokos] The democratization of the country, the establishment of the economy on rational, modern, and efficient bases will be a difficult, contradiction-riddled process, a fact which also became clear in today's meeting. The same as in the case of the rethinking of the new Constitution and the new laws and placing them on new bases, the national relations and the policy regarding minorities is a process which will require a thorough examination, a considerable intellectual effort, mutual trust and esteem, mutual integrity—in short, patriotic and civic sense of responsibility from all those who one way or another participate and play a role in this process.

The policy of national homogenization, of forced assimilation of national minorities, the blatant disregard of the Constitution, the deliberate flaunting of legal and moral rights have caused a dramatic accumulation of pressing issues. To our regret, in some localities we witness obvious tension. Some foolish, downright criminal actions took place in the first days of the revolution. The Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania and all reasonable citizens of Magyar nationality in Romania, who understand the character and prospects of the popular revolution, distance and dissociate themselves from these things and brand all reproachable excesses and actions. At the same time I am asking the Council to take into account the fact that these actions were directed against the representatives of the dictatorship's organs of repression and against those directly involved in the Ceausescu policy of de- nationalization. I must say that I do not exclude the existence of isolated Hungarian

nationalistic manifestations, which I strongly condemn, but this is not a case of anti-Romanian outbursts.

It is necessary that the National Salvation Front [NSF], which from the very start, in its first document, appears as a guarantor of social peace, of freedom, and of the rights of minorities, must continue to be in the forefront of the process I am referring to and must show the same democratic spirit and revolutionary daring in this respect, as it has shown in the other fields of civic life. The Hungarian Democratic Union wishes to contribute to the success of this political measure.

[Announcer] Geza Domokos also presented the NSF statement on the rights of the national minorities in Romania, a document which will be completed and improved further. During the debates of all points on the agenda of the meeting between the NSF members and the presidents of the NSF County Councils, many proposals were put forward and an agreement was reached regarding immediate measures regarding the current and future revolutionary process in our country.

## Domokos News Conference on Minority Issues

*AU0501181190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1605 GMT 5 Jan 90*

["Press Conference"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 5/1/1990—The provisional committee of the Democratic Union of Magyars of Romania held a press conference on Friday, at Intercontinental Hotel where Geza Domokos, member of the Council of the National Salvation Front [NSF], chairman of the Committee, presented the programme of the Union and its major aims to the Romanian and foreign newspapermen. He showed that the new committee would convene a congress of the Magyar population in the near future, that the Democratic Union of the Magyars of Romania was not a political party, but an association of Magyars based on professional, confessional principles, etc.

The main aim of the association is to ensure the individual and collective rights of the national minority seriously violated by the former dictatorship, the creation of bodies and institutions to secure the observance of the rights of this minority. The future parliament will submit a nationalities law to guarantee the representation of Magyars in legal administrative and judicial bodies, instruction in the mother tongue in their own institutions of culture and science, access to press, radio and television, free flow of persons. The Magyar population and the Hungarian Republic, he said, declared and declare that they do not have territorial claims, that self-determination is out of the question as more than 70 percent of Transylvania's population are Romanians. The Romanians and Magyars fought together in this revolution and triumphed against the dictatorship.

Referring to those who had to leave this country, the speaker said that their return would be encouraged and welcomed.

## NSF Minister of Culture Plesu on Priorities

*AU0801215590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1949 GMT 8 Jan 90*

["Andrei Plesu on Priorities of Romanian Culture"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 8/1/1990—What will be the priorities of the Romanian culture in 1990? This is the question posed on Monday by a ROMPRES reporter to Minister of Culture Andrei Plesu. The answer was:

"Three priorities take shape in free Romania's culture, a culture which all of us wish to see free of immobility and petrification, that should really promote value, talent, and originality. With the 1,400 million lei assigned to culture for 1990 (as compared with 600 million last year) we will especially see to the financing of the Commission on Historical Monuments and of the Museum and Collection Department, both of them subordinated to the Ministry of Culture and meant to redeem to their natural rights the values of the national heritage that were ignored and so heavily neglected in the years of the dictatorship. We should rapidly liquidate the self-financing of the artistic establishments, an unprecedented blow dealt at the national culture, in brief we should finance the artistic life in all complexity of its domains. A genuine 'cultural dialogue' will be promoted in the relations with the foreign countries. We must better meditate about the idea of correct reciprocity in the cultural relations with the foreign countries, in which the guiding criterium so far was not the value, but rather a numeric inventory of the cultural-artistic events".

## Minister on Prospects for Chemical Industry

*AU0901103590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0904 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 9/1/1990—According to a statement made by Gheorghe Caranfil, Romanian minister of the Chemical and Petrochemical Industry, of the 1,108 major installations only 327 are operating at capacity, which is the cause behind the acute shortage of products for various branches of the national economy.

Mr. Gheorghe Caranfil referred to the other causes behind that situation: the delay in the commission of installations with a large weight in the ensurance of intermediary products for the chemical and petrochemical sector, the technical and technological level of parts and specific equipment. Our current research capacity and knowledge are not enough to solve existing technological problems in the chemical and petrochemical industry, he said, showing that to overcome difficulties cooperation should develop with specialized companies abroad and imports should be made.

In connection with the priorities in the area, Gheorghe Caranfil said they were the proper operation of existing installations a passage being achieved from the first trimester to the optimization of technologies in chemical plants operating improperly. Furthermore, a halt will be put to all investments that have no possibilities of raw materials supply in the next few years.

In his opinion Romania will soon have a modern, sound chemical industry. Chemistry could once again turn into one of the sectors making a massive contribution to the national wealth formation, to fully meet home requirements and export demands.

### Electric Power Minister on Electricity Supply

*AU0901172290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1501 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["Developments in Electric Power"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 09/1/1990—The power supply to the national economy and the satisfaction of the whole population's requirements are priorities with Romania's new government. From the early days of the revolution, the Council of the National Salvation Front decided upon the cancellation of the absurd regulations imposed by a dictatorship that had condemned the Romanian people to darkness. Relevant in this respect is the fact that over 1987-1989 alone, the population's power consumption was cut by more than 20 per cent.

The "quotas" that had been set, as well as the differentiated tariffs were renounced starting January 1, 1990. Power is supplied continuously, without brakes and at a unique tariff of 0.65 lei per kilowatt.

"At present", the Romanian minister of electric power, Adrian Georgescu, told a ROMPRES editor, "the population is supplied the power they need and consumption early in January is 50 percent larger than a year ago". The new power minister took steps for public lighting, an area where consumption had been drastically reduced by 80 percent over 1972-1989 alone.

### Further on New Higher Education Regulations

*AU0901172090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1501 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["Steps in Support of the Autonomy of Romanian Higher Education—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 9/1/1990—Academic autonomy will be a basic criterion in the organization and operation of higher education in Romania, the Romanian Government shows in a resolution on the freedom of education and its foundation on democratic bases. To this end, in the shortest possible time, the Ministry of Education will work out the draft regulations needed, which will be submitted for public debate.

According to the resolution, an advisory commission, including teaching staff and students representatives of the new management boards which were democratically elected will be created in the relevant ministry and they are to examine all the proposals for the reorganization of and the course of activities in higher education.

The resolution shows: The winter examination session starts on January 26 as an open session, examinations being taken by series of students through the mutual agreement of teaching staff and students; attendance to courses and seminaries is optional, with the exception of laboratory and schoolshop classes, where attendance is compulsory; the examinations are to proceed according to normal criteria of academic exigency; the old system of job-assignment for graduates is no longer valid. The priority criteria in the future will be the graduation average mark and contests; self-administration of student hostels and canteens is put an end to. They will be administered by specialized staff. Student hostels will be managed by a team, which will necessarily include delegates elected by the students; two thirds of the hard currency earned by learning units will go to the respective institutions, while the rest—that is, one third will be deposited into the state budget, in the form of taxes; the applicants who pass higher-education admittance examinations will no longer be drafted before first-year courses, the continuity of the learning process being thus ensured; the future law of education, which will come into force before the start of the admittance examinations for higher schools and higher-learning units this year, will provide for fewer classes for pupils and students, as well as for fewer classes for the teaching staff.

### Priorities of Telecommunications Ministry

*AU0901151390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1242 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["Priorities in Post and Telecommunication"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 0/1/1990—The Ministry of Post and Telecommunications has worked out a new investment programme for 1990 for the implementation of which two billion lei has been allotted, as to the initial 900 million lei.

New telecommunication structures are to be built on the basis of this programme in the regions with a critical situation in this respect. As many as four telephone exchange offices will be commissioned in Bucharest alone and another six districts being connected to the telephone network [sentence as received]. The telecommunication network of the Romanian capital city is to be repaired as it was badly affected by demolitions and the works on the development of river Dimbovita.

Measures have been taken for the fabrication of optical fibres for communications and of numerically controlled information systems.

The experts in this field are drafting the plan for the development of telecommunications over 1991-1995 both in the urban and in the rural area where this activity has been entirely neglected.

### More on NSF Repeals of Former Laws, Decrees

*AU1001115690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0905 GMT 10 Jan 90*

["NSF Council Repeals Laws and Decrees Issued by the Dictator"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 10/1/1990—Under a decree-law of the Council of the NSF [National Salvation Front] signed by its President Ion Iliescu, 20 decrees and other anti-democratic and administrative bureaucratic acts issued by the former dictatorial regime against the interests of the Romanian people were repealed. Among them are those on the calling of the congress and county conferences of the peasantry which were purely formal and demagogic in character and which automatically ratified the decisions made by the dictator and his allies, as well as the decree for the creation of the Hero of the New Agrarian Revolution, a title that was conditional on impossible-to-achieve plant and animal productions, which was the reason why unreal productions were claimed. It is worth noting that, apart from agricultural units chosen by other criteria than their performance, the title was conferred to no other physical person than the dictator himself and his brother-in-law, Vasile Barbulescu.

Until 22 December 1989, the population could not buy bread, wheat or corn flour outside their place of residence or of work; agricultural producers in non-cooperativized areas were forced to join various kinds of associations; animals, particularly young sheep or lambs the property of physical persons or of socialist units could not be slaughtered below a given weight and unless highly centralized norms were observed (for instance lambs could not be slaughtered beyond a number that was fixed from the centre or unless they were at least three months old and weighed at least 15 kg., disregard of any of these provisions was an offence). Compulsory wool quotas were set varying from one to three kg per animal, but whoever owned more than 20 sheep was forced to hand over the whole quantity of wool collected from every animal exceeding that limit; the plant production was estimated in the field before harvest according to centrally preestablished norms that were unrealistic; culture and production plans for all state units and cooperatives as well as for private producers were also made at the centre; ceilings were set to spending on the principal plants and animals and their disregard incurred fines that varied from two up to five thousand lei; production prices were so fixed for plant and animal products that substantially reduced profits and incurred large losses in a number of state units. All such laws and decrees were abrogated.

Other normative acts that were repealed by the council's decree-law concern: the obligation that the money for all exports be collected within 30 days from their delivery from Romania; the ban on production managers and executives to travel abroad to negotiate foreign contracts (the law provided that contracts could be negotiated and signed only by the staff of foreign trade enterprises and the trade managers of producer central departments); the unjustified dissolution of foreign trade companies was slashed and a standard organizational structure was imposed; the rigid organization structure of the Foreign Trade Ministry which does not take into account its tasks and its activities.

### Government Decision on Aid to Victims' Families

*AU0801102590 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1500 GMT 7 Jan 90*

[Text] Today in Bucharest there are about 500 families of victims whose houses and homes have been destroyed. Families in other towns in the country, such as Timisoara, Sibiu, and Brasov, are in the same situation. Urgent measures have been taken to provide dwellings to these families. Likewise, clothes and foodstuffs have been given to them from the aid received from abroad.

In order to assist these victims, the government established that they will be granted assistance in buying furniture and other household goods. In this respect, they will be given CEC [Savings and Deposits Bank] account books with the note: 'for victims.' On the basis of these books, citizens will be able to buy the necessary items from the established stores within the trade network. The amount given will be established as follows:

For one person, 30,000 lei; for families of two to four people, 50,000 lei; for families of more than four people, 10,000 additional lei to each person. The victims who receive this aid are determined by the Council of the National Salvation Front [NSF] of Bucharest Municipality or of the respective county. The proposal is being made by an NSF commission, which establishes the position of the victim. The commission will include an NSF vice president and representatives of the ICAR [expansion unknown] and of the Financial Administration. The funds for this action will be taken from the aid account.

### CTK Interviews Democratic Party Spokesman

*AU0901125390 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 5 Jan 90 p 7*

[CTK report: "Composition of the Executive Committee of the National Salvation Front"]

[Excerpt] Bucharest (CTK correspondent)—[Passage omitted] Support for private initiatives, especially in the sphere of services and consumer goods production, is the aim of the nascent Romanian Democratic Party (RDS). This was declared by Nicolae Costel, press spokesman for the new party, in an interview with CTK correspondent Jan Kokes in Bucharest.

He said that the RDS has its own ideas and plans on what needs to be undertaken in regards to food supplies, in the provision of hotel services, or in the small-scale production of consumer goods. We want the RDS platform to reflect the interests of a great portion of workers, farmers, students, and other social strata.

Regarding politics, we struggle for a democratic, free, and just Romania, so that no one has to flee abroad, so that the country can live without lies and everyone can openly express his view without fear, Costel declared.

The RDS supports the Council of the National Salvation Front and its aims. Adrian Stefanescu is the RDS's provisional chairman. The party wants to take part in the parliamentary elections in April. [passage omitted]

### German Democratic Forum Supports New Leaders

*LD0801180290 Hamburg DPA in German 1638 GMT 8 Jan 90*

[Text] Bonn/Bucharest (DPA)—Romanian Germans, who have established the Democratic Front of Hermannstadt (Sibiu), have expressed their support for the new Romanian leadership. A memorandum from the Forum, published in the Bonn daily DIE WELT (Tuesday edition) [9 January], says that the association agrees with the program of the new Romanian leadership for a comprehensive restructuring of political, economic, and social life.

For the Romanian Germans, the protection of national minorities with constitutional and legal guarantees is necessary to secure their survival as an ethnic minority. The Forum recalls that since 1965 the number of Romanian Germans has fallen from 383,000 to the current 250,000. The Banat Swabians and Siebenbuergen Saxons have for centuries exercised political and cultural rights in Romania that have been built into the respective Constitution. The wave of emigration, unleashed among other things by the policies of the now toppled dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, has greatly restricted the independent lives of the Germans.

It is hoped that the memorandum from the Democratic Forum of Hermannstadt, founded at the end of December—there are similar forums in other towns—will serve as a suggestion for a future common platform for the Romanian Germans.

### Roman Meets USSR's Ryzhkov in Sofia

*AU0901211890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1947 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["Petre Roman Meets With Nikolay Ryzhkov"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Sofia ROMPRES, 9/1/1990—Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman, now in Sofia as head of a delegation to participate in the 45th CEMA session, had an interview with Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

During the meeting, Petre Roman thanked the Soviet Union people on behalf of the Romanian people for the support given from the very first days after the triumph of the popular revolution that led to the removal of the old regime in Romania.

The Soviet Prime Minister N. Ryzhkov expressed the USSR Government's determination to intensify as early as January and further on the deliveries of oil, natural gas and electricity to Romania.

The two heads of government then reviewed the concrete questions of development of the economic relations on multiple planes in the period ahead and in a longer run.

Both sides agreed to expand their economic cooperation first of all by establishing broad and direct cooperative relations between economic units, enterprises [word indistinct].

For that purpose, practical measures were agreed upon to make such relations effective without delay.

Petre Roman and Nikolay Ryzhkov informed each other about the solutions that can be given on a national plane to the principal problems concerning the economic and social development of Romania and the Soviet Union and to ensure domestic economic balance.

The atmosphere of the meeting was one of warm friendship, deep understanding and mutual regard.

### New Romanian Ambassador to USSR Appointed

*AU0901164790 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1600 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Text] By decree of the Council of the National Salvation Front, Mr. Vasile Sandru has been appointed Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Romania to the Soviet Union, replacing Mr. Ion Bucur, who has been recalled.

### Iliescu Addresses Diplomatic Corps

*AU0901212790 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 2020 GMT 9 Jan 90*

[Speech by Ion Iliescu, president of the Council of the National Salvation Front, at a meeting with chiefs of diplomatic missions accredited in Bucharest on 9 January—recorded]

[Text] Mr Dean, Mr Ambassadors and Charges d'Affaires: To begin with, I would like—on behalf of my colleagues in the Council of the National Salvation Front [NSF] and Romania's Government—to thank you for the warm words addressed to Romania's leadership, the Romanian people, and the people's revolution in our country. I thank you for the warm words of appreciation of the Romanian people's heroism and sacrifice in the struggle to overthrow the dictatorship.

Please extend to the political leaderships in your countries and to your governments, public opinion, and

peoples our sentiments of gratitude for the expressions of sympathy and broad international solidarity, at a political, moral, and material level, which are an important source of moral encouragement and support for the Romanian people's efforts to promote the country's renewal.

As you can see, we are now embarking on a difficult, much more difficult and complicated road of building a new structure, the structure of a renewed Romania at the political and economic levels. The whole nation is mobilized to normalize the economic life and base social and political relations in our country on a new and democratic foundation.

Along with all this, in the sphere of Romania's international relations, we want to promote a broad opening toward the whole world, to eliminate everything that has darkened relations with some states, and to remove all obstacles that have hampered a broad development of comprehensive cooperation with all states in the world, primarily with our neighbors, with the European states, and with all countries with which we maintain diplomatic ties. We want to be active in the international political life and in the international bodies and we want to be an active partner in the struggle for disarmament, detente, and broad cooperation in the international life.

We thank you once more and we beg you to convey our wishes for success to your nations and your countries's leaderships in the new year. Have a Happy New Year.

## Foreign Leaders Send Greetings to NSF Leaders

### Sudan Leader Greets Iliescu

*AU0601223990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1923 GMT 6 Jan 90*

["Exchange of Romanian-Sudanese Messages at Top Level"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 06/01/1990—The Council of the National Salvation Front President Ion Iliescu received a message from Lieutenant-General Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir, president of the Council of the National Salvation Revolution Command of Sudan, expressing the Sudanese people's solidarity with and full support for the heroic Romanian people. We harbour the highest respect for the Romanian people's option, for their determination to live in freedom, the telegram shows, highlighting Sudan's wish to cooperate with Romania.

In his telegram Mr. Ion Iliescu fully shares the wish for close cooperation for the further development of the friendly and cooperative ties between the two countries and peoples.

### Tunisian President Greets Iliescu

*AU0701181890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2021 GMT 6 Jan 90*

["Romanian-Tunisian Messages Exchanged at Summit Level"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 6/1/1990—Mr. Ion Iliescu received a telegram from the president of the Republic of Tunisia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, warmly congratulating him on his appointment as president of the Council of the National Salvation Front.

In his message of response, Mr. Ion Iliescu expresses his belief that the fine links between Romania and Tunisia will develop further, in the interest of the two peoples, of democracy and freedom, of international peace and cooperation.

### Prime Ministers Greet Roman

*AU0701183890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1918 GMT 6 Jan 90*

["Exchange of Telegrams"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 6/1/1990—Romania's Prime Minister Petre Roman received congratulatory telegrams from the premier of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Mouloud Hamrouche, and the prime minister of the Republic of Tunisia, Hamed Karoui, on his appointment to that office.

The telegrams of reply to the Romanian prime minister sent to the heads of government of those countries express the belief that through concerted efforts, the fine relations between Romania and those states will develop continuously, for the benefit of our peoples, of the cause of freedom, democracy and cooperation in the world.

## Foreign Minister Celac Receives Ambassadors

*AU0901155890 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2053 GMT 8 Jan 90*

["Calls"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 8/1/1990—Sergiu Celac, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, received on Monday, January 8, in separate interviews, the ambassadors of the Hungarian Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Mongolian People's Republic, the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Belgium and Switzerland.

### Celac Receives More Ambassadors

*AU0901222390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 2024 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["Meetings of the Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 9/1/1990—Mr Sergiu Celac, the Romanian foreign affairs minister, had separate meetings on 9 January with the ambassadors of Canada, the Republic of Hungary, and Sweden, and with the charge d'affaires ad-interim of Malaysia.

### UNESCO Official Brings Message for Iliescu

*AU0901174790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1500 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["Message"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 9/1/1990—Mr Sorin Dumitrescu, UNESCO director-general, arrived in Bucharest with a personal message from UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor for Mr. Ion Iliescu, president of the Council of the National Salvation Front.

Mr. Mayor asked Mr. Sorin Dumitrescu and Mrs. Carin Berg, director of UNESCO European Centre for Higher Education (CEPES) headquartered in Bucharest, to examine together with the Romanian authorities the prospects for a broader cooperation between UNESCO and Romania, to establish modalities through which UNESCO can help the Romanian people at this crucial moment of their history.

### More on the Receipt of Humanitarian Aid

#### Arrival of Aid for People

*AU0701182690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1851 GMT 6 Jan 90*

["Aid for Romania"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 6/1/1990—Aid for the victims of Nicolae Ceausescu's repressive regime continues to arrive in Romania from governments, social-assistance organizations, companies and private persons in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, Finland, Italy, France, the GDR, West Germany, Denmark, England, the USSR, Norway, Turkey, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Poland, Japan, Czechoslovakia, Spain, the USA, Greece, Sweden and other countries.

Twelve tons of food, medicines and clothing for children and adults arrived in Suceava (a town in North-Eastern Romania) from Poland. The aid was collected in an initiative by the "Solidarity" and the "Red Cross" in Rzeszow. Adam Skleowicz, M.D., also requested a list of highly necessary medicines to be sent to health units in Suceava. The clinical hospital in Craiova received various medicines from Bulgaria, as well as foodstuffs for children and medical equipment from France.

The drive to collect goods and medicines for Romania's population continues. In the Burgenland region in Austria as many as 80 tons of foodstuffs and other commodities were collected which will be sent by the regional Red Cross Organization in 4-5 cars to Cluj and Dej. The Turkish people offered emergency humanitarian aid from the early days of the revolution. It consists of 20 tons of medical equipment, medicines and blood, sent by the director for foreign relations of the Turkish Red Crescent Association.

The "Moldova" cultural society in Moscow collected more than 4,000 roubles, which bought medicines, beds and other highly necessary goods to be sent to Bucharest by air. Furthermore, the "Intersputnik" satellite communications organization, headquartered in Moscow, deposited 2,000 roubles in the Romanian bank for foreign trade which are to be transferred to the "Liberty 1989" bank account.

The first aircraft belonging to an "Air Bridge," between the United States and Romania, carrying 40 tons of medicines and medical equipment and flying ten people representing a private aid agency, headed by Burton Lee, President Bush's personal physician, are awaited in Bucharest. So far, private aid agencies in the U.S. offered medical help worth 1.4 million dollars.

The governorate of Piemont, Italy, decided to grant aid worth 350 million Italian liras while Torino will send aid worth 250 million liras.

#### Greece Sends Medical Aid, Food

*AU0701163090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1928 GMT 6 Jan 90*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 06/01/1990—Substantial aid has arrived from Greece at "Gheorghe Marinescu" Hospital of Bucharest medicines, neurosurgical instruments (donated by Sony Athens Headquarters).

Medical materials, foodstuffs for children, blankets, oranges donated by the National Bank of Greece, the Bank of Greece, the Agricultural Bank of Greece, the Hellenic Red Cross Society and the Vamva Firm were sent to hospitals in Iasi, Baia Mare and Bucharest.

#### ROMPRES on More Foreign Aid

*AU0901172590 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1504 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["Shows of Solidarity"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 09/1/1990—Telling proofs of friendship and fraternity with the Romanian people, heavily tried in the years of Ceausescu's dictatorship and especially in the days of the revolution are confirmed by the support granted to Romania by numerous states in Europe and throughout the world. UNDRO representative in Geneva, Sergio Piazzi, informed that 288 trucks with foodstuffs, 231 trucks with clothes, 85 trucks with medicines, and toys, a hospital train with 25 physicians and 50 nurses, two barges with foodstuffs, clothes and medicines have been sent to Romania. Aid worth 25 thousand dollars and medicines and medical equipment worth 250 thousand dollars has been sent from the Unites States.

A large quantity of priority commodities has been loaded on the ship "San Marco" which is to arrive in Romania.

It is the most substantial aid sent to Romania from Western Europe. The ship carries 23 containers and two buses loaded with roughly 300 tonnes of products and 500 tonnes of various commodities. Approximately 20 percent of this load consists of medicines collected by the Red Cross Society, 260 tonnes are clothes and the remainder foodstufss.

Ninety trucks left Holland for Romania on 6 January bringing in 865 tonnes of footstuffs for those who suffered during the revolution.

The common market allotted some 20 million d.m. to assist Romania, and 4,680 tonnes of foodstuffs, medicines and other commodities are to be sent to Romania in the next three months. This aid does not include that granted separately by the EEC member states.

Showing their support to the Romanian people in consolidating their revolution, asserting democracy and freedom, the inhabitants of Nimes (France) sent to Dolj County 40 tonnes of medicines, foodstuffs, as well as equipment for the Craiova radio station which was compelled to cease its activity six years ago.

### Iran Provides Aid

*AU1001115990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0921 GMT 10 Jan 90*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 10/1/1990—The Iranian minister of foreign affairs expressed Iran's sympathy for and solidarity with the revolution process in Romania, showing that the overthrow of Ceausescu's dictatorship opened a new chapter of the cooperative relations between the two countries and peoples.

He denied tendentious rumours according to which Iranian citizens would have taken part in fighting during the popular revolution in Romania as well as the fact that the late dictator would have deposited in Iran money or assets that belonged to the Romanian people.

The Iranian authorities announced that 60 tons of medicines and food were sent to Bucharest.

### Daily Decries 'Excessive' Economic Centralization

*AU0901163490 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 28 Dec 89 p 4*

[Article by Radu Negrea: "The Odious Clique at Variance With the Course of Humanity]

[Text] As of now, we are no longer afraid of anything. With the nation's united uprising, we were able to defeat the most horrendous repressive mechanism ever created. Freed of tyranny, the heroic people are aiming toward other horizons and are determined to overcome all obstacles.

At this crucial time, it is absolutely necessary to speak the truth. We must openly state the whole truth, in order to reveal the extent of the economic disaster caused by the ousted dictatorship [Nicolae Ceausescu]. With the publication of true statistics and uncensored figures, it will become apparent that our national economy was brought to a disastrous stage. The recommendations of the "omniscient leader" created serious problems in all spheres, which deeply disrupted economic activities.

The economic system based on strict and inflexible centralized planning has long since proved unviable and, with a few insignificant exceptions, the socialist countries have abandoned it. Reform has swept the countries bordering on Romania one at a time. Restructuring was implemented and new foundations were laid for economic activities, in order to ensure true development. Even in the most developed countries with a market economy—that is, in countries with an impressive potential, the need was felt of late for greater liberalization, in order to stimulate economic life. Even the poorest, underdeveloped countries have given up borrowed models and other experiments with excessive centralization, in order to invigorate overall activity and strengthen productive structures. However, the Ceausescu dictatorship strongly opposed this renewing world trend. The "omniscient economic expert" decided that this is not the course of history and, at odds with all contemporary thinkers, maintained that the future belongs to close state guidance. Consequently, all levers were applied to ensure an inadmissibly heavy and rigid supercentralized economic system, stifled by guidelines and directives, and totally devoid of initiative. Swamped by decrees, thrown into disarray by ever changing and often contradictory dispositions, and intimidated by the ceaseless "reorganization" process, all that the state apparatus in Romania did was to further burgeon the huge and already rusty mechanism.

He liked to say that, in the end, life and reality will confirm the soundness of ideas and facts. The bankruptcy of the economic system, "one of a kind," forcefully established in Romania is indeed a confirmation of the fact that, instead of the promised prosperity, the Romanian people were given a society in chains.

### ADEVARUL on New Democracy, Pluralism

*AU1001083390 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 29 Dec 89 p 1*

[Paul Dobrescu article: "Truth and Democracy"]

[Text] The revolution has brought democracy to power. It is a very young democracy, but not at all shy. Maybe because it has been desired and expected for so long. It has grown out of the thousands of hearts from where it sprang up, but its development was stifled by dogmatic practices. This is the explanation for the impetuosity with which democracy stepped into the country's political scene and the joy which accompanied it. There are many of those who never tasted the sweet fruit of democratic life. People of 50 or even older, have never had the opportunity to vote freely, to make a real choice, to have a genuine option. Therefore, the new democracy is not a simple event, but is equal with a true political renaissance of each of us and of the country as a whole.

For today's and tomorrow's future, the pluralist democratic structures of government are the major instruments for fulfillment of our new democracy. Through them and through democratic forms, the public life will encounter a new stage and will be penetrated by the new and regenerating currents of differing and even of contradictory opinions. Someone said, to think means to think differently. Truth cannot emerge and certainly cannot survive unless it is constantly submitted for discussion, renewed, enriched, varied, and developed with something that knowledge considers as viable. A different opinion and a different idea is the form under which truth is progressing—this is the fuel without which the genuine democracy withers even if seemingly democratic structures can survive.

The truth has a reduced social value if it is not shared, acknowledged, and implemented by people and social groups. The real democratic discussion is the form through which the truth becomes "ours," it becomes a cause and is converted into a resort and a motivation of the action. Now, from the prospect of time and of the dramatic events that the country has experienced in the past days, we can state that the one party system has been proved to be obsolete, favoring the installation of the odious dictatorship, whose elimination required so many deaths. The great progressive value of the pluralist democracy is the fact that it prevents passivity and enstrangement and turns the activism and participation into fundamental dimensions of the civic spirit.

Political parties with individual platforms are in the processs of being established. Within the next days other political groups will probably also be established, with specific concepts and strategies regarding the progress of the country. Certainly, under the new circumstances, the approached issues will bear the mark of the interests of the respective parties or of the social groups that are included in it. In the opinions or viewpoints expressed on several occasion we can find the basic options of the parties and the fundamental provisions of their political programs. This does not imply that the analysis has to revolve around their individual interests and of the electoral concerns, but requires a constant opening toward the country's general interests for progress. The approach to issues that derive from these interests and the promotion of long term solutions, which at first sight might seem a departure from the party by its own supporters, is the essential way to serve the homeland and its citizens. The big political parties in the political life of our country and of other countries have stood out through their capacity of harmonizing the interests of the party with the immediate and long term interests of the entire national comunity.

In the democratic life of our country a new period is opening up and the threads of parliamentary life, which were interrupted many years ago, are renewed. Therefore, let us step with confidence and hope into the new stage of our homeland's development, with the confidence that the fulfillness of the democratic life depends on each individual, too.

### Brasov Demonstrators of 1987 Return Home

*AU0901175790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1521 GMT 9 Jan 90*

["The Return of the 'Exiles'"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 09/01/1990—Some of the participants in the memorable demonstration staged in Brasov on November 15, 1987, who had been "transferred" to other localities in Romania and dubbed as declasse elements and hooligans for having had the courage to rise against the abuse of power, against starvation and against the lack of civic rights and freedoms at a time when Ceausescu's terror had reached its height, resumed their activity in enterprises in the town wherefrom they had been expelled.

Now they are able to enjoy the freedom the heroic Romanian people won at the cost of heavy sacrifice.

According to news items in the Bucharest press as many as 74 individuals returned to the truck manufacturing enterprise in Brasov.

### ROMANIA LIBERA Editorial Staff Statement

*AU2312160189 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 0931 GMT 23 Dec 89*

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 23/12/1989—The staff of daily ROMANIA LIBERA Have released a declaration which reads:

All of us working with the daily ROMANIA LIBERA tell the whole country that we were forced for a long time to write against our own will, against our own conscience, against our beliefs and professional ethics, against our real feelings for the homeland and for the Romanian people.

Bowing before the Romanian nation, we apologize for the untruths printed and decide to come out as of this issue as "Daily of All Patriotic and Democratic Forces of Romania".

We want to serve henceforth the truth and only the truth, most honestly and in dignity serving our homeland and people.

## Suvar Speaks on Political Pluralism

*AU0901181590 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23-24 Dec 89 p 15*

[Speech by Dr Stipe Suvar, member of the SFRY Presidency, at the session of the Presidium of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Croatia held on 21 December: "National Affiliation Indicated in the Name"]

[Text] I will deal with the Yugoslav political scene and then in this context with the Croatian scene, because matters in Croatia cannot be explained and represented well without bearing in mind the whole of Yugoslavia.

And one more point: I do not find the phrases "alternative organizations" and "the alternative movement" acceptable. If I am not mistaken, the organizations that are appearing in Croatia and have also sought urgent free and secret elections have called themselves the "opposition block." In Slovenia these organizations are called "Demos," which is short for the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia. In other countries, alternative organizations are called social movements, and in fact want to be a negation of the traditional political parties (the ecological movements, the peace movements, feminist movements, and movements which struggle for homosexual equality, and so on). In our country this is mainly a question of the aspiration to set up traditional political parties which as such have the intention of being the opposition to the existing League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance (perhaps some of them will probably enter into coalitions in the future with the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance).

About 30 alliances, communities, associations, parties, and initiative committees have already appeared on the Yugoslav political scene which have demonstrated their intention of being set up as more or less traditional political parties and to enter into a vehement struggle for gaining power in communes, republics, and the federation. Probably about 50 political parties will appear before us in a relatively short period of time, for example in the next few years.

### Symbols in the Name

Most of them will even indicate their national affiliation in their names, and their programs will stress concern for their own nation or nationality, in the case of national minorities. This is because, if Slovene, Croatian, Serbian, and other parties are set up and begin to operate, parties will also appear which will be concerned with the interests and rights of Hungarians or Albanians in Yugoslavia, to mention the two most numerous nationalities. After all, an initiative recently appeared in Vojvodina which is going in the direction of setting up a special organization of Vojvodina Hungarians, albeit within the framework of the Socialist Alliance at the moment.

Out of the 13 alliances, communities, movements, and associations which already operate publicly in Croatia, 7 or 8 of them have the adjective Croatian in the name, which makes it known what their priorities are, even though they have even announced that they are open to people of various national affiliations and that they will support the freedoms and equality of everyone. This is even more prominent in Slovenia. According to some reports, in Serbia this is already a question of the setting up of an organization that will be called nothing other than Serbian people's defense.

It is possible that parties will even appear which will especially fight for the interests and rights of the parts of our peoples which live outside the so-called mother republic. So if, for example, the Croatian League of Communists is not able to confirm itself as the strongest political force on the Croatian scene, it is possible that a particular party will appear which will insist on the interests and rights of Serbs in Croatia.

Therefore, the process has begun and will gather pace in which primarily national political parties and organizations are set up, operate, and take part in political rivalry and mutual conflicts. The great majority of these will not have a chance of appearing even as the smallest factor at the Yugoslav level, but they will nevertheless certainly strive to "conquer" the nation and republic in which they seek their raison d'etre.

The second type of political party which is appearing wants to be transnational and transrepublican but for now these parties do not have any more hopeful prospects of acquiring more of a mass membership and support, and some do not have any hope of surpassing local and nationally enslaved horizons even when they proclaim a nonnational or extranational character.

The third type of political party that is appearing are those parties that the present sociopolitical organizations could be transformed into. In the Socialist Alliance itself, there are obvious aspirations for it to be turned into a political party which would at the least be independent from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Socialist Youth Federation already does not function in practical terms and some of its parts—the youth organizations in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia—still want to formally become political parties within the borders of their own republics. Even in some republican trade union organizations, if I am correct, there are aspirations for them to in fact turn into political parties.

### "Wealth" of Parties

The present Constitution contains provisions on the leading role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and political organization and association within the Socialist Alliance. However, the constitution that will soon be adopted, will not have these provisions. It seems that the prevailing mood in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia itself is inclined toward renouncing the leading role and to multiparty political pluralism. All sociopolitical organizations have so far elected delegates

to the sociopolitical chambers but the general consensus is that new constitutional provisions should abolish these chambers.

Because of everything that is happening in our country, in other socialist countries, and in Europe, we are faced with the actual establishment and political endorsement and constitutional legalization of multiparty political life.

I will not speak on this occasion about the theoretical and historical reasons for and against a multiparty system. After all, I spoke about this in a recent interview for VJESNIK.

However, I will make a few points:

First, new Yugoslavia is now, after a half a century, acquiring a plethora of political parties which old Yugoslavia had; moreover, judging by everything, the new Yugoslavia will have more of a wealth of them. However, this does not in itself mean that our history is regressing half a century and that a half a century of our later history symbolized by revolution and socialism is being destroyed and that everything was futile and unsuccessful; on the contrary, the achievements of our half a century have been great, not to mention magnificent, despite all the present discoveries of "dark spots" and "blank spaces," and even despite the attempts to push Tito out of history as a revolutionary and hero and to brand him as a de facto monarch, satrap, and plotter against all of our peoples. History nevertheless does not repeat itself but goes forward. Social circumstances have changed so much over a half a century that not even the political parties—which are sprouting around us like mushrooms after rain—can restore something that took place a long time ago, has been superseded, and has already been defeated by history. In short it is even impossible to return to the old days of the Balkan inn, where all lamps would be extinguished before a fight.

Second, since the National Liberation Struggle, in which Yugoslavia was created, the Communist Party, that is to say, the League of Communists has been the only leading political party not because it used force to prevent other political parties but because it headed and led the people's masses in the entire country from Triglav to Gevgelija in a united deep social and national revolution and because as early as 1941, and all other political parties liquidated themselves in practical terms and left the social and historic scene.

Their leaderships either escaped abroad or collaborated with the fascist occupiers and domestic fascist and counterrevolutionary forces, and only the left wing of some parties entered the antifascist struggle and the antifascist front, from which today's Socialist Alliance arose. Should the outcome of the revolution be marked by the restoration of these and similar defeatist parties? The League of Communists of Yugoslavia won the absolute support of the great majority of peoples and later confirmed it through Tito's unification of the country on new foundations, the realization of the self-determination of our peoples and the policy of brotherhood and unity, resistance to Stalin, the ideas and practice of socialist self-management, and through its initiatives and role both in world politics against the blocs and for the equality of peoples and countries, and even as the inspirer of a great undertaking in industrialization and urbanization, the development of production forces, and changes in the social structure.

There is no reliable proof that it has lost its social legitimacy and majority support even in this latest post-Tito decade in which we have not succeeded in breaking with the methods of the heroic socialism characteristic of incipient industrialization and in promptly preparing ourselves for the development of production forces which would be linked with world technological achievements and dictated by the criteria of the world market.

The Communists in this country were not a handful of people who usurped power, nor is this a question of the dictatorship of a minority, and the much greater political democratization of society, which we are now embarking on by establishing a multiparty system, is not a result of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia not having wanted and not wanting this democracy but, on the contrary, it is the fruit of its opening the way to this democracy and its voluntary acceptance of it.

### Ambitions for Putting the Communists on Trial

Those who do not understand that we are talking about social and historical circumstances in which the League of Communists of Yugoslavia itself wants to break off with itself as a one-party monolith and that we are not talking about the restoration of old parties and relations which it must accept, show at least that they will play political games which indeed can be costly to us but cannot destroy and change the course of our history.

Why have I said all this? You see, among some of these parties but not all of them, the ambition has been shown to put the Communists on trial for what they have done. This is not a trial in the literal sense. This is even shown by the "touching" banner that was on Republic Square by candlelight during the collection of signatures: "Communists, this is also your homeland!" Who has fought most for this homeland of ours in the last half a century? Were they not Communists? And what do those who say this want? Do they think that they will be able to achieve something on the platform of condemning our later history as virtually criminal and unsuccessful? I have already said that they could give us many problems in the future but they cannot win on the platform of accusations and the restoration of the past.

The other thing is that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia itself wearied of its already outmoded monolithism as its running sore and it must pay the price of the illusion that Communism can be entered into quickly and only in one country and that the mode of production

can only be changed through political desires and measures. And then, what happened to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was that in order to stay in power, some of its parts fell for programs to right the injustices done to the nations in which they operate, which in practical terms disintegrated the League of Communists.

Most of the parties that are appearing are at the moment made up of narrow intellectual elites of mainly former and even current members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia or followers of the prewar parties which have waited several decades for the moment to resurrect their programs, albeit in modern phraseology. Whether they will acquire a wider membership and support at elections will essentially depend on their attitude to two key issues of our, and not only our, entire history; the social and national issue. This depends even more on how the entire front of organized socialist forces, whose ideological leader is still the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, will be redirected and what kind of stand they will take in the present and future conditions toward these two crucial issues—the social and national issues.

This is because all or nearly all of these new incipient parties begin with cries of: We want citizens' freedoms and rights, we want the freedom of political association, we want strict adherence to constitutionality and legality, we want secret and direct elections, we want the pluralism of ownership, we are for the market and integration in Europe, we are demanding that one or other form of repression stops, that one or other thing be changed in the Constitution and the law, that all so-called political prisoners be released, and that there be no more political trials.

However, all this has been advocated by both the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance and all current socialist forces, although not everywhere. That is to say, in some parts of the country, there have been attempts to and the practice of retaining the absolute political monopoly of the League of Communists, or to put it better, the absolute political monopoly of and control by its narrower leadership in relation to the League of Communists itself, all other sociopolitical organizations, assemblies and organs of authority, and economic organizations, however this will fail, and relatively quickly.

In this area, neither an efficient opposition nor an efficient supposed alternative to the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance and other of our organizations—which indeed we assume will remain on the strategic basis of socialism, self-management, and national equality—will be possible, or to be more precise, they soon will not be possible.

**Vulnerable to the National Question**

As far as I have followed the programs of the majority of the new Croatian parties, they are most vulnerable in their attitude to the national question. What is meant by the demand for the unification of Croatia on the entire ethnic and historical area of the Croatian people? A program of Croatian nationalism existed earlier which pleaded for the "optimal" borders: Croatia plus Bosnia-Hercegovina, plus Backa, plus Boka Kotorska, and possibly the Sandzak. That is a greater Croatia. If people in the Croatian Democratic Community are not in favor of this, then let them stop speaking about it. They should be forced out into the open. If they do not support the "liquidation" of Bosnia-Hercegovina then they have to say so. Or, let them not play with their programs and their attempts at making the people go crazy because in opposition to this there is the concept of a greater Serbia, on behalf of which, proposals are now being put forward to set up new provinces throughout Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. This is in fact the program of Stevan Moljevic and Draza Mihailovic, which some people would like to put into practice. According to the earlier programs of nationalist provenance, the borders of greater Serbia proceed from the belief that Serbia is Serbia, Montenegro is a Serbian Sparta, Macedonia is southern Serbia, Vojvodina has proven that it is Serbian, Bosnia-Hercegovina is "traditionally Serbian country" (just as it is "traditionally Croatia" for Croatian nationalists) and in Croatia, the border would go from Virovitica below Zagreb to Karlobag.

The great majority of citizens in this country will not allow people to kill and be killed because of such matters either in the near or distant future.

It seems to me that the most important struggle for national equality is in every commune and every district where people of various nationalities live. This should be talked about for a long time. I wanted to speak in particular about the position of Serbs in Croatia and not only of Serbs in Croatia. We must wipe out Croatian nationalism by attacking the nationalists but on the other hand we must crush the infiltration of Serbian nationalists who would like to make Serbs in Croatia into a strategic reserve for the battle for some kind of greater Serbia or for realizing the slogan of: "Serbs together." People in communes and districts are greatly concerned and we also have worrying divisions in them. We have begun to acquire ethnically pure committees in the League of Communists, both Croatian and Serbian. These are things for which we could pay dearly.

To conclude: In Yugoslavia, the only ones who have a chance are those political parties which will be integrative and contain what is our revolutionary inheritance. If the League of Communists does not make itself capable of having an integrative role, it will disintegrate. However, we will then struggle for a new League of Communists but the Socialist Alliance will in any case remain. As far as I have analyzed the processes within it, the League of Communists could even disintegrate into three new parties: one which would eliminate all the borders in Yugoslavia, proclaim a Yugoslav nation, and restore the title of Communist Party of Yugoslavia, although all this would be a historical anachronism; a second which would want to in fact remain as it is, even though it has already broken up into national monoliths; and a third which would take up the continuity of the

revolution but would also clearly stress the discontinuity of what should not be continued and in this sense adopt a new program, a new statute, new decisions, and so on.

As regards the Socialist Alliance, I think that it is essential to transform it into a political party which would also restore its members. It should then define its relationship with the League of Communists as well as a platform for joint representation in elections and so on. This is all one subject that should be very urgently discussed, particularly in Croatia. In this sense, we must quickly organize ourselves and prepare ourselves along a clear line and in specific action for the forthcoming elections.

We must not be afraid of either 13 or 33 new organizations which have political ambitions in Croatia. Moreover, we can support everything that is positive in their program but also clearly say what we are against. We do not need repression in this respect.

Neither the Croatian nor the Serbian people nor other peoples in this country are desirous of bloodshed and delineation....

[The following passage appears boxed within the body of the item]

**Where Will the Political Struggle Be Conducted**

The political struggle will be conducted on the social scene. We must be aware that in Yugoslav society too—and history has imposed this on us and we cannot do anything about this—the struggle between capital and labor will appear and intensify. Communists, the Socialist Alliance, and the trade unions must line up and know what that means. We must be aware of the fact that citizens in this country will be divided between entrepreneurs and employees. In no single modern society that I know of, do the entrepreneurs make up more than 15 percent of the population while the other 85 percent of the members of society are hired labor in a more or less traditional sense. This also applies to our society. Then a conflict will certainly come onto the scene between management and self-management, including a conflict between the workers class and the technological bureaucratic monopoly which has historically remained in play both in our country and everywhere in the world. You see what is now happening: we have again renamed work organizations enterprises and the same monopoly is even more skillfully and successfully fencing in "its" Basic Organizations of Associated Labor in independent enterprises. Let us then be aware of the possible intensification of the class conflict and class issues. Then, what is particularly worrying is the division into rich and poor. This is also the most important and most sensitive division. No one among us has spoken about this either, except only to ease our consciences. There is also some talk on this in these opposition organizations for heart rending reasons, but even they do not have a serious social program.

Then we come to the national issue. The federation cannot change even in the unitarist sense nor in the sense of the forced expulsion of anyone from Yugoslavia nor in the sense of various new delineations within it, nor of a cancellation of the present republics and provinces and the creation of new ones, nor of an overnight formation of a Yugoslav nation and so on. We probably realize this. In every republic, the battle for national equality is also certainly on the agenda. In Slovenia, 90 percent of the population is Slovene and the other 10 percent is made up of other nationalities, in Croatia, 25 percent of the inhabitants do not call themselves Croats, in Serbia including the provinces of Serbia, 34 percent of the population is not Serbian, in Macedonia, 33 percent are not Macedonians, in Montenegro, 34 percent are not Montenegrins, and in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 42 percent are Muslims, 32 percent Serbs, and 18 percent are Croats. Therefore, the battle for people's national equality both at the level of Yugoslavia and at the level of every republic is important and topical for us. We will come into vehement conflict with the opposition in this respect too. However, the League of Communists must rid itself of enslavement to nationalism, which it has more intensely leant toward, in order to save its power in this time after Tito. Communists must again have a clear position concerning the national issue: to be rooted in one's own nation but also in the struggle for the complete equality of all peoples, regardless of their national affiliation, and of all the peoples in Yugoslavia and to be against the national minorities being heaped together into national reservations that are condemned to disappear.

## Radmilovic Views Concepts of Reform

*AU1001100290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Dec 89 p 2*

[Article by Serbian Executive Council President Stanko Radmilovic: "Four Crucial Questions"]

[Text] We are now going through a comprehensive social crisis. We know that the economic crisis itself is strong, long-lasting, and tough. It is a crisis of the stagflation type. Therefore, an inflation which has already grown into hyperinflation and a stagnation exist at the same time.

I am of the opinion that this latter component, stagnation, should not be neglected. Therefore, I would rather speak about stagnation, not because I want to diminish the problem with inflation—that problem is so big that it cannot be diminished—but because we have to bear it in mind when planning roads and ways to curb inflation.

In the period between October 1988 and October this year, inflation has reached an annual rate of 1,470 percent. Data on stagnation are also grave. Investments have dropped to the half of their 1979 level and personal incomes are even lower than they were in 1979. They are lower even than their 1970 level. Real social product has increased as little as 6 percent in the last 10 years.

The second kind of crisis is political crisis which is by no means less grave than the economic one. It has two components: one is the crisis of the federalist concept, which has increased so much that it has led to the aggravation of interethnic relations in Yugoslavia, and the other is the crisis of the concept of the democratization or pluralization of society. We all know that this is what we want, but there is no agreement on how we are going to achieve it.

As a consequence of the two crises (economic and political), there is also an ideological crisis. One speaks about dilemmas more and more today: What kind of society are we building? What kind of society do we want to build? Is it socialism, and if so, what kind of socialism should that be?

Therefore, there is a general crisis with a rather long genesis. One asks the question: What now? The following false dilemma has often been heard: Should one implement the reform, that is, start solving long-term strategic questions, or start solving the crisis by short-term economic policy measures? The dilemma is false, because the two cannot go without each other.

### Social Property and Self-Management

I would say that there are four open, even conspicuously open questions about the directions of the social reform today.

The first question is what kind of society we want to build, whether it will be socialism, and if so, what kind of socialism it should be. One hears today more and more often that it can be a reformed, reformulated, or de-dogmatized socialism. If this is so, and this is the way it has to be, then the question is also asked what will its characteristics be. Second, what kind of microeconomic system? The laconic answer one hears so often is—the market system. This is true, but it does not tell us much. One has to be told what the subjects of that market economic systems are, or, to be more specific: Can one build an efficient market economic system on the basis of social ownership? Can economic subjects based on social ownership and self-management be market subjects in the proper sense of the word, as well as subjects of an efficient market economic system? If we say that they can, then there is one more question: Will the changes that we have been making with that aim in mind, the changes that should be made, lead to abandoning socialism, even the one that is reformulated, reformed, and de-dogmatized?

Third, what kind of macroeconomic system, that is, what kind of economic functions and economic relations should be established in Yugoslavia? This is the basic question about the concept of the Yugoslav society and Yugoslav community. All other questions have been derived from that one, that is, all disagreements about what society and the concept of Yugoslavia should be like have in fact arisen from the differences about economic questions.

Four, what should be the concept of the democratization or pluralization of society and, within that framework, what should be the position of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] and what the LCY should be like within federal Yugoslavia?

Problems in solving these questions do not lie solely in their being complex, but also in disagreements about them being too great. First, we do not all want the same thing or cannot agree about what we want and, second, we cannot agree about whether that which we want (provided we do agree about that) is feasible and if it is, in what way it is so.

The first and second questions (what kind of socialism and what kind of micro-economic reform?) involve the question of the fate of socialism in our country. The third and fourth questions (what kind of macroeconomic reform, what kind of reform of the political system and pluralization?) involve the question of the fate of Yugoslavia.

In the political sense, socialism must be a democratic society and be so in all aspects of the word. In the economic sense, it is clear today, socialism must be an efficient, highly productive, and rich society. In order for a socialism to really be socialism, it is necessary for overall production relations to contain enough self-managing production relations, and for the overall ownership structure to contain enough social ownership which should maintain its position only through its efficiency, and by no means through false protection, by being favored, etc.

In order to make social property efficient, it is good that we opted for gains and for making gains from property possible, for pluralism of forms of ownership, and for a general social environment in which we would not only separate the party from the state and enterprise, but also manage to make all institutions of the system have an equal attitude toward social enterprises and private enterprises.

Moreover, it is necessary to make enterprises based on social property, as well as those based on mixed property profitable, so that their aim will be to gain the highest possible accumulation, that is, profit. In order to make that possible, I think that one needs the following formula: social property, plus self-management, plus management.

### Federation and Pluralism

What kind of federation and what kind of political pluralism? According to a dogmatic view, pluralism is not necessary. According to the bourgeois-liberalist view, pluralism must inevitably take the form of the multiparty system. According to a third view, political pluralism is necessary, although it is not necessary for it to take the form of a multiparty system—it is possible to build a non-party pluralism. However, this concept is disputed by many people.

We can also speak about three concepts of reform. The first one in fact supports confederation, confederalist relations, and even the establishment of an asymmetric federation. Moreover, the opinion is that political party pluralism is necessary. In this context, it is thought that the LCY should be established on the same principle as the Federation. Since the Federation is in fact established as a confederation, one therefore demands the confederalization of the LCY as well. The LCY Central Committee is based on a parity principle, clearly already an element of federalism, but one nevertheless wants this process to go even further toward abolishing democratic centralism and introducing consensus.

Such a concept of the federation and political party pluralism is untenable because it calls Yugoslavia into question. Republics cannot be sovereign and the federation simply derived, without its own substance, originality, and elective offices. This inevitably leads to the establishment of republican and provincial economies in which the unified market is reduced to a mere united territory, a free territory for buying and selling, while there is no unity of opinion, only consensus.

Such an organization and structure of the community certainly suit the developed regions, however; in the long run, they are completely unacceptable to underdeveloped regions. Such a concept of federation can function only in the times of crisis, and even then, it is uncertain how long it will do so.

With such a principle of federation, one cannot even implement the reform on the microeconomic level, because there is no law-governed state.

In my opinion, if political pluralism takes the form of party pluralism, parties will be formed on a national basis. This is logical, because power in fact rests at the republican level.

Therefore, the struggle for power would be waged within republics. It is clear that there cannot be any Yugoslav parties in such a confederalized country. Some people have gotten carried away with the idea that some all-Yugoslav parties will be formed and that one should not be afraid of that, but that is simply an illusion. This is not a bureaucratic fear of an opposition to the League of Communists, or to one's personal position, but a reality. I think that it is clear to everybody what that would mean for Yugoslavia. There is no example in the world of non-party pluralism, just as there is no example of multiparty pluralism in a confederalist federation, that is, a consensus federation such as the one we have. That mechanism could not function in the SFRY Assembly, for instance, because the Chamber of Republics and Provinces adopts decisions by consensus. In my opinion, this concept is unacceptable and untenable, and, in case it should come to pass, would mean danger to the survival of Yugoslavia.

The second concept has not been explained at great length because its supporters, of whom there are many throughout Yugoslavia, proceed from the assumption that an authentic federation has already been established, as if the concept of a confederate federation, that is, an asymmetric federation, has somehow already been overcome. They are of the opinion that under such conditions it is possible to form political parties, albeit not on a national basis.

According to the third concept one should establish an authentic federation—and only then can a unified market be established—and should opt for building a non-party pluralism at least for the time being. Some people remark that this is unreal and so far an unknown thing. However, if we established an authentic federation, that is, if we carried a reform of the federation, it seems to me that then it would not be so dangerous if non-party pluralism would turn into or in fact take the form of party pluralism.

However, if we turn the order of steps the other way round, and say that the federation cannot be changed and open all doors to political parties, I think that the ensuing situation would mean an essential threat to the survival of the Yugoslav community. Therefore, the right order of moves is as follows: Let us see and try to reach an agreement soberly and reasonably about what kind of federation we want. Because, if we fail to agree about that, everything will be blocked, including reforms.

### Bosnia-Hercegovina LC Secretary Elected

*LD0801210790 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1219 GMT 8 Jan 90*

[Summary] Sarajevo, 8 Jan (TANJUG)—Today's Bosnia-Hercegovina League of Communists Central Committee session elected Dragan Kragulj as secretary of the Bosnia-Hercegovina League of Communists Central Committee presidium. Dragan Kragulj was born in 1949.

### Jantol Elected Zagreb SAWP President

*LD2411142489 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2257 GMT 23 Nov 89*

[Summary] Zagreb, 23 Nov (TANJUG)—Delegates to the Zagreb Socialist Alliance of Working People [SAWP] City Conference today elected Dr Tomislav Jantol as their president.

### Vice Admiral Petar Simic Stresses Unity

*LD0801210390 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Dec 89 p 8*

[Unattributed report on KOMUNIST interview with Vice Admiral Petar Simic, date and place not given: "Army Must Remain Faithful to Constitutionally Established Tasks"]

[Text] "Members of the Army will not abandon the proclaimed principles on which efficient defense rests: unity of the Armed Forces, unity of leadership and

command, unity of the Yugoslav theater of operations, and unity of the armed struggle. The defense of Yugoslavia can survive only on these principles. Abandoning any of these principles would be fatal to this country's defense."

This was stressed in an interview given by Vice Admiral Petar Simic, president of the Presidium of the Committee of the Organization of the League of Communists in the Yugoslav People's Army, for KOMUNIST on the occasion of Army Day on 22 December.

Replying to the question "how would the Army act in the case of more tumultuous events," Vice Admiral Simic said Army members had pointed out several times what kind of role and tasks the Yugoslav People's Army has, which is also defined by the Constitution. "No matter where the danger to Yugoslavia's integrity or the attack on the constitutional order comes from—whether from within or outside—the Army would have to carry out all the orders of the Supreme Command (the SFRY Presidency), as this is the only body authorized to decide on this." Army members advocate that all available, primarily political, means be used so that the worst does not happen and the use of repressive methods is avoided; however, according to Simic, "regardless of what is being done today in some communities to undermine the functions of the federation—among other things in the field of all-peoples defense—the Army must remain faithful to the tasks that are established in the Constitution."

### Those Who Criticize Army Do Not Wish This Country Well

Separatist forces want to organize territorial defense in order to use it according to their own concept. This is the reason for the ever frequent attacks on the concept of all-people's defense as if society is supposedly being militarized through this concept or the process of socializing defense is being hindered. All this is done, Simic pointed out, "for the simple reason that the functions of the republics and their bureaucrats are thereby strengthened."

According to Simic, at a recent conference of the League of Communists in the Yugoslav People's Army, the demand was "somewhat more emphatically" stressed that the Communists in the Army get involved even more intensively in the political life in society, which is imposed by the increasingly obvious negative aspects which have encompassed all social communities. Events in Kosovo, for example, the crime in Paracin, and some other occurrences like the trial of the four men in Ljubljana, give sufficient warning that we must work much more enthusiastically to preserve our freedom.

### Unite Around Program of Reforms

Unfortunately, he noted, the activities of members of the Yugoslav People's Army meet with "different criticism and comments by those forces which do not wish this country well and thereby do not want the Army to be the connective tissue in society and the foundation for the preservation of the unity and equality of all our peoples."

According to Simic, the Army membership is the "best seismograph of nationalist tremors," because the male population of Yugoslavia is gathered together in the Army at a time of life when they react very emotionally, particularly as regards interethnic relations. This is why the curve of the number of nationalist attacks has risen sharply in the last few years, even despite the measures that are being taken in Army collectives.

In Simic's words, Communists in the Army rally around a program of ideopolitical tasks. We primarily stress what we have in common, common achievements, what should be the essence. We endeavor to influence what concerns class and nationality through organized forms. It is easier to achieve this in the Army because it is a highly organized institution. Why can't this be the case in the other parts of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia too? Simic left this question unanswered, but said: "If there were 10 times fewer of us in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia today, it would be important for us to be united because nothing can be achieved through disunity. Therefore, the program of reforms must be embarked upon urgently, this is the program to ensure that we unite on the basis that will represent the interest of the working person."

## Addresses Grmec Rally

*LD0701164590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1340 GMT 7 Jan 90*

[Excerpt] Jasenica, Grmec, 7 Jan (TANJUG)—Certain forces are appearing today both within and outside of the country, which are attempting with all their strength to negate the values achieved by our revolution, to depict everything as a mistake with the aim of turning us back, to restore a bourgeois social system, and to put on trial the leading forces in the National Liberation War and postwar period.

This was stated, among other things, by Vice Admiral Petar Simic, member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] Central Committee Presidium, at a rally in the Grmec mountain village of Jasenica, where Tito reviewed as supreme commander the famous 4th Division on 7 January 1943.

Simic added that the enemy also "uses the events in East European countries to equate us, not even shrinking from linking us, with the infamous behavior of the Stalinist regime." They unite on this platform and, stopping at nothing, unscrupulously promote their campaign against the LCY and socialism, against Yugoslavia as a federation, against brotherhood and unity, and against equality of nations and the nationalities of this country.

No matter how hard they try in this dirty work, they cannot negate historical facts. Hysteria and crazed propaganda may mislead certain strata of our society or a section of the young generation. They are helped in this by the profound social crisis. Working people, however, believe in the foundations realized, in their own abilities, and in the goals we have set for social progress and socialist social relations. They do not support any kind of step backward either into statist centralism or bourgeois parliamentarianism, stressed Admiral Simic.

Simic went on to speak about upcoming major events, the realization of economic reform, reform of the sociopolitical system, the drawing up of a new constitution, the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress, and the process of transformation within the LCY.

In these important undertakings, Simic said, it is essential to reaffirm and critically evaluate certain stages of our development so far and to ensure the continuity of basic values in keeping with our times and the demands of progress. We have painstakingly arrived at certain programs of social reform. We have defined our courses of action; on the basis of some initial results of their realization, we have reasons for optimism. We need to mobilize ourselves politically and to ensure a higher degree of unity on specific programs. I expect that this, among other things, will be a result of the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress. Communists must respond to this in the same way as they excelled in their work, moral and other personal qualities in the war and postwar periods. [passage omitted]

## FEC on Effects of Ljubljana Rally

*AU0801151490 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Dec 89 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Both the Serbs and the Slovenes Are To Blame"]

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 19 Dec—The Slovene organs had legal provisions for their actions regarding the announced meeting by Serbs and Montenegrins in Ljubljana; however, their moves were nevertheless politically inappropriate; the proclamation by the Presidium of the Republican Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People [SAWP] of Serbia directly instigated the mass breach of the most important values of our community and had to be withdrawn. The West reacted to the situation that arose in the country using expressions such as "the beginning of the country's disintegration," "collapse," and "craziness." These are the main assessments presented by the Federal Executive Council [FEC] to the SFRY Assembly today regarding the Serb-Slovene dispute. [passage omitted]

With regard to the call to break off economic links between Serbia and Slovenia, the FEC report says that after the proclamation by the Presidium of the Republican Conference of the SAWP of Serbia, business ties with economic entities in Slovenia began to be broken off, which is at variance with Articles 251, 252, and 255 of the SFRY Constitution and the concept of the new economic system. The trade of goods and services on a unified Yugoslav market can only be restricted by federal law.

As concerns the consequences of this situation, the FEC cites that if the interethnic fighting continues, "pressure from the foreign factor will increase to achieve various aspirations, which even include territorial ones," and it can be justifiably expected that "the activities of internal enemies will intensify in cahoots with emigrants and the foreign factor." It is stated that in the last few days the activities of certain alliances and associations have begun to be radicalized based on narrow national, separatist, and anticommunist concepts. It is realistic to assume that in this situation the Army will be the object of even more vehement challenges and the incipient reforms will not be able to be implemented normally.

### An Impotent Federation

"What is particularly worrying is the fact that on the basis of its present constitutional powers, the federation found it impossible to undertake anything concrete and effective in the situation, whereby the country had been led virtually to the point where arms would be used and the unity of the economic system would be essentially destroyed. In order to eliminate the aforementioned possible negative consequences, it is essential to quickly provide at the least the minimum of prerequisites for the federation to function efficiently as a state." Therefore, the FEC will ensure consistent adherence to Amendment 37 of the SFRY Constitution, which allows federal organs to intervene when their republican colleagues cannot ensure the implementation of federal regulations.

The government ultimately believed that the weakened functions of a unified Yugoslav market is one of the basic factors that influence relations in our federation as well as on the situation that has arisen in relations between Serbia and Slovenia. The serious consequences of such a situation would have been apparent even if this involved any other of our republics, but they are all the more serious when one considers that the share of these two republics of influence on almost all the key socioeconomic trends amounts to around 50 percent. The consequences of this conflict include increased uncertainty among foreign partners regarding investment in our economy because, in the situation that has arisen, the economies of the two republics "have been forced to set up even more comprehensive and irrationally based national economies because the political factor has been imposed." There are also serious dangers for the efficient setting and realization of the federal budget, the financing of the Yugoslav People's Army, the development of the economically underdeveloped republics and Kosovo, the implementation of social programs, the elimination of the causes of inflation, and the settling of new deficits and questionable debts—in a word, the disintegration of relations in the federation is an unbridgeable obstruction in the reform of the political system, constitutional reform, the construction of an

efficient law-governed state, and for the establishment of a democratic system as a whole.

[The following passages appear boxed within the body of the item]

**Concern in the World**

The FEC assesses that the present state of relations between Serbia and Slovenia has primarily caused negative assessments of the internal development of our country by mainly Western countries. They existed even earlier but as the course of reform was affirmed, they were replaced by optimism. "Not at any time in the past has the question of the survival of Yugoslavia, as a sovereign united community and unified entity in interethnic relations, been raised with such seriousness and concern."

East European countries are preoccupied with their own problems, and so they devote less attention to events in Yugoslavia than the West does, but this has nevertheless been enough for concern to be perceived. The latest events have "obviously had a negative effect on the credibility of Yugoslavia." Even in the IMF on the eve of decisive talks with Yugoslavia, great skepticism was expressed as to "what can at all be done with a partner in whose country there are constant, unpredictable, and unreasonable events which represent a serious risk factor," although the IMF mission highly assessed the actions of the FEC a few days ago.

Regarding our neighbors, it has not been noticed that they are trying to use our crisis to satisfy some of their own interests and pretensions. "Apart from Austria and Italy, which increased combat readiness in the Armed Forces stationed near the border, other countries did not react in this way. As regards the announced meeting in Ljubljana, Austria took additional police-security measures on the Yugoslav border. At the same time, Italy and Austria, as well as France, the FRG, and other Western countries have shown a more elastic approach to cooperation with Yugoslavia, seeking a new way of helping stabilization and taking care that their actions do not contribute to the polarization and a further complication of circumstances in our country."

**To Urgently Change the Constitution**

Concluding its report, the FEC says: "Considering that the entire situation in which the country finds itself requires that measures, for which there is at the moment no provision in the SFRY Constitution, be urgently taken, the FEC has decided in line with its constitutionally established responsibility—without undermining the necessity of adopting a new SFRY Constitution, for which the SFRY Presidency will give the initiative—to propose to the SFRY Assembly that the SFRY Constitution be changed as soon as possible."

## Croatian Opposition Supports FEC Program

*LD2312223589 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2115 GMT 22 Dec 89*

[Text] Zagreb, 22 Dec (TANJUG)—The political opposition in Croatia this evening gave its support to the program of measures of the Federal Executive Council [FEC]. It positively assessed the market orientation of the program and the abolition of clearing currency exchange, while the convertibility of the dinar was seen as the most positive move.

Among the criticisms made of Ante Markovic's program, emphasis is placed on the strengthening of centralism and the introduction into the budget of social allocations and exchange rate differences. The danger of placing too much pressure on exchange rate differences and social allocations and thus completely exhausting funds for development was noted.

The political opposition in Croatia advocates a dialogue with the prime minister so that it can also contribute to improvements in the program—not only to its economic part but also to what pertains to the development of democratic relations in society.

The final assessment of the meeting, in which the representatives of six political parties, alliances, and associations took part, was that, if the FEC program is not implemented, we will find ourselves in a chaos of hyperinflation with serious social conflicts.

## Slovenian Committee on FEC Proposals

*LD2812223289 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1343 GMT 28 Dec 89*

[Excerpts] Ljubljana, 28 Dec (TANJUG)—If it accepts the proposal of its constitutional commission, the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia will not agree to the start of the process of changing the SFRY Constitution, as was proposed a few days ago by the Federative Executive Council [FEC]. In the constitutional commission's view, the proposed changes will, if adopted, change the fundamental relations in the federation at the expense of the sovereign rights and authority of the republics.

The proposed changes also mean a significant encroachment on the economic and political sovereignty of the republics, and considerably change the authority of the SFRY Assembly in the direction of centralization and the constitutional position of the FEC. They reduce the role of the SFRY Assembly and strengthen the role of the FEC and the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

The members of the constitutional commission consider that the way in which the changes have been proposed does not allow for a comprehensive democratic evaluation and debate on their substance. Instead of the unacceptable adoption of the whole package, the commission considers it better to discuss and adopt the proposed changes individually. [passage omitted]

At the moment, the constitutional commission thinks acceptable only those proposals which, if adopted, will remove some of the barriers to the processes of reform of the economic and political system already started. The remainder, primarily those on relations in the federation and its areas of authority, should be changed patiently, slowly, and with the agreement of everyone in the country.

So that it is not mistakenly thought that Slovenia is against reform, Miran Potrc, president of the constitutional commission and Slovene assembly, said the constitutional commission has also drawn up a working draft of changes to the SFRY Constitution, which, it is considered, will facilitate reform without radically changing relations in the federation and its authority. These are some 30 amendments which on the whole do not touch the present relations in the federation, but rather the fundamental principles from the introductory part of the Constitution, the provisions on the rights and freedoms of man, the norms of political association, ownership...[punctuation as received]

According to this proposal, the decree on the special position of the League of Communists and Socialist Alliance of Working People will be deleted from the Constitution, while political pluralism, pluralism of forms of ownership and its equality will be affirmed. The right of a nation to self-determination, including the right to secession, will be transferred from the introductory to the normative part of the Constitution.

This proposal also envisages the abolition of the present fund for the underdeveloped and its replacement with more flexible and economically more rational forms of encouraging the more rapid development of the underdeveloped. In addition, adjustment to the procedure for the introduction of a state of emergency in Yugoslavia or its parts, is proposed, and the greatest powers ("of intervention) in these circumstances are envisaged for the SFRY Assembly.

Both texts, the FEC proposal and the draft of the constitutional commission, will be discussed further at the forthcoming session of the Slovene Assembly, probably in the first half of January.

## TU Official Gives FEC Measures 3 Months

*LD2912141789 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 29 Dec 89*

[Text] The first 3 months of next year are the most important for the implementation of the federal government's economic measures. If there are some specific results during that period, the measures will have full support of the Trade Unions and the majority of the workers' class. This was what Andjelko Vasic, president of the Yugoslav Trade Unions, said in reply to the appeal issued by Ante Markovic, president of the Federal Executive Council, to the effect that the workers class should refrain from striking during the next 6 months.

If the government's measures yield no visible effects, no appeal, then whoever issues it can obligate the Trade Unions and workers, Andjelko Vasic pointed out.

## Serbian Council Approves FEC Proposals

*LD0501153190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Jan 89*

[Text] The Federal Executive Council proposal to amend the SFRY Constitution should essentially be supported because the reasons for such a step are justified, the Serbian Executive Council believes. At the same time, the Council noted today that the proposed solutions go some way only toward certain partial requirements, that some proposals are not consistent either with each other or with existing provisions of the SFRY Constitution, which are not to be changed.

## Serbians Back FEC Constitutional Changes

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[Excerpt] Belgrade, 5 Jan (TANJUG)—At today's session, the Commission for Constitutional Issues of the Serbian Assembly proposed to the Serbian Assembly to give its approval in principle for the Federal Executive Council [FEC] proposal to proceed with the changes to the Yugoslav Constitution. These changes, as assessed, must not influence a regular course of preparations and adoption of a new federal constitution in the sense of slowing them down or postponing them.

For the first time in our constitutional practice, the introductory speaker, Slobodan Vucetic, stressed that two different initiatives for constitutional changes are under way. The bearer of one initiative is the SFRY Presidency, which is preparing a proposal for the adoption of a new Constitution, and the FEC, which established the proposal that partial changes to the Constitution should be embarked on. This reveals the untenability of further changing the SFRY Constitution through amendments and the urgent need to adopt a new Constitution.

Talking about the FEC proposal, Vucetic stressed that the proposed solutions are inconsistent, that is, that they are not completely harmonized with a series of constitutional regulations which would not be changed. Some solutions are unclear and even completely unacceptable from the point of view of the fundamental constitutional and legal principles. On the other hand, changes regarding the sphere of economic system are in accordance with reform and above all market orientations. Furthermore, the proposal to abolish the upper limit on land which can be owned by individual farmers is acceptable, Vucetic stressed. However, retaining consensus as the decisionmaking procedure for systemic economic laws would significantly hinder the achievement of the set objectives of the reform. Therefore, more efficient solutions should be reached in the phase of developing draft amendments.

The solution to empower the FEC to determine measures for implementation of the established development and economic policy merits a special critical judgment.

If that was accepted, the SFRY Assembly would be deprived of its basic rights in this area, because it would be competent just for legal activity. Thereby, republics and provinces would be deprived of their participation in the creation and adoption of the measures of development and economic policy in this area.

Regarding financing of the federation, the orientation that the federation has its own sufficient sources of income is acceptable, but the proposal that turnover tax is the only source for securing these funds when other taxes are available is unacceptable. [passage omitted: Several participants in the ensuing discussion voiced their pro and con views about the FEC proposals]